Copy 9

50th Anniversary Year

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

SURPLUS DUPLICATE
NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE LIBRARY
MAR 21 1972
Periodicals Section

APRIL

1972

VOL. 50 NO. 3 $2.50 A COPY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

APRIL 1972

Reflections on Our National Purpose . . *Kingman Brewster, Jr.* 399
Germany's "Westpolitik" . . . . . *Willy Brandt* 416
Volunteer Armed Forces and Military Purpose
Morris Janowitz 427
China and Taiwan: The Economic Issues . *Robert W. Barnett* 444
The Essential Domino: American Politics and Vietnam
Leslie H. Gelb 459
Whose Century? . . . . . *Thomas L. Hughes* 476
Beyond SALT One . . . . . *Herbert Scoville, Jr.* 488
Nuclear Balance in Europe . . . . . *Walter F. Hahn* 501
Big Business and "Dependencia": A Latin American View
Osvaldo Sunkel 517
The Space Program and the National Interest
Robert Jastrow and Homer E. Newell 532
The Sovietization of Mongolia . . . . . *Henry S. Bradsher* 545

RECONSIDERATIONS

Genoa Revisited: Russia and Coexistence
Evgeny Chossudovsky 554
Recent Books on International Relations . . . . . *John G. Stoessinger* 578
Source Material . . . . . *Donald Wasson* 594

HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG
Editor
JAMES CHACE
Managing Editor

Editorial Advisory Board

JAMES H. BILLINGTON
ALFRED M. GRUENTHER
CARL KAYSEN
GEORGE F. KENNAN
HENRY A. KISSINGER
WILLIAM L. LANGER
JOHN J. McCLOY
ISIDOR I. RABI

Published quarterly by Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Editorial and Business Offices, 58 East 68 Street, New York, N.Y. 10021. All mail, including correspondence about subscriptions, should be sent to this address. Cable address, Foraffairs, New York. Subscriptions, $10.00 a year, post free to any address. The Editors will consider manuscripts submitted, but assume no responsibility regarding them. Reprints of articles are available for purchase. Printed at 10 McGovern Avenue, Lancaster, Pennsylvania.

Vol. 50, No. 3.

Copyright 1972, Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Printed in the U.S.A.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

KINGMAN BREWSTER, JR., President of Yale University; Professor of Law, Harvard University, 1953–61; co-author of "Law of International Transactions and Relations" and author of other works * * * *WILLY BRANDT,* Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany; Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister, 1966–69; Governing Mayor of West Berlin, 1957–66; author of "A Peace Policy for Europe" and other works * * * *MORRIS JANOWITZ,* Chairman, Department of Sociology, The University of Chicago; Fellow, Center for Advanced Study of the Behavioral Sciences, 1958–59; author of "Political Conflict: Essays in Political Sociology," "The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait" and other works * * * *ROBERT W. BARNETT,* Director of the Washington Center of The Asia Society; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, 1963–70; author of "Economic Shanghai: Hostage to Politics" * * * *LESLIE H. GELB,* Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution; formerly Director and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning and Arms Control, and Director of the Pentagon Papers project * * * *THOMAS L. HUGHES,* President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; formerly Deputy Chief of Mission, American Embassy, London; Deputy Director and Director, Intelligence and Research, State Department, 1961–69 * * * *HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.*, formerly Deputy Director for Research, Central Intelligence Agency; Assistant Director for Science and Technology, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; author of "Missile Madness" and "Toward a Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement" * * * *WALTER F. HAHN,* senior member of the research staff of the Institute for Defense Analyses; co-editor of "American Strategy for the Nuclear Age" * * * *OSVALDO SUNKEL,* Professor of Economic Development and Senior Research Fellow of the Institute of International Studies at the University of Chile and Professor at the Catholic University; author of "Integración política y económica" and other works * * * *ROBERT JASTROW,* Director of the Institute for Space Studies, an office of NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center; Adjunct Professor of Geophysics and Chairman of the Graduate Program in Space Physics at Columbia University; author of "Red Giants and White Dwarfs: The Evolution of Stars, Planets and Life" and other works * * * *HOMER E. NEWELL,* Associate Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; Associate Administrator for Space Science and Applications, 1963–67; author of "Express to the Stars" and other works * * * *HENRY S. BRADSHER,* Hong Kong correspondent of *The Evening Star,* Washington, D.C.; Bureau Chief for the Associated Press, Moscow, 1964–68, and New Delhi, 1962–64 * * * *EVGENY CHOSSUDOVSKY,* a Soviet citizen and senior U.N. official; Secretary of UNCTAD's Trade and Development Board; formerly Special Assistant to Professor Gunnar Myrdal, first Executive Secretary of the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe.

The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.* The Editors.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 50 APRIL 1972 No. 3

REFLECTIONS ON OUR NATIONAL PURPOSE

By Kingman Brewster, Jr.

IN his last book, published shortly after his death, Maurice Bowra wrote that "by making the Athenians believe in their city, Pericles made them believe in themselves." Americans today, in spite of their accomplishments and privileges, might envy the Athenians' national and personal self-confidence. It would be wrong to say that Americans do not believe in their country. Fundamentally they do. But for the very reasons that their expectations are so high, their distress is very deep. They want terribly to believe in the rightness of America. Yet, even those who are not overcome with a sense of wrongness yearn for the energetic, optimistic self-confidence which made all things seem possible until a few years ago.

It is not only that many goals seem hard to attain. Conventional goals themselves seem inadequate. "Peace and Prosperity" are the traditional words of political promise. But competitive material advantage, and even physical survival, are not by themselves enough to lift the national spirit. A nation, like a person, needs to believe that it has a mission larger than itself. Sometimes we do not seem to have that any more.

At home there is a widespread uneasy feeling that the "open society" is closing. In our relations with other nations and peoples we suffer a national trauma as we reluctantly admit that we can neither escape from, nor control, the rest of the world. We will not regain our self-confident spirit until we believe once more that we do have something special to contribute to the prospect of humanity generally, both because of what we are as a society and because of what we might mean to the hopes of all peoples.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

I am optimistic. I think we can put an end to our dither. I am particularly encouraged by the cast of mind of many of the most talented younger Americans. This piece, then, is admittedly an exhortation as well as an analysis.

II

At the outset we must rid ourselves both of the tar and feathers of the scapegoat hunter and the whitewash of the image-maker.

Serene, sustaining purpose requires a maturity which can acknowledge that our problems are not to be explained primarily in terms of personal fault or blame. Yet the witch hunt is on. The Left wants to hang "war criminals." The Right wants to pillory "radic-libs." When the abandonment of Vietnam is finally accepted as defeat, there is bound to be crimination and recrimination of those who willed the ends but would not will the means. Those who committed us, as well as those who would not see it through, will be caught in the scapegoat trap.

It is easy to castigate the headstrong, the wishful, the stubborn chauvinist and equally easy to upbraid the soft-headed, the wishful, the peace-at-any-price abdicator. While there is no presumption of wisdom, however, there should be a presumption of innocence in history as well as in law. In addition to simple fairness, it is important not to use blame as an excuse to avoid the tough problems, the roots of which lie deeper than personalities and individual motivations.

While approval and disapproval of people and judgments and styles have their place in political preference, such biases should not blind us to the issues and dilemmas which inhere in the world's present circumstance. Our fundamental problems will not vanish with any single change in government. Revival of national purpose is influenced by and does depend upon national leadership. However, that will take more than the normal alternating current of partisan politics; it will require a view of American purpose which sees beyond the next stop on the quadrennial political timetable.

Just as the scapegoat-trapper distracts us from effective attack on the real problems facing the country, so too the image-maker who whitewashes all the serious cracks in our façade can only serve to postpone their repair.

It is always tempting for a person or a nation to pretend that a problem which seems insoluble does not exist. "Stop poor-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mouthin' America." "Talk about what is *right* with America." The more truly unavoidable a problem is, however, the more important it is to acknowledge it. Frank exposure, comment and public discussion are more reassuring than the pretense of false gladness which in facts saps credibility. The denial, the cover-up, the evasive answer, the callous brush-off in the name of "realism" are far worse than the admission of difficulty, of fallibility, of error or even of past wrongdoing.

Broad scope for the Naders, Proxmires, Kerrys is a source of national strength. Without them there would be no limit to the suspicion which attaches to the self-serving capacity of entrenched authority. It is not that would-be Davids are always in the right; but their ability to slay Goliath from time to time does give some confidence that the established powers are not immune from exposure or assault.

One fervently wishes that the Kent and Jackson State killings had not happened; but the fact and the quality of the Scranton inquiry were reassuring to those who wondered if the society had gone mad. My Lai was a sickening disgrace, but the Calley jury's refusal to be swayed by professional, political or public pressure helped to vindicate the larger procedural integrity which was so scarred by both the public and the presidential reaction. The ability of a Connecticut judge to dismiss a murder complaint because he doubted whether a new trial could be fair encouraged many in their belief that law could still serve justice as well as order. Attica will never be excused, but in the eyes of our more sympathetic foreign critics the stain could be somewhat bleached if there were a credible postmortem investigation.

"It may be true, but you shouldn't say it" is not acceptable counsel. Exposure, questioning, reappraisal are often painful, even agonizing; their price is nothing, however, compared to the resentment aroused by a feeling of manipulated ignorance. Other peoples, especially those whose press is more inhibited than ours, give us credit for our openness, even if it often does call attention to the unsavory.

III

No selling job can conceal the growing doubts about the reality of the openness of the open society in the United States today. The pretensions of the American promise have always been ahead of performance. The trouble now, though, is that too many

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Americans doubt whether the ideals of social equality, economic opportunity and official accountability are really the commanding objectives of those who have the greatest responsibility for our national life. Unless we are once again satisfied on this score, self-doubt will stultify our own self-confidence as well as the hopes of those who might want to be our followers.

It would be a mistake to exaggerate American self-doubt. In material terms we are the envy of the world's majority and we know it. Also, with the exception of the inherited poor and the segregated minorities, there is probably more freedom of choice and individual opportunity in the United States than there is in most other countries.

However, there is a feeling at home and abroad that somehow the American system has become a great self-perpetuating machine with an inexorable momentum of its own. The "System" often seems more attuned to its own logic and inner drive than it is to the needs of human beings. It no longer seems sufficiently responsive or accountable. It is not all bad. A lot of it is very good. But for the black and the poor it is no good, and for them it is both hard to escape and hard to do anything about.

Put in phrases which Salvador de Madariaga used more than 30 years ago, the danger is that while the Citizen is still supposed to be for the State, the State is no longer for Man. Put politically, the concentration and interlocking interests of both public and private power seem to defy accountability to the people they affect. Increasingly, position and status rather than choice and contract seem to be the deciding factors in human relationships. Unlike the America which Margaret Mead described during World War II, success is no longer widely thought to be related primarily to effort. It seems more dependent upon public favor or private inheritance. This is not so startling to many societies, but it is to Americans. It also tarnishes the classic vision that "America is Promises," eloquently portrayed by Archibald MacLeish four decades ago.

In political matters this closing of the open society is most crudely evidenced by the enormous amounts of money it now takes to communicate effectively with masses of voters. The high cost of politics, the amounts of money which have to be put at risk in a campaign, naturally favor the known against the unknown, the conventional in comparison to the new. Outside of political contests, the marketplace for the competition of ideas

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on television depends for the most part on the three major networks and the advertisers for whose accounts they compete. The effective national opinion forum is scarcely wide open to either the politics of elective office or the politics of ideas. The voices of change are easily drowned out. If the openness of American politics is to be restored, indeed if the promise of the Bill of Rights itself is to remain credible, something must be done to achieve easier and cheaper access to network broadcasting; not just by limiting what a candidate may spend but by drastically curtailing what a network may charge him.

In addition to inviting a greater variety of voices, ideas and interests onto the television screen, there is of course a much longer agenda for an open politics. Most obviously it involves party reform and congressional reform and elective reform. Unless this political agenda is addressed boldly and imaginatively, skepticism about the American political process will soon be pushed into cynicism both at home and abroad.

The highly concentrated American economic system is doubly vulnerable. It is under attack even within its own assumptions. Its assumptions too are being questioned. Even if the material interest of the consumer were all that mattered, more voices are asking whether the present high concentration of finance, management and labor organization can be expected to be sufficiently responsive to the people's interest in obtaining highest quality at lowest cost. Further, even if the discipline of price competition could be restored (or simulated by government regulation), how can the ethic of maximum profitability ever take adequate account of human and social and environmental needs which do not show up on the cash register? Even if we supplement the private sector, how do we get the world's "unprofitable" work done without so overpaying for it that the benefits are vitiated by inflation? How do we so organize ourselves that the "right" to a minimum income and the "right" to pursue nonmaterial goals are somehow earned by sufficient service and contribution to the society?

The replies to these questions can never be good for all time. The important thing for our national self-confidence, however, and for the confidence of others in us, is to admit the agenda and to approach it with candor and energy. If we can once reawaken a restless insistence that both American politics and American economic opportunity be genuinely open, and that openness and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a feeling of individual choice are much more important than material efficiency, we will once again take deserved pride in our historic national ideals.

IV

In addition to a renewal of a belief in what we are and might be for ourselves as a society, we—like the Athenians—also badly need to feel that we have a role in the world which is not just meanly self-serving. We yearn for some belief that our nation has a significance for mankind generally which can be measured by some scale larger than our own survival and well-being.

It is not easy for Americans to adjust to their new position in the world. At the same time it is not easy for other peoples and nations to appreciate how new and strange we find our current plight. The essence of our new realization is that the United States now depends upon a world to which it cannot dictate, yet from which it cannot withdraw. To Americans this is a quite novel and thoroughly unwelcome reality. Everybody else in the world, on the other hand, has long accepted this situation as the normal circumstance of nations.

Americans are unique among modern peoples in that their national experience until very recently has been one of either confident aloofness or confident supremacy. While it can be argued that both extremes were somewhat overdone, they were, in their time, quite plausible. It was not unrealistic for George Washington to feel that "If we remain one people, under an efficient government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyance. . . ." This state of mind lingered well beyond the strategic reality, as any pre-Pearl Harbor politician will recall.

So too, it was not unrealistic for the late Henry Luce to proclaim the dawn of an "American Century" at the time of the passage of the Lend-Lease Act, long before the atomic bomb, the Marshall Plan and the electronic age made it real. This state of mind, too, outlasted the facts and sustained the brash and wishful confidence of the Kennedy-Johnson years.

A hundred and fifty years of plausible isolation, followed by 25 years of plausible world dominance, do not prepare a people for the realities of dependence upon a world which cannot be unilaterally controlled.

Whatever the discontinuities with the past, in fact or in state

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of mind, certain realities of the politics of power and certain elements of national self-interest persist. The United States does occupy a position of indispensability to the security and economy of the rest of the world. If we abuse it, the world suffers. If we were to abdicate it, the world would suffer the abuse of others. So would we.

Willful weakness is not compatible with American responsibility. We may have to accept nuclear pluralism with the advent of Chinese nuclear capacity and eventually that of an independent Europe. We might even welcome this as inherently more stable than bilateral monopoly. Nuclear stability and our ability to upset any nation's immunity from retaliation, however, require the continuation of very expensive American military strength, and the economic capacity to support it.

There is another truism which should not be denied in a mood of backlash from Vietnam. Any potential aggressor should be kept on notice of what might be called our "exasperation points." Self-defense, defense of the Hemisphere and defense of countries which share our origins, traditions, common law and constitutional values seem to me to be likely to evoke our automatic, unilateral response in the event of overt attack. I also believe that we would honor commitments if called upon to do so by the clearly legitimate government of any people to whom we are bound by a treaty of mutual defense. There could be no more dangerous invitation to aggressive miscalculation than to suggest that because of the Vietnam experience the American electorate has lost its ability to react. It would react explosively to the outrage of unambiguous aggression in areas where we feel visceral commitment by affinity, a territorial commitment by proximity or a moral commitment by promise.

In the international economic areas, too, there is no reason to believe that we are any less determined in our self-interest than other nations are, despite the conspicuously wasteful standard of consumption in many sectors and levels of American life. Indeed, it was one of the marks of maturity in the origin and administration of the Marshall Plan and subsequent foreign aid programs that they were not undertaken on a "charity-basket" basis. Those who now talk of America's postwar "generosity" do a disservice to both the Americans and the recipients. If we deserve credit, it is for wise, foresighted self-interest, not for generosity. By the same token it would be folly to suppose that anything other than

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

national self-interest should govern our economic policies now. The only question is how farsighted the vision of that self-interest is, and how wisely we serve it in our relationship with others. The issue is not whether we prefer meekness to strength or piety to selfishness. It is how best to serve our own interest in a world on which we are dependent but in which we do enjoy, for the moment, what might be called a "balance of indispensability," for we do make more difference to the strategy and the economy of any other single nation than any other single nation does to ours.

How should we use that advantageous, but no longer dominating, position? The temptation, of course, is to use it in order to squeeze out every short-run advantage before our bargaining power erodes as others grow and strengthen.

The trauma of discovering that we cannot have our own way—either in isolation or in hegemony—leads many to resort to strutting and chest-beating in order to impress others and reassure themselves. Petulance, which blames all one's problems on the machinations of others, or bluffing, which double-dares the rest of the world, does not describe a very constructive, let alone serene, posture for the United States. They also tend to bring out the worst in others. One of President Johnson's wisest acts of forbearance was not to overreact to General de Gaulle's provocations. The same may be said of the ostensible patience of our European and Oriental friends with Secretary Connally. American Gaullism, however, could become infinitely more destructive than French Gaullism, precisely because we do have a balance of indispensability to the economic and strategic survival of others.

The danger is only superficially one of style. The substance of chauvinism is more serious. Once adversary self-interest replaces mutual self-interest as the rationale of a relationship, advocacy replaces compromise. Every negotiation then has to have a winner and a loser. Inevitably, candor ceases to be trusted, even honesty ceases to be expected. Worst of all, understandings become falsified and agreements become breakable. Rivalry, not coöperation, becomes the only reliable calculation.

Such a deterioration is in prospect if America does not achieve a maturity which enables her to endure with some grace and serenity the fact that she can neither escape nor control the rest of the world.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

V

Just as reality has shattered the dreams of both isolation and hegemony, it has also presented the nation with an oncoming generation whose experience and resulting outlook are wholly without precedent. For the first time in our history a very substantial number of the future leaders of the country are disenchanted with the inherited role of the United States in the world. They badly need a vision of their own about what that role might be.

The anguish and rancor provoked by the Vietnam experience overwhelm everything else at the moment for those who reached the age of military service during the last ten years. Every parent of a boy in this age group knows the impact of this experience.

Being asked to risk one's own life and to kill others in a war which has never engaged official or popular enthusiasm is hard to accept. When to that is added a rising crescendo of popular opposition and an ever-widening concern about the constitutionality of the war, the candor of its spokesmen and the morality of its conduct, the anguish is sharpened. When this had to be faced in the context of a Selective Service law visibly inequitable in its inconsistent and occasionally abusive administration, it became a prescription for torment and resentment. Because of the student deferment, the campus became a purgatorial sanctuary for four years of intense argument in which the cynical evader sparred with the conscientious objector and the dutiful draftee. This experience was bound to make a deep and permanent imprint on the outlook of a whole generation.

Agony makes voices shrill. It is hard to tell which is the true signal and which the false. It is like trying to pick out the sound of a bell buoy in a crowded fogbound channel. The danger is that you may hear what you want to hear on the one hand, or what you most fear on the other. Even a decade of almost continuous conversations with students under circumstances of mutual tension does not leave me with an unambiguous impression. However, I think there are some clear signals.

First, the oncoming generation does not believe it is either possible or desirable for America to try to keep the peace everywhere in the world, let alone try to impose its own political and economic system on others. This is not just because of limits on our resources. More fundamentally it is a rejection of the pre-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tentiousness of a "Manifest Destiny" to bring the "American Way of Life" to the rest of the world. Quite apart from concern about our own troubles, this generation would very much doubt whether our values as well as our institutions would make sense for most other peoples in contrasting cultures and vastly different states of political maturity and economic development.

Second, the younger generation is not anywhere near as fearful as their parents were of the prospect of communist world revolution. Dictatorship in proletarian trappings does not seem to them vastly more distasteful than dictatorship in what seems to them feudal form. Their experience—all post-Stalin, it must be remembered—is one of a falling-out among communists. The so-called Red threat has lost its global awesomeness. At the same time they have no illusions about the ruthlessness of the response whenever and wherever dictatorial or imperial régimes are threatened.

Third, they do worry about the leverage exercised by the military and their industrial suppliers. This I do not think is primarily rooted in Marxism, although some of the old jargon is used occasionally. Their deepest concern is that the power of life and death can be influenced and exercised by private interests and public authorities which are not in fact accountable to those affected.

Fourth, even if all such interests and pressures were benign and public spirited, the weapons of frightfulness make the stakes so enormous that the young have a desperate desire for some way by which individual men—particularly the President of the United States and his advisors—can be held in check, lest their fallibility or stubbornness or misguided aim should lead them to trip the trigger of nuclear destruction. A generation whose hero-President launched the Bay of Pigs fiasco, and whose mature experience has been dominated by Vietnam misjudgments and by surreptitious wars in Laos and Cambodia, cannot be expected to feel comfortable when the head of the world's strongest power seems to be free to "go it alone." President Nixon's insensitivity to this concern led to his terrible misjudgment of what the campus response would be to the style—even more than to the substance—of the Cambodian invasion.

To many this recital of symptoms of malaise brought on by an excessive dose of world responsibility may recall the epidemic of American isolationism of an earlier day, almost 30 years ago.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

While I can see some parallels, I find the contrasts more striking.

The current student generation's misgivings about the universal wisdom and virtue of the American experiment clashes sharply with the self-righteous scorn for the vicissitudes of the foreigner which has always been such a large part of the isolationist tradition. Also, they are more genuinely imbued with an interest in and enthusiasm about peoples, nations, cultures other than their own than any preceding generation of Americans ever has been. In part because their skepticism has cast them loose from inherited credos—religious, national, social—they tend to put a higher value on human beings as such, with less prejudgment on the basis of familiarity, traditional relationships, common language, appearance or behavior. All of this is fostered by the fantastic ease with which they wander. To many of them nothing is strange.

They are vividly aware that the shadow of nuclear destruction and the spreading decay of the environment extend around the whole world, and cannot be escaped by distance or speed or height or depth, or any living creature. The isolationism of smug, disdainful, secure, aloof Americanism is not likely to be their lot; nor is it their style.

The experience of many younger Americans and the cast of mind which it has left can be either enormously destructive or, I believe, enormously constructive. The destructive potential is everywhere apparent. There is a real risk that too many of them will abdicate their talents and slide into a disdainful, secure, aloof anti-American "privatism." Far more haunting to me than any echoes of classical isolationism is the possible rejection of all aspiration. This would not be any proud, defiant retreat to the water's edge, or old-fashioned imperial "hemisphere isolationism." It would be, rather, a kind of sentimental hedonism which supposes that passivity will be rewarded by some international version of "Consciousness III" in a dreamy world of "powerless politics."

On the other hand, their deepest concern is that the powers created by modern technology and economics might not be harnessed any longer for the benefit of those subject to them. This, as I have suggested, is a large part of the domestic malaise. I rather think that it may be the common denominator of student qualms throughout the world. The international dimension of this concern may possibly make the oncoming generation in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

United States and in other developed countries not only willing but eager to see the creation of authorities superior to national governments. Those who are in college today, after all, do expect to be at the peak of their careers when the new century opens. Their children in turn will live most of their lives in the twenty-first century. They are not likely to be satisfied with mere tinkering with the present competitive anarchy of sovereign nations.

VI

Peace will probably continue to rely more on the standoff of mutually deterred great powers and their alliances than it does upon world organization. But it can still be hoped that the frightful cost of competition for superiority in all military options will stimulate reliable arms-limitation agreements. Also, the serious risk caused by the contagious nature of minor wars strongly urges big powers to be willing to support an adequately financed United Nations peacekeeping force. Moreover, even though ultimate authority to make military decisions in the national interest may not be fully delegated in our time to any international body, the support of world opinion expressed through a world organization, or failure to obtain such support, may become increasingly important in the making of national military decisions.

Although the prophets of world government expected their cathedral to be founded on the rock of superior collective military force, it is more likely that supra-national institutions with some of the attributes of governmental authority will first emerge in nonmilitary areas. Control and management of worldwide satellite communications; prohibitions and requirements to diminish the pollution, plunder and decay of the natural environment; the regulation of international capital, commercial and financial transactions—all of these areas are already demanding a regimen which no single nation can provide on its own.

If there is no coördination of international transmission of information by satellite its vast educational potential for all the world will be stymied. If, at the same time, international control is not somehow insulated from either commercial or ideological exploitation, no matter how technically perfect the circuit, the message will be jammed by the politicians and the censors serving rival contestants for the minds of men.

Unless national standards of acceptable and unacceptable pollution in manufacture as well as in products are harmonized,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

there is little prospect for the fairness or feasibility of purely national efforts to achieve environmental responsibility in the production of goods which flow freely in the channels of world trade. Since purity is expensive, the impure source will always drive out the products of those held to higher environmental standards of manufacture. Atomic fallout from nuclear tests is not the only, or even the worst, pollution menace which requires international coöperation.

It is now obvious, of course, that the ability of nations to control their economic destiny is also falsified by the facts of international economic life. The chance of holding a job, how much you get paid, what you can buy for your wages—all these are often determined more by the economic policies of other countries than they are by your own government. Sometimes they are determined by another country's import policy; sometimes by its exchange rate; sometimes by its willingness or unwillingness to let its own citizens invest abroad, or to let foreigners invest at home. These decisions are made by visible groups, making identifiable decisions.

This was not so likely to breed resentment when the impact was filtered through billions of private industrial, commercial and financial arrangements pegged to gold. It seemed so objective and impersonal before governments assumed such a decisive and visible role. Now the "unseen hand" is there for all to see, to praise, to blame. Resentment was also dulled when things appeared to be better than they otherwise would be because of the willingness of Americans to finance their customers, either by direct aid in the days of the dollar-gap, or by the indirect aid of allowing claims to be built up against the dollar deficit. But now it is plain to everyone that economic opportunities, rewards and penalties for vast populations, are determined by a relatively small group of governments and their central banks. Both economists and spokesmen for the developing countries have noted that it can hardly be said that those who determine the world's economic circumstance "derive their just powers from the consent of the governed."

The same is true of private economic and social power. Now that industrial as well as mineral firms span the globe, their investors, customers, suppliers and employees may be governed by a corporate organization which is not effectively accountable to any sovereign, because the enterprise straddles the jurisdictions

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of so many nations. What Delaware did in the United States to drive out the more responsible corporation and tax laws of its sister states, a host of corporate and tax havens can do on the world scene.

Property and contract may be falsified by high-handed expropriation; but sovereignty, too, can be mocked by high-handed private corporations which are many times more powerful than the sovereign to whose laws they formally submit. Yet internationally there is no "federal" regulation which transcends nations, no federal jurisdiction which can rise above the bias of local prosecutors or the political allegiance of local judges. Neither property owner nor sovereign can vindicate his rights in any tribunal which in the eyes of both is truly neutral.

Failure to devise the international mechanisms to supplement national authority in any one of these fields could lead to a literal breakdown of the world environment or of the world economy; some would be hit harder than others, but none would be immune.

The currents of chauvinism—whether isolationist, protectionist or "go-it-alone"—are very hard for elected politicians to resist. Short-run political expediency indicates that it is wise to knuckle under to a George Meany's tirade when a socialist is appointed to the Secretariat of the International Labour Office. Popular applause may be won by insisting that we will not be handcuffed by the articles of the GATT. A reputation for boldness and decisiveness is acquired when monetary decisions bypass the consultative procedures of the Monetary Fund. The popular mood is petulant when we are outvoted in an international forum, and it is easy to fall in with it. We have been so spoiled by our temporary supremacy that we tend to sulk if we cannot be captain. The collective will of the United Nations does not have the political power of either the Pentagon or the mineral interests when it comes to deciding whether the United States will purchase Rhodesian chrome.

If the individual citizen could earmark some portion of his taxes for United Nations peacekeeping, economic development or emergency relief needs, perhaps this would to some extent offset the conventional reluctance of politicians to stand up for the integrity of commitments of the United States to international institutions. Maybe if the obligation of selective service could be discharged through membership in a United Nations

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reserve, there would be some chance for the individual of military age to demonstrate that a larger loyalty would command his enthusiastic service. Until there is a chance for the individual citizen to vote with his pocketbook or with his personal service, however, the chances of using the power of the United States to assure survival in face of the international contagion of war, poverty and pollution will depend on most unusual political leadership.

It is fortunate that at every turn the present Administration has paid verbal respect to the need for initiatives and arrangements which transcend nations. The new communications satellite corporation; our NATO initiative on environmental matters; our support for the coming U.N. conference on environmental problems in Stockholm; even the bows we have given to the need for universal trade and monetary coöperation in footnotes to the (hopefully) short-term protectionist efforts to cure the payments deficit—all these have "preserved the option" of truly transnational arrangements.

It is the natural tendency of those who make policy, however, to look upon international institutions as window dressing, or as forums of last resort. To those who carry out policy it is natural to try to avoid the delays and compromises inherent in multinational accommodation. Despite the assurances and promises which always accompany presidential efforts to persuade persons of note or of promise to accept the post, the Ambassador to the United Nations is normally treated as an outsider in the councils of high policy.

Neither the political atmosphere nor the administrative priorities will change until a President of the United States is willing to affirm that the national destiny requires first priority for international solutions to international problems. President Nixon has shown such an insistence on the issue of maintaining the military presence of the United States in Europe. Comparable boldness has not been shown by the leadership of either party with respect to support and development of international institutions and organizations on a global scale.

It was easier for President Roosevelt to mobilize public opinion for support of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals because of the high purposes enunciated in the Atlantic Charter and later galvanized into national unity behind the cause of global victory. It was also easier, perhaps, for President Truman to forge under-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lying popular support and a legislative coalition for the Marshall Plan because of the cold-war psychology and the popular fear of the threat of communist takeover of a Europe in economic despair. Nevertheless, the salient fact is that neither President Roosevelt nor President Truman would have prevailed if they had waited for the winds of public opinion to make it politically riskless to proceed.

History does seem to suggest that it takes the discipline of great sacrifice or the threat of imminent disaster to lift a people from their day-to-day habit of life and mind to a higher level of concern and a broader scope of loyalty. But the old "it's got to get worse before it gets better" cliché is unacceptable counsel when "worse" means holocaust, environmental malignancy or economic destitution. Yesterday's rhetorical metaphor has become today's literal concern, tomorrow's specter.

My hope is that perhaps the Vietnam-seared generation of Americans has it in them to insist that the problem of survival be taken seriously. Far from being strident "America Firsters," many of their most talented members are viscerally aware that political and economic power may run amok unless harnessed by some arrangements bigger than nations. Some of them care fiercely about the restraint of power and redress against its abuse. They would be quite willing, even eager, to see their own country's global enterprises and policies made more responsive, not only to fellow American citizens, but also to the world community.

My fear is that if their own country does not become the affirmative champion of arrangements adequate to deal with those problems which transcend nations, then the initiative, and especially the appeal to the future generations, will fall by default to the champions of centralized world socialism. The initial posture and pronouncements of the mainland Chinese delegation at their first United Nations' session are a fair warning. They are not unaware of the delightful opportunity for leadership in the third world and among the younger generation which is invited by the passivity, petty parochialism, and scorn for supranational institutions, in the developed countries.

It is hard to see how we will engage the young, and stand any chance of competing for the respect of mankind generally, if we continue to be hold-outs, more concerned with the sovereignty of nations than with the ultimate sovereignty of peoples. The

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

problems will define the scope of the solutions. Transnational problems will eventually call forth transnational arrangements. The question is whether these solutions will embody a concern for the rule of law and the dispersion of private and local initiative, or whether they will bring with them the heavy and often cruel hand of authoritarian prescriptions. If we remain inert, no one else has the power, coupled with a common law heritage and federal experience, which might achieve a rule of law as we know it. That is, a rule of law which seeks to encourage private initiative and local self-determination, while at the same time keeping private powers or local principalities from overreaching or overrunning others.

If we continue to be grudging about it—if we are unreliable partners, except when it suits our immediate self-interest, if we wait until leadership is riskless—then, when we appeal for followers, they will not be there.

Our new situation of mutual, national dependence is inescapable. If we would face it in a creative mood, we will have to take some risks in order to invite others to pool their sovereignty with ours on matters which none of us can control alone. We shall have to abide by lawfully achieved results even when we might have wished or voted otherwise. Some day, some President must convince all the American people that this is a proud and exciting call to be faced with zest rather than with reluctance.

As we approach the bicentennial of the Republic, perhaps what we need most for 1976 is a resounding Declaration of International Interdependence. Maybe by 1987 we could then celebrate the two hundredth year of the Constitution of the United States with at least the beginning of global arrangements and institutions to safeguard the common defense and the general welfare of humanity everywhere. Then we would rediscover the sense of purpose, and once more know the satisfaction, of those who saved the peoples of the colonies by making them into a nation. We, in our turn, might save the peoples of nations by making them into a world community capable of survival.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

GERMANY'S "WESTPOLITIK"

By Willy Brandt

AFTER President Nixon and I met at Key Biscayne on December 28 and 29, 1971, a commentator pointed out that the joint statement issued on our talks seemed more like an American-European than an American-German communiqué. This, he felt, showed itself even on the surface in that the terms "European" or "Europe" appeared 11 times whereas German" or "Federal Republic of Germany" were only mentioned twice.

The talks at Key Biscayne did indeed center on the American-European partnership rather than on German-American relations. This will not surprise anyone who knows to what extent bilateral relations between West European countries and the United States are overlaid by a network of multilateral relations which is steadily getting more dense. In the Federal Republic of Germany there is not a single question of any importance that could be treated outside the context of American-European relations. This applies to international currency and trade affairs as well as to security police and above all to efforts to decrease tensions between East and West.

In the European Community we have not yet reached the point where the head of a member state is authorized to speak for his European colleagues. All the same, we have at least come to the point where none of us—be it the President of France, the British Prime Minister, the Prime Minister of Italy or the West German Chancellor—could or would refrain from bringing joint European interests into play. Each one of us tries in his own way not only to look after his own nation's interests but also to articulate European considerations. This is true even in cases where one or the other might feel tempted to extract some special advantage from talks with the Americans.

Relations between Western Europe and the United States have reached a kind of in-between stage. Some symptoms of this lie in the area of currency and trade affairs; others in the desire of the United States to lighten its burden; others in the wish of West European nations to establish closer political ties with each other besides their economic unity inside the Common Market; and, last but not least, in America's long-standing recommendation to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

speed such development, which today, however, is modified by her concern lest her own interests might suffer in the process. To be sure, these factors are somewhat contradictory, which only proves my point about this being a kind of in-between stage.

There is no predicting future developments; they may go in a variety of directions. Responsible forces—on both sides of the ocean—should realize that decisions will be expected from them in this crucial area of "Westpolitik." From my own point of view and considering my own responsibilities, I should like to specify in which direction we should move if we are to take our partnership seriously.

II

People in Europe, at least in Western Europe, are quite aware of the role America assumed at the end of World War II. It was the role of a world power and helpmate who made only limited distinctions between former and future friends. In other words, yesterday's wartime opponents were given aid along with the rest. This aid meant a great deal to them and—this I can say at least for my own country—they have not forgotten it. The twenty-fifth anniversary of the Marshall Plan, which we are going to commemorate this year, offers a special opportunity for remembering with gratitude what the United States has done for Europe.

It does not diminish this gratitude to point out that the position then taken by the United States also happened to suit its own interests; the reconstruction of Europe was a sensible thing for it to undertake from its own point of view. Not only then, immediately after World War II, but through succeeding years relations between America and Europe were marked to a large extent by the polarity between the United States and the Soviet Union. To be sure, there was much talk about bipolarity long after it had, in its original sense, ceased to exist. Now there is talk about tripolarity, when it should be obvious to anyone that both economically and politically there are more than three centers of power.

Here I should like to take up President Nixon's recent remark that the risk of war is declining while economic rivalry is increasing. If this is so, it must mean that the nations or groups of nations among which economic rivalry is increasing are not the same as those among which the risk of war is on the decline.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

One might also put it this way: if and because the risk of war is diminishing between the United States and the Soviet Union, limited rivalry has a chance of developing between America and Western Europe without the parties concerned having to regard this as a threat to their security. I speak here of economic rivalry, in the sense of President Nixon's remark. This does not mean that we should overlook the danger stemming from the fact that no foolproof line can be drawn between economics and politics.

Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that, on the whole, the existing situation regarding Western security, or security in the Atlantic area, has hardly changed at all in recent years. European security requires that it be actively geared to the American interest. In military potential, the gap between the American superpower and the West European nations is continuously widening. It is going to be a long time, if ever, before Europe will be in a position to guarantee her own security effectively. This is a fact well-informed Americans understand as fully as they do the possible consequences of disengagement within the Atlantic defense community. A role imposed by history cannot be shaken off except at one's peril even if, at times, it seems a burden. I can well understand isolationist trends within Europe, but I think they will not significantly influence the decision-making process. If, some day, there should be a fundamental change in the relationship between the superpowers, new questions will develop with regard to engagements inside the Alliance, which may then be easier to solve.

For the foreseeable future, Western Europe will have to remain militarily geared to the United States. This dependency will diminish as peace is made more certain and as tensions are reduced. This is another reason why both Europe and the United States must maintain a strong interest in efforts to decrease conflicts between East and West. For the benefit of some of our contemporaries who have refused to take note of this, it should be stressed once again that for the past five years the policy of the Atlantic Alliance has rested on two pillars: readiness for defense and an effort to decrease tensions. It is from these principles, demonstrated in the consultations of the Alliance, that what is called our *Ospolitik* has developed.

If, militarily, we speak of West Europe's dependency on the United States, the reverse is also true. It is dictated by U.S. interests. This needs no special explanation, since the play of in-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

terests which expresses itself in interdependence has not changed in many years even though many changes have occurred on the international scene. The United States is politically engaged in Europe, and regardless of incidental disputes in current affairs this fact has never for a moment been questioned, as was confirmed only recently in the form given in the Four-Power agreement on Berlin. The American engagement in Europe is essentially a result of World War II. The communist-governed countries of Europe recognize it as such and have dropped their objections against the United States and Canada taking part on equal terms in a European conference on security and coöperation.

There has been much discussion as to whether or not the unification of Western Europe might relieve the United States of the burden of its military guarantee. Certainly a more or less politically united Western Europe would wish—and be able—to organize its security. While we are on our way to that point, West European efforts within the Alliance as presently structured and European participation in certain American planning mechanisms may play an important part.

But nothing can change the fact that, as far as security is concerned, the United States and Western Europe will retain their close connection and remain dependent on each other. Moreover, only in a limited way can the U.S. burden be transferred to other shoulders. People who somewhat simplistically argue that Europe should now be rich enough to do more about her own security skip easily over the actual contribution made by the European partners within the Alliance; moreover, a readiness to make additional contributions has been shown, particularly in the past year. As is well known, NATO's "Euro-Group" has launched a program to reinforce European defense, and the participating members, including the Federal Republic of Germany, have allocated additional funds for defense and have started to coöperate more closely on joint projects. The foreign-exchange balance for the U.S. forces stationed in Germany has once again been regulated. Nobody will deny, however, that American troops leaving Europe can hardly be replaced by European forces, either with regard to their nuclear equipment or their political and strategic deterrent power. Moreover, repatriated forces stationed at home are not cheap either.

To be sure, one may argue about the number of American

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

troops that it is advisable or necessary to maintain in Europe in the interest of mutual security. The German side has not shunned such a discussion, but on the contrary has taken an active part in a preliminary study of the complicated but important question of an even reduction of forces. However, this concept precisely does *not* mean only that joint burdens must find joint relief. It means, above all, that a reduction of the American armed presence in Europe must be a part as well as a result of decreasing tension between East and West. To my mind, a one-sided weakening of the West is foolish, and a substantial one-sided reduction of American forces—coupled with a request to restore the balance through an equal number of European substitutes—may easily turn out to be equally foolish.

From this point of view, Europe has no less interest than the United States in reducing the risks of conflict. For the future of Europe, the chances for her development, the opportunities to find her role in world affairs and to play it adequately, will take shape only when it becomes possible to view the security factor in a calmer way. Europe will be able to find her identity in a convincing and lasting manner only when peace becomes a fairly certain working hypothesis.

III

If we are to accept this working hypothesis that a destructive East-West conflict can be avoided, an interesting picture emerges. We now identify economic spheres of more and more equal potential strength; the much-discussed bipolarity between the United States and the Soviet Union widens into a quadrangle in which Western Europe and Japan have their place. And, obviously, China as an independent force of special potency must be included—though for the time being she remains a strange combination of the most populous nation, an underdeveloped country and a developing nuclear power.

There seem to be more or less equal opportunities for the participants, and herein lies the crucial point of the remark about a possible rivalry between Western Europe and the United States. Those who have followed the discussions of the past few months may almost have come to the conclusion that the working hypothesis mentioned above is more widely accepted in America than in Europe. For it is largely in America that concern has been voiced over an extension of the European Commu-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nity to ten members—provided the plebiscites in Denmark and Norway have positive results—and that their joint trade policy might lead to angry rivalry, even to economic warfare. To my mind these concerns are understandable, in some instances even justified, but on the whole exaggerated. After all, experience has shown that the American economy has not suffered from the Common Market; quite the contrary. Nowhere have American exports increased more than in the Common Market countries. This is equally true of exports of capital. And perhaps it should be noted that this has something to do not only with the problem of the American balance of payments but also with the international currency crisis (which in essence, it is hoped, we may have overcome).

Those who remember how strongly Americans advised Europeans to unite, those who have not forgotten the statements of American statesmen that the political advantages would be well worth certain economic sacrifices, those who recall American annoyance at the slowness of these Europeans and who now, when the Community of the Ten is beginning to take shape, compare all this with some of the American voices we hear today, might ask themselves whether certain of our American friends have not lost their sense of success. Were it not for American policy over the past two decades Western Europe would never have reached its present point. The United States should actually congratulate itself, for it has helped Europe achieve what it recommended: West European unification has come within reach. And in view of the power relationship even in the economic area one is oddly tempted to say to American friends: "Don't worry! Europe is not as strong as some might think and, above all, she has no intention of making unfriendly use of her new possibilities."

So far we have seen that joint interests and rational thinking are strong enough to prevent any undue aggravation. For many years—and again since I became Chancellor in 1969—I have stressed that it would be desirable to give an organic form to the economic dialogue between the United States and the Common Market. On the American side this was not taken too seriously, probably because people had ceased to believe in an extension of the Market. In Europe, not least of all in Paris, there was concern lest an organized dialogue, meaning one that was held on a high level and with a certain regularity, might lead to a kind

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of American "co-regency" in the Common Market. I am convinced that we will be able to overcome misunderstandings and obstacles of this or any other sort.

After the disputes in the field of currency and trade policy which we have witnessed in the past months, I feel encouraged in my belief that luckily there is no question of a crisis or a threat of serious estrangement. The economic and currency warfare which the pessimists predicted has not taken place and will, I hope, never take place. There is agreement between the United States and Europe that questions of partnership with other powers—among them mainly Japan—must be settled. This can happen only on the basis of independence and responsibility.

The way to European unity is developing along lines different from those foreseen by perfectionists, including Americans. Everything goes more slowly and less systematically than they had thought. But it should have become clear over the past two years that there is vitality in the European Community. Since the summit conference at The Hague in December 1969, the process of unification has received a definite boost.

When the 12-year transitional phase of the Common Market terminated, as prescribed, at the end of 1969, the Community decided that the enlargement of it into an economic and currency union should be the central task of the seventies. Since January 1, 1971, a new financial constitution has been in force, under which the Community has its own income and, step by step, becomes independent from contributions of its members. The very desirable enlargement of the Community, as urged by the United States, to include Great Britain (as well as Ireland, Denmark and Norway, subject to their ratification) is an accepted fact; it will come about on January 1, 1973, after the governments have accepted the conditions negotiated at Brussels and have signed the Rome Agreements. Finally, and with all due modesty in view of previous results, the international coöperation which started last year and which has included the member candidates, is beginning to take firmer shape.

IV

All this goes to show that the process which will make Western Europe a more serious partner of the United States is fully under way. Past and present experiences warn that along the road snags and contradictions will be encountered. The project in-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

volves incorporating independent nations which have evolved over centuries and the social structures of which, despite many similarities, are on the whole quite different from one another, into a Community transcending national borders. The task is not going to become easier with the forthcoming enlargement of the Community from six to ten members. This is true not only of the development within the Community itself but also of the shaping of its relations with the rest of the world. On the other hand, enlargement should not necessarily slow down integration; in certain vital areas the new mixture of interests may very well provide an easier way to overcome some previous obstacles.

The members of the European Community basically agree that economic and political unification belong together. The rule still holds that whoever wishes to join the Community as a full member must, in principle, adopt its political aims. (To put it more precisely: must be able to adopt them, for, as we know, there are European nations whose status is respected by East and West—indeed, in some cases has even been determined by East and West—but which aim only for an associate relationship with the Community.) Among them is the concept that at some as yet unforeseeable point, a kind of European government should be established which would be able to take the necessary decisions on joint policy, subject to parliamentary control.

I am convinced that the Community will gradually approach this goal if in the coming years we are interested in further developing the present beginnings of international coöperation. A step-by-step development of an economic and currency union is in itself a major political project. The realization of it will require continuing political decisions as well as further institutional development from which political unification as a whole will benefit.

The next objectives in West European unification will have to be defined at the summit conference of the heads of state or governments of the extended Community. This conference will probably meet in Paris in the fall and, I hope, will generate as much momentum as did the summit conference at The Hague in December 1969.

The Federal Republic of Germany ranks foremost among those who insist that the European Community must not encapsulate itself but should be turned outward to the world. We in Europe cannot integrate a number of important industrial na-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tions without considering the consequences of this for the rest of the world. It would not only be irresponsible toward the others but also very short-sighted with regard to our own interests. One does not have to be an expert to recognize that such integration is bound to have a considerable impact on international trade. We must, therefore, strive for liberal world trade policies in order not to upset the entire international economy. This means that the European Community must remain open, above all, in its relations to the United States—and also to that other great "Western" power, Japan. Here it will not always be possible to avoid confrontations of economic interests. But I do not see any danger in this as long as we all take care that natural competition does not lead to angry rivalry.

Some American statements about the alleged protectionism of the Common Market strike me as unfounded, or at least exaggerated. I have already pointed out that American trade and export of capital to Western Europe have grown out of all proportion—if we go by value, even as regards agricultural products. I could with good reason add that the Community as a whole is less protectionist than the United States. Besides, I am not one of those who complain about foreign investment in Europe; but this does not change the fact that among certain Europeans its volume has aroused fear of "Americanization" in the economic and technical sectors. Many Americans understand the dangers to the U.S. balance of payments of an excessive accumulation of American investment interests in Europe without an equivalent counterflow. The warnings and steps taken by various American governments to safeguard the dollar were, after all, largely related to this.

Yet I would be the last to deny that there is room for improvement in the exchange between the United States and Europe. Here I do not exclude the agricultural area. On the other hand, our American friends are aware of the difficulties which extensive short-term changes may cause in this particular area. I mention these difficulties, although they deal with a worrisome chapter as far as the Federal Republic of Germany's interest and point of view are concerned. But there is no getting away from the fact that if the agricultural Common Market is jeopardized this threatens the Community's entire future development. This fact has to be taken into proper account, especially when it is a question of finding additional outlets for American

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

agricultural products in Europe. A sensible joint policy on agricultural structure, as well as worldwide efforts for a more balanced exchange of agricultural goods, will in the long run change the situation.

I am aware of American criticisms of the Community's policy of forming, by means of associations, closer trade relations with their members' former colonial possessions, although here too we naturally try to abide by the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Totally apart from this, it seems to me that these associations have not had an adverse effect on American trade; on the contrary, they correspond to the need for economic progress and political support in the countries concerned. This is particularly true of Africa. To this I will quickly add that I am against an overcommitment of the European Community in this area and that I am in favor of having special arrangements with developing countries transferred to a worldwide system of preferences.

In view of their immediate geographical proximity and their historical, economic and, to some extent, political ties with the member states of the Community, West European countries which, for one reason or another do not wish or are unable to join the Community still aim for a closer relationship with it. It would not be in the interest of political stability in Europe if the Community were to close its doors to these countries and pretend that they did not exist. They, too, have a right to contribute, within the limits of their possibilities, to European coöperation and unification. One must look to the coming negotiations to bring the agreements into accord with the requirements, if possible, of a liberal world trade.

The joint responsibility of the United States and Europe for a global economy developing on the basis of a stable currency system, which will also help growth and stability in the third world, makes inevitable the establishment of an organized alliance between the United States and the European Community in the not too distant future. I have already pointed out that hitherto the dialogue between America and Western Europe has been left too much to chance and has not always been conducted on a high enough level. It will be a priority of the near future to establish a system of information, consultation and definition of interests which takes the new partnership into account.

It is in the nature of things that even those countries in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

COMECON—the Soviet-East European economic bloc—will normalize their relations with the European Community as well as with Japan and probably also with the United States. We are dealing with realities. Obviously this, too, must come about on the basis of equality, *i.e.* of nondiscrimination with regard to markets and rights.

The possibilities of East-West coöperation in Europe are vast; the tasks involved are immense; the chances to realize them jointly are beginning to improve. Here a way may open to bridge a dangerous gap in a vital part of the world and make a peaceful contribution to the future.

The more this succeeds the more America should rejoice. Peace and welfare in Europe are always advantageous to the United States. In this connection I am reminded again of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Marshall Plan. Without the support and protection of the United States, Western Europe would never have been able to develop into the prospering Community it has, on the whole, become today. Without this support and protection we would not have succeeded in building a democracy in Germany's Western portion. Without this support and protection it would not have been possible to safeguard Berlin. How could a long-time mayor of that city ever forget that!

Precisely because our partnership is based on common ideals and joint experiences it will continue to prove itself at a time when a mature Western Europe, confident of its newly acquired strength, sets out to assume an independent and responsible role in the efforts for peace and progress.

I have said on another occasion, and I should like to emphasize here especially: Western Europe will form a union beyond that of the economic community which will be able to take its share of international responsibility independently of the United States but in firm partnership with it. At the same time, there will be chances for all-European coöperation and security, perhaps even along the lines of something like a European partnership for peace.

And I should also like to emphasize that Europe and America, which in my opinion can hardly be separated in terms of objectives, should not let each other be separated subjectively either. They need one another as equals. As I said at Oslo in December 1971, the heavier the burdens America has to bear the stronger will become our friendship for that great country.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

VOLUNTEER ARMED FORCES AND MILITARY PURPOSE

By Morris Janowitz

THE NATO nations are phasing out of existence the mass conscript armed force with vast mobilization reserves. This has profound and subtle implications for international relations and also for domestic civil-military relations. In the United States, one campaign promise that President Nixon sought to implement after he took office was to halt the draft as soon as possible and create an all-volunteer force. Paradoxically, the prolongation of hostilities in Vietnam served only to speed the end of conscription and develop congressional support for his campaign promise. Terminating conscription was one issue on which antiwar Congressmen and pressure groups could unite with the Nixon administration. The result was that Selective Service legislation will not extend beyond July 1, 1973, and that military officials plan to reach the objective of a "zero draft" call by January 1, 1973, at the latest.

The end of the draft in the United States will also push NATO nations toward all-volunteer systems or toward new forms of militia systems. Great Britain introduced an all-volunteer system in 1960, and the 1970s will certainly see further overall reductions in its military manpower because of economic pressure and the sheer difficulties of recruitment. In the last three years NATO countries have reduced the length of conscript service and are certain to examine more radical measures closely after the American end of the draft. The Netherlands, with its powerful commitment to NATO principles and strategy, is openly debating and planning for the conditions under which it will institute an all-volunteer system. In Germany Helmut Schmidt, Socialist Minister of Defense, has advocated an all-volunteer cadre augmented by a short-term six-month militia. In Italy, and to a lesser extent in France, the size and type of manpower systems are related not only to international relations but to internal security, so that the debate on the shift toward a volunteer force has been retarded but is being raised with greater frequency.

Can an all-volunteer armed force produce the number and quality of military personnel required for an effective U.S. mili-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tary posture of deterrence? The concept of an all-volunteer armed force also raises deep concern about civil-military relations and the question of social isolation or even "alienation" of the military from the larger civilian society. In the United States, the military establishment, and especially its ground forces, are experiencing a profound crisis in legitimacy due to the impact of Vietnam, internal race tension, corruption, extensive drug abuse, disintegration of command and operational effectiveness, and widespread anti-military sentiment, as well as a continuous reduction in force levels that limits career opportunities.

A political democracy rests on citizen participation, especially in the armed forces; therefore, I am politically and morally concerned about an all-volunteer force. However, historical trends and the opposition to Vietnam will produce an all-volunteer force. Sociologically, in the contemporary context an all-volunteer force can be made compatible with American political forms if two conditions are met.

First, U.S. foreign policy must be one of flexible deterrence and the military must incorporate a "constabulary" type of strategy. Second, new and higher levels of military professionalism must be developed which recognize that the armed forces, while distinct in many of their operating procedures, must be based more and more on contractual and public service conceptions and less on sheer traditional authority.

II

The mass armed force has its origins in both technological and sociopolitical factors. The technology of the mass army was rooted in an organizational system created by the increased firepower of the infantry and artillery plus improved means of transporting military personnel and supplies. Historical epochs do not start or conclude on a specific textbook date. The technology for the mass army was in operation during the American Civil War and in the Franco-Prussian conflict, but essential prototypical elements, especially organizational elements, were already present in the Napoleonic wars.

However, there are strong reasons to ground the origin of the mass armed force in the sociopolitical struggle of the American and French Revolutions and the emergent forms of modern nationalism which they produced. These armed rebellions marked the end of the post-feudal armies, as the revolutionary leaders

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

armed the rank and file. The idea that citizenship involved the right to bear arms—truly a revolutionary notion—came into being. In fact, military service was an essential element in expanding the scope of citizenship. To be a citizen of the nation-state was to have the right to bear arms in its defense. (It is striking that during World Wars I and II, elements in the Black community in the United States demanded the right to serve in combat units as an expression of their aspirations for full citizenship.)

In Europe, after the French Revolution, the mass armed force developed professional cadres augmented by a conscript and mobilization system of reservists. The professional officers were distinct from the rest of society, although the military was based on an ethos of citizen participation. In the United States, the professional cadres were smaller and the development of the concept of mass armed force was not institutionalized until after World War I, and "peacetime" conscription not until after World War II.

However, a highly professional armed force did serve the political and ideological cause of nationalism, since the officer corps of Western Europe had no difficulty in transferring its allegiance from feudal authority to the modern bureaucratic nation-state. A corresponding process occurred in the United States. Mass armies gave the lower classes the opportunity to participate directly in developing the national polity in a manner they could readily manage and appreciate. Military service in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was for a significant segment of the population—even after the slaughters of World War I and up through World War II—an act of political affirmation. In Europe it undercut internationalism and socialist political tendencies, and in the United States it was an equally strong expression of popular nationalism. The right to participate in the conscript armed force, as much as the extension of the franchise, was at the core of the political emergence of modern nationalism.

The distinctive professional officer corps of the mass armed force, with its strong sense of separation from civilian society, in due course brought with it its own elements of institutional transformation, including its sheer increase in size. In Europe since the close of the Franco-Prussian War, and in the United States since the Root reforms and the mobilization of World War I, the dominant trend in the mass armed force and in civil-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

military relations until 1945 was the "civilianization" of the armed forces. The boundary between military forces and civilian society weakened as total mobilization required that an ever larger segment of the population become part of the war apparatus. Within the professional military, recruitment shifts as officers are drawn from more and more socially representative backgrounds, the concentration of personnel with civilian skills increases, and the patterns of military authority shift from authoritarian command to organizational decision-making.

The civilianization of the mass military is not an outgrowth of technology and organizational control alone. The vast resources needed for military operations and the justification for prolonged hostilities and massive destruction require an egalitarian ideology in both democratic and totalitarian societies. Men are progressively less prepared to fight for nationalist sentiments alone; they must see the cause as morally justified. Although the expanded resources of the military permit it to operate as a powerful pressure group, the threat of old-fashioned military dictatorship seems remote.

Both technological and sociopolitical factors associated with World War II started the decline of mass armies in the affluent nation-states of the West, although it has taken 25 years for the process to become fully evident. The deployment of nuclear weapons marked the technological transformation of the NATO nations' armed forces. But the introduction of nuclear weapons per se did not dictate the gradual erosion of mass armies; it was only a precondition.

In advanced industrialized societies, the goals of military institutions have been subjected to massive criticism and belief in the moral worth of conscript service has been shaken. Hedonism, self-expression, resistance to military authority and a new diffuse moral criticism have become paramount among young people. The use of force has traditionally operated within circumscribed limits; new moral and political definitions generate a powerful sense of neutralism and new forms of pacificism. Literacy, mass consumption and political rhetoric have emerged as more important hallmarks of citizenship than military service. Nationalism itself is muted and mixed with diffuse but powerful feelings of transnationalism. The performance of the United States forces in Southeast Asia, of course, supplied an emotional basis for the emerging popular pacificism. These trends are concentrated

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

among an important minority of young people, but they can be found in varying degrees in all parts of the social structure. Thus, in Germany, reluctance to serve in the armed forces and a broad definition of conscientious objection have meant, in recent years, that up to ten percent of the eligible age groups are exempted from service.

Comparable trends exist in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but in vastly different cultural and political settings. Totalitarian control eliminates political and moral debate about conscription. However, youth's discontent is widely acknowledged and has its implications for conscription. The Soviet Union has sought to limit the term of conscripts, emphasized volunteer recruitment wherever possible, and closed important branches of the armed forces to all but volunteer personnel. The military has been downgraded as a locus of citizenship training; this function has been transferred to premilitary training in high school and involves military personnel assigned for it.

The Soviet military forces are an integral element of the internal security forces, both at home and in the Warsaw Pact nations. These political realities, plus the validity given to the Chinese threat, mean that personal, moral and even political opposition to military service has no direct or immediate impact on manpower policy, but one should not underestimate the extent to which Soviet authorities are concerned and to which they consider the attitudes of youth.

III

In the next decade, U.S. military policy will obviously be conditioned by the successes and failures of the last 25 years. During them, the United States has essentially pursued a global nuclear-force strategy and two increasingly divergent strategies for its conventional forces, one in Western Europe and one in Southeast Asia. The redeployment of American military forces rests on an effective recognition of the duality of American foreign policy —on the difference between American interests, responsibility, and capacities in Western Europe and in East Asia. This formulation does not exclude the problematic issues of the Middle East, Africa or South America; it places them in an appropriate perspective for the purposes of this analysis.

During the last quarter-century, the prospects for nuclear war were very remote indeed, as was clear to detached observers im-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mediately after 1945. A vast amount of literature during this period has analyzed the delicate balance of terror developed by nuclear technology. Because nuclear warfare would be so destructive the United States and the Soviet Union developed the strategy of mutual deterrence. However, there has been much less recognition of the fact that political leadership and institutions were essential to the deterrence of major war, or, rather, to the ability of the Soviets and the Western bloc to work out an arrangement under the threat of accidental and premeditated war. The essential political element in this formula was: the belief of the Soviet leaders that: (a) the U.S. leaders firmly controlled their military establishment and that the United States, on political and moral grounds alone, had ruled out a preëmptive nuclear attack on the Soviet Union; (b) the conventional forces of NATO would not be used to support any movements of national liberation among the Eastern bloc nations.

As the 1960s came to an end, this political formula was being fundamentally strained by the uncertainties that MIRV weapons and anti-ballistic missiles introduced. Again, the issue is not merely the technology per se, but the political setting, although these new weapons and counterweapons greatly complicate the search for effective political arrangements. The threat of a nuclear confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union remains remote during the 1970s as new vehicles emerge for mutual political communications and negotiations, both formal and informal. First, the SALT negotiations have become a central forum; prolonged discussion will at least inhibit the deployment of new weapons, and more effective negotiations will produce ad hoc and partly formalized settlements. Second, partial resolution of the "German question" and unilateral and bilateral troop reductions will provide a new format for political discussions and assurances. As China develops her potential, the United States must take the initiative in extending and adapting the political formula of the last 25 years to include China, and under these circumstances the threat of nuclear war with China will also remain remote.

The issues center, therefore, on the deployment of conventional forces, which have been conceived of in the West as adjuncts to the deterrence strategy. In Western Europe, the stationing of American troops and the system of defense alliances were compatible with European national and political aspira-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tions. The sociopolitical impact of stationing the considerable numbers of troops required for the overall strategy of deterrence raised relatively few profound questions of community or even national sovereignty. However, in East Asia, the stationing of troops and their direct involvement were relatively compatible with local and national aspirations only until the end of the Korean War. The tasks of American forces have become progressively more difficult because of the opposition they have encountered from national and political forces. Cultural and racial differences have been deeply disruptive. Moreover, the fundamental sociopolitical basis of military strategy has been incompatible with the realities of social structure and social change in Southeast Asia. Finally, civilian military leaders overestimated the impact of conventional strategic air warfare, whose limitation had been demonstrated in the case of an industrialized nation like Germany and could have been projected, on this experience and that in Korea, to have even more limited consequences in Southeast Asia. A result of this misjudgment has been the basic stalemate and atrophy of the U.S. intervention in Southeast Asia.

For its post-Vietnam foreign policy, the Nixon administration has projected that an all-volunteer army could supply the manpower required for a more limited overseas deployment. In 1970, the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force estimated a manpower level of approximately 2.6 million, or slightly less than that of the pre-Vietnam buildup. At the time it was made, that projection already appeared to be a major miscalculation. In the spring of 1971 civilian officials in the Department of Defense were stating publicly that the post-Selective Service force would be approximately 2.25 million, while privately they indicated a more realistic 2.0 million. However, a force of 1.75 million by 1975 is even more realistic, and the prospect that even that level may not be reached cannot be ruled out. The major reduction will, of course, be in the ground forces.

While there would be an element of risk, a military force of 1.75 million men could support a meaningful military policy of effective and minimum deterrence rather than merely a balance of terror. Such a military force could also undertake a variety of national emergency tasks which cannot be performed by civilian organizations and which would enhance the force's organizational effectiveness. But it would have to redeploy effectively and reorganize professionally.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IV

In the ever-quickening redeployment and reduction of overseas American military forces, what appears to be a striking strategic consensus has emerged; only in Western Europe does there remain a positive reason for the stationing of any significant numbers of United States ground troops. Even in South Korea, the prospect is one of an American military presence limited to air and naval units. A contracting system of naval and air bases, training missions, and an overseas scattering of specialized troops for communications and logistical purposes would be the augmenting elements. The type and number of ground troops required for deterrence and peacekeeping through a military presence in Western Europe have emerged as a central issue for military professionals.

Military perspectives and doctrine adhered to by professional soldiers persist even as they adjust to changing technology and an altered sociopolitical environment. The distinction between the "absolutists" and the "pragmatists" still dominates the day-to-day struggles over military budgets and missions. The trend, because of the wounds inflicted on professional pride by the agonies of Vietnam, has been more and more toward an absolutist doctrine.

Both absolutists and pragmatists believe that they are sensitive to the interplay of political, economic and military factors in worldwide international relations. But advocates of each school live in different worlds—although it must be emphasized that officers only lean toward one or the other pole. The crucial difference is in the degree to which the professional military man has in effect internalized the implications of the strategy of deterrence and abandoned the "killing business" as the organizing principle of his profession.

Deeply rooted images of professional ideology about violence are at work. At the international level, the absolutists maintain an "assault" perspective, even though they recognize the inhibitions that nuclear weapons place on the great powers. They are concerned that the United States will not realize the full impact of its military forces unless it maintains a "forward" military posture. Such an assault posture implicitly rejects Nixon's "no more Vietnams" as a passing political slogan. A force structure and a deployment of aggressive patrol—air, sea, and forward

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

positioning of ground—forces, and a potential for significant intervention outside Western Europe, are required. The absolutist perspective is in effect a continued affirmation of the inevitability of armed force but in an altered format. At the personal level, the absolutists are deeply concerned and fearful that a military without combat experience will inevitably decline and atrophy; the models of Sweden and Switzerland are rejected as not professional—by implication—and insufficiently masculine.

In contrast, the pragmatists, while emphasizing combat readiness, see the military force as operating under powerful political and moral constraints. They see the possibility of a successful U.S. foreign and military policy without an overt assault ideology. For them, the function of the military is in the political intention it conveys as much as the sheer destructive power it can wield. At the professional level, they are prepared for and hope for careers as soldiers without combat.

Each orientation leads to differing military contributions to the persistent questions of force levels, structure and deployment. For any given budget or force level, the absolutists are at odds with the pragmatists, although service attachments in and of themselves operate to mold professional perspectives. But the issue is not merely "army" self-interest versus an "air force" approach. The absolutist assumes that a higher or at least the current proportion of the gross national product is required while the pragmatist is prepared to accept an adjustment downward from the current nine percent. The hypothetical staff papers of joint staff planning for a 1.7 million force afford an insight into the contemporary professional debates and struggles.

The absolutist, with an assault concept, would recommend a 200,000-man marine corps, with capabilities for tactical nuclear weapons, an air force of 500,000 men, and a navy of 500,000 men that would emphasize aircraft carriers to support amphibious or airborne warfare. The ground forces would be limited to 500,000 and most would be stationed in the United States, with 50,000 in Western Europe. The U.S. ground troops in NATO would be part of a highly automated battlefield of electronic surveillance, with highly "modernized" weapons and deployment, and would operate with tactical nuclear weapons as a trip wire. In addition, 15,000 of the ground forces would be of the Special Forces variety for armed reconnaissance, operations behind enemy lines and counterinsurgency.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In contrast, the pragmatist would limit the marines to 100,000 men, have a small navy and air force of approximately 450,000 men each; the naval emphasis would include anti-submarine warfare. Seven hundred thousand men would be allocated for the ground force; 150,000 of them would be stationed in Western Europe (representing half of the current 1971 force level), and they would be closely articulated with the emerging military and militia systems of various Western nations. The Special Forces would be limited to a few thousand specialists. The forces stationed in the United States would be heavily involved in national emergency work as well.

V

Adapting the U.S. armed forces to the end of conscription has meant that operational procedures that have emerged since the end of World War II require comprehensive changes. An armed force which is (a) smaller, (b) recruited on an all-volunteer basis and (c) organized more and more as a force-in-being reverses or at least halts the historical trend of the American military establishment toward civilianization. The Vietnam War has drastically delayed a new organizational format; in fact, military historians will look back on the U.S. intervention there as having extended the life of traditional World War II perspectives and strengthened barriers to change. The transition to an all-volunteer system will therefore have to occur abruptly and under very unfavorable circumstances.

In the American environment, it was to be expected that Congress would emphasize economic incentives as the main element in the shift to an all-volunteer system. In the fall of 1971 the economic incentives approach was put into operation with a substantial pay raise under which a private was moved closer to the symbolic annual $5,000. There is every reason to assume that additional major increases will have to be instituted.

Congress dismissed without debate a system of volunteer national service which would allow young people to choose between military and civilian service. Such a program would have strengthened the social definition of service to the nation, which, in turn, would have greatly facilitated recruitment by creating a new legitimacy for government, community and military service. Moreover, the necessary basic changes in recruitment, career lines, education and deployment are being faced very slowly.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New operating procedures, especially in the ground forces, have been limited to physically improving the barracks for enlisted personnel, new recreational resources, wider freedom in personal appearance and modification of some aspects of the daily routine of garrison life, particularly early morning reveille; these steps have been described by skeptics as "cosmetic." However, a number of areas of change promise to create volunteer forces appropriate for a democratic society and a military posture of effective deterrence.

First, an all-volunteer service requires a fundamental redefinition of the military career that would strengthen its civil service basis. A significant number of both officers and enlisted men will continue to serve for six or fewer years. For them, military experience is an interlude in an essentially civilian existence; this type of military appears to be viable, although there are a host of attendant issues. However, for another group, military service will cover extended periods, often up to 20 years. For them, military service must be redefined as one step of a two-step career which is essentially a lifetime career in the public service, with the military part being the first step, and the second step being in the civil service establishment.

For enlisted personnel, successful completion of a specified period of service, such as three periods of enlistment, could constitute effective entrance into civil service employment. The United States Civil Service and/or the Department of Labor would be responsible for their placement in the federal service or, by negotiation, in state or local government. Such a career system would broaden the basis of recruitment, attract personnel of appropriate quality and eliminate the costly system of reënlistment bonuses and high-cost pension plans. When an enlisted man transferred to the civil service establishment, he would take with him pension benefits equivalent to civil employment that would be paid to him on retirement.

An equivalent system would operate for officers but would go into effect only after the size of the officer corps was reduced. In addition, the length of the officer's term of service would be made more flexible. Retirement with appropriate pension benefits after ten to 12 years is essential to ensure a flow of personnel into the Civil Service which would meet the forces' requirements in regard to rank structure and military tasks to be performed.

Second, an all-volunteer system must deal with the excessive

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

number of general officers that have accumulated in the three services. This concentration thwarts the assignment to important posts of younger men prepared to adapt to the changing environment. The army, in particular, has a deep division between the junior and mid-career officers who actually fought in South Vietnam and the ranking personnel who flew over the battlefield or were in top command positions. Men in their forties who are more prepared for change must be rapidly incorporated into the general officer group to heal the breach and to offer an incentive for able mid-career officers to remain in service. In the immediate future as many as 50 to 60 percent of the general-rank officers will have to be retired, a difficult step. A one-rank deflation for all assignments at the general level is also needed.

Third, the existing worldwide personnel system which leads to continuous, excessive, expensive and disruptive rotation can no longer be justified. Instead, the armed forces, particularly the ground forces, must develop a modern version of the British regimental system—or, in the present context, a modified brigade system. Each man would have a basic unit and would spend a significant portion of his military career within that brigade. For the navy, a home-port concept, and for the air force, a home base, would serve as equivalents.

Fourth, underemployment is a powerful source of negative attitudes toward a military career, especially among young officers. In the past, military personnel were less sensitive to the stimulus and responsibility of their initial assignments, since they could always assume that war would break out and they would be fully engaged. The heavy reliance of the military on short-term officers, and the emergence of the strategy of deterrence, make the intrinsic relevance of the day-to-day job and the avoidance of boredom and futility very important. Many training functions can be transferred from specialized units to operational units both in order to improve training and to reduce the actual amount of underemployment in the latter.

Fifth, there must be a stronger emphasis on Officer Candidate Schools for recruitment and training of new officers. The end of conscription will reduce the pool from which qualified officers can be selected. Officer candidates will become less socially representative—they will be largely from the South, the Southwest and rural and small-town areas. ROTC units must be reorganized so that any college student in the United States, either on

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

entering college or when a junior, will have access to a collegiate ROTC program. In each of the ten major metropolitan areas, there should be a composite program, administered by an existing ROTC group, enrolling students from any accredited college in the area. Such an approach is required if the under-representation of Black officers is to be remedied.

Sixth, the three-step system of in-service professional schools must be consolidated. It is wasteful, often mechanical and repetitious as well as time-consuming. Military officers require extensive education, but many competent officers consider the present system an excessive diversion from professional service. The system should be reduced to a two-tier one, with the interservice component distributed to the service war colleges. A stronger emphasis on brief courses for handling new developments in organization and doctrine would be desirable, as well as permission to substitute civilian schooling for advanced military professional school attendance. In addition, the military academy programs should permit one year of attendance at a civilian university, in the junior year, for example. The academy could have a five-year program with one year free for civilian work experience or service in the enlisted ranks.

Seventh, the services must establish a Department of Defense commission to revise the essentials of military discipline and justice. Combat-ready forces fully sensitive to their heroic traditions and under the closest operational control can be trained and maintained without brutality, personal degradation or "Mickey Mouse" discipline. The Marine Corps may be able to maintain its traditional organizational code of repressive basic training, but an all-volunteer military force must face questions of authority and military forms openly and candidly. For example, extensive saluting on military bases serves no purpose but to degrade the act; saluting can have meaning if it is practiced at selected and significant occasions.

Eighth, it is not the responsibility of military personnel to defend and publicize official military policies; this is the task of elected officials. But the military are not hired "mercenaries;" they cannot be mechanically deprived of participation in community and public affairs. By law, and particularly by judicial decree, military personnel are exercising their particular forms of free speech and citizen petition. In a truly pluralistic society, with dignity and good taste, military personnel, while on active

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

duty, should be able to attend educational and public affairs meetings and state their views on the legitimacy of their profession.

In Germany, the idea of the civilian in uniform has been pressed to the point where regular military personnel—both officers and enlisted men—are permitted to stand for political election while on active duty. In the United States, the military must maintain a nonpartisan posture, *i.e.* a nonparty affiliation, but a broader perspective on civic participation is possible. Military personnel should be permitted to serve on local school boards, run in nonpartisan local elections, and be members of government advisory boards and public panels where they have qualifications and interests.

VI

The all-volunteer armed force faces a dilemma in the next steps of its redeployment. A powerful self-fulfilling prophecy is already at work: each reduction in force serves only to dampen new recruitment, especially officer recruitment. Why enter a profession whose career and promotion opportunities are highly uncertain and declining? A civil service base for the military profession, as described above, is one device for handling this problem. Therefore, paradoxically, the faster the initial rundown to a long-run troop level, the more readily the adaptation can be made to a volunteer force. The phased withdrawal of troops from South Vietnam represents the single major locus from which the overall reduction in manpower has been achieved. The next step in reductions, and especially in ground troop reductions, must come from NATO forces.

While plans are projected for negotiations with the Soviet Union on European security and on mutual and balanced force reduction, economic pressures may require the United States to reduce American contingents to NATO unilaterally. Senator Mike Mansfield has been a persistent advocate of such reductions. An immediate reduction of five to ten percent of the 310,000 troops could be directly implemented without loss of military effectiveness. The American forces in Europe have become excessively bureaucratized, and a reduction would increase operational morale and reduce tensions associated with boredom.

If troop reductions, however limited, are seen as first steps toward a U.S. neo-isolationism and withdrawal from Western Europe, the Brandt initiatives will collapse and there will be a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

major political crisis in Western Europe with profound implications for the United States. The actual size of our troop commitment is not more important than the stability of our intention. Assuming an effective transition to an all-volunteer force with a goal of 150,000 United States troops in Western Europe in three to five years, both effective negotiations with the Soviet Union and a political strategy of reratification of the basic principles of NATO are required. These can be accomplished by sending a U.S. delegation of the highest level—including bipartisan representation from Congress—to prepare a new treaty to be ratified by the President and the Senate. Its essential element would be the restatement of a long-term U.S. troop commitment in Western Europe. Such a declaration would set the minimum force level under various conditions, including successful negotiations at the NATO-Warsaw Pact conference.

The politico-military aspects of a reconstructed NATO would include the following points. First, the projected manpower reductions in Europe would increase the U.S. strategic reserve, which would be available for airborne redeployment to Europe should the international situation require it. The Nixon Doctrine of "no more Vietnams" has important implications for the priority tasks for the strategic reserve that should reassure Western Europe. Second, a NATO rear headquarters in the United States would be in order, where European NATO officers could be assigned for planning, staff work and joint command of U.S. strategic reserve forces. Third, U.S. planning and commitment for NATO should be done on a five-year basis rather than the present year-to-year basis. Fourth, the United States and NATO nations should encourage new manpower systems. For Europe, and especially for Western Germany, militia systems, including six-month conscript service, must be developed. In the United States, in addition to the reforms mentioned, the reserve forces must be fundamentally reorganized into three elements: (1) a ready reserve, capable of two-week deployment; (2) a reserve made up of individuals who, following the Israeli pattern, would serve a short period of time each year as filler personnel in operational units; and (3) a traditional inactive reserve—a manpower pool with some limited training activities, which would be compensated accordingly.

Fifth, the following guidelines are proposed for the NATO-Warsaw Pact conference on mutual and balanced force reduc-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion: (a) A hot line between the headquarters of the Warsaw Pact and NATO headquarters and a joint Warsaw Pact-NATO liaison staff for information and communication should be established immediately, to reduce the threat of accidental war and to implement the surveillance aspects of mutual security arrangements. The joint NATO-Warsaw Pact liaison staff could be located in neutral Switzerland. (b) A balanced reduction of the level of troops should be negotiated step-by-step, first to a 25-percent and then to a 50-percent level taking into consideration the strategic positions, weapons balance and lines of communication of both NATO and Warsaw Pact nations. (c) An effective system of mutual surveillance both to guarantee compliance in the results of negotiation and to monitor deterrence capabilities should be established. On-the-spot inspection is probably not necessary if aerial and electronic surveillance are jointly organized.

All these changes in military organization and troop deployment involve shifts in professional ideology and self-conception. Over a decade ago I offered a definition of a constabulary force. The constabulary concept provides a "continuity with past military experiences and traditions, but it offers a basis for radical adaptation of the profession. The military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory, because it has incorporated a protective military posture doctrine."[1]

Today I would emphasize the conclusion that, unfortunately, the prolonged hostilities in Vietnam have diverted the attention and energy of the military from such a goal. Masses of documents have been written about the changing role of the military in contemporary society, and its essence is widely debated by military officers. The military profession is divided and unclear about how much of the emerging doctrines it will accept. The idea that the military is mainly in the "killing business" dies slowly. But the vitality of the military depends on the transformation of its self-definition, so that peacekeeping alters traditional self-conceptions.

Moreover, the military cannot revive its vitality unless it uses its facilities for a wide range of other national emergency func-

[1] See "The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait" by Morris Janowitz. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press; second edition, 1971.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tions. The basic issue is not, as traditionalists hold, that the military should not be diverted from its fundamental mission. The military has traditionally been engaged in national emergency functions, but the nature and contents of these functions change. In fact, in the reconstruction of the military, it is essential that it use its manpower and vast resources to keep it an active and responsible institution. Such a professional outlook is required to attract and retain bright and highly motivated men who wish to avoid underemployment and get on with social change.

Clearly, the military cannot engage in activities or programs which are better performed by civilian agencies. The essential issue is to make use of the military's standby resources; that is, its ability to respond to emergencies, broadly defined, and to improvise in a crisis. The military is already deeply involved in control of natural disasters—floods, hurricanes, and the like pose emergency situations which require its flexible resources. To natural disasters can be added the increasing scope of man-made disasters: oil spills, power failures and chemical and atomic accidents are likely to increase rather than decrease. The armed forces are indispensable in a great deal of air- and sea-rescue work, to which is being added, experimentally, medical evacuation, especially of victims of road accidents where alternative facilities are not available.

But the major frontier is in environmental control and the handling of particular aspects of pollution and destruction of resources. The Army Corps of Engineers has moved in this direction, but only the first steps have been taken. Many units in the armed forces have contributions to make; and the concept of a military career as part of a civil service career means new patterns of assignment between military and civilian agencies. An armed force of over 1,500,000 men is a significant manpower pool—one that is urgently needed, given the economic pressures of contemporary American society.

The all-volunteer armed force represents the end of the historical phase of the mass armed force. With the emergence of a new type of all-volunteer force, civilian society will have to assume an active role in directing the military to redefine its professional perspectives and to help to understand that peacekeeping through a military presence, deterrence, and participation in the control of national emergencies are the modern definitions of the heroic role.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CHINA AND TAIWAN: THE ECONOMIC ISSUES

By Robert W. Barnett

CAN Mao or the inheritors of Mao's authority entertain the possibility of some "separateness" for any Chinese within his egalitarian One China world? The answer to this question will influence Peking's attitudes toward peaceful coexistence with Taipei, intellectual and cultural diversities at home, and possibilities for future organization of China's economic system.

After a 20-year tradition of relentless mutual hostility, the "recognition" by the United States of the People's Republic of China, implicit in Dr. Henry Kissinger's July 8–11 visit to Peking, produced a sudden and great need for diplomatic recalculation throughout the world. It was inevitable, thereafter, that the People's Republic of China be taken into the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations. And now President Nixon's February conversations with Chinese authorities have focused attention upon what Washington and Peking can agree to do about Taiwan—with Taipei, Seoul and Tokyo, not to mention Moscow, New Delhi and Southeast Asian capitals, likely to perceive transcendent strategic implications in that transaction.

At a press conference last November 30 Dr. Kissinger said: "Our position is that the ultimate disposition, the ultimate relationship of Taiwan to the People's Republic of China, should be settled by direct negotiations between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China.... This is our policy, but it is without prejudice, as I have pointed out, to existing commitments." Last spring the White House had scoffed at the possibility that Taipei and Peking could engage in useful dialogue on such a subject. Which expression of White House attitude is a better reflection of reality depends upon how Peking comes to judge the acceptability of allowing Taiwan some separateness, and under what arrangement.

The United Nations has settled the issue of representation: Peking represents China. The international community now turns to consideration of security in the Taiwan Strait. As seen from Peking, that issue relates to U.S. commitments to and military

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

presence on Taiwan, and to Japan's military potential which since the 1969 Nixon-Sato Communiqué on the Reversion of Okinawa, could be seen to be looming over the Taiwan Strait. However, another pressing issue has been largely ignored: the accommodation of the divergent economic purposes and systems which Peking and Taipei have pursued within their goal of One China.

II

Peking and Taipei are alike in their readiness to support large and costly military systems to cope with their differing defense requirements. Otherwise, however, Peking and Taipei have embraced radically different conceptions of how to cope with the needs of their situations. The success of their methods has been measured in terms of growth of gross national product and trade, social development, popular welfare and political democracy. Leaving aside judgment on their comparative devotion to democracy, what we know suggests that Peking and Taipei can be seen to have been committed to two generally different methods of organizing development which greatly interest economists and planners throughout the world.

Taiwan's commitment to sustained economic growth is outward-looking and depends on trade, and its performance has attracted respect. Peking's method of development has been self-reliant and "culture-permeated" full employment, and its willingness to sacrifice growth of gross national product in that endeavor will attract increasing attention, and not just from poorer countries. Dr. Sabuto Okita, Japan's representative on the Pearson Committee, suggests that all countries concerned with pathological urbanization, with high rates of unemployment and under-employment, and with the frightening environmental costs of overcommitment to growth, can study usefully Peking's employment practices. Chinese manage both systems—not to mention those in Hong Kong, Macao and Singapore. Chiness commitments to one or another definition of social and economic purpose in these places reflect different Chinese responses to different necessities: Chinese capability is what all have in common.

Taiwan's gross national product (GNP) rose from $2 billion in 1960, at an annual rate of almost ten percent, to $5.4 billion in 1970. Per capita annual income rose from $180 to $360 during

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the same period. The rise of Taiwan's exports was even more impressive—$164 million in 1960 to $1.248 billion in 1970, an annual rate of about 25 percent. To the United States alone, Taiwan's exports rose from $19 million to $563 million, while imports from the United States rose from $113 million to $364 million.

Population rose during the decade of the 1960s to make Taiwan one of the most densely populated areas of the world. But Taiwan's achievements in the field of family planning, reflecting concern for the quality of life in individual family units, have been perhaps the most carefully documented in the world. They are studied by other developing countries such as Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia—and, doubtless, by the People's Republic of China as well. Substantial investment has been made in education, and one percent of GNP goes to research and development. Graduates of Taiwan's universities excel in the universities of North America, Japan and Western Europe.

During these ten years, Taiwan saw the end of U.S. economic aid, which had totaled over $1.6 billion, and Taiwan itself commenced foreign assistance programs. Taiwan consolidated all manner of economic links with Japan and the United States. It clung fast to its position in international organizations. And, among Taiwan's leaders, economic purpose gained precedence, quietly and gradually, over big-power political and military pretension.

By 1960 government authorities, after a faltering start, had established a well-managed, well-led economic system for Taiwan's 13 million Formosans and two million mainlanders. Chiang-inspired military, internal security and police expenditures sometimes amounted to over 50 percent of the national budget and 12 percent or more of GNP, but formerly cannibalizing exactions for defense requirements were finally incorporated into a realistic national budget. Industrialization, notwithstanding low capital ratio to output, has brought still unsolved problems of urban underemployment, slums, traffic congestion, air and water pollution and scarce social services. Still, Taiwan, throbbing with activity, had come to offer to private investors, the World Bank and multinational corporations one of the most attractive areas for foreign investment anywhere in the world.

Taiwan's labor force showed itself to be willing and skilled, and wage rates, though rising, were much lower than in Japan,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

incomparably lower than in the United States, and were matched by rising productivity. (In 1968 average daily manufacturing wages were $1.61 in Taiwan, $6.00 in Japan.)

Economic stability encouraged Chinese to save. By 1970 Taiwan's investment rate reached 26 percent of GNP, with the domestic saving rate just behind. Industrial investment took place not only in large cities, but also throughout the countryside, with output by private enterprise rising from 43 percent in 1952 to 70 percent in 1970. The rural population commuted on Italian and Japanese scooters from high productivity farms to widely dispersed rural factories. Between 1964 and 1969 purchases of TV sets rose 18 times in rural areas compared to seven times in cities.

Government bureaucracy and the Taiwanese and Mainland management classes created new export-oriented lines of production, and then found new foreign markets for output. Once trading mainly with Japan and the United States, Taiwan has widened its commercial horizons and is trading now with 50 or 60 countries around the world. It is making a conspicuous export push into Western Europe. And, perhaps foreshadowing new attitudes toward trade with communist China, it is considering trade possibilities with East European countries. Taiwan's business community is delighted to hear cabinet members declare that Taiwan will trade with any country, whether or not that country shifts political ties to the People's Republic of China. Cabinet members are also now saying that Taiwan will depend more on economic strength, trade and technology than on military power: Taiwan will learn from the Japanese model.

Those who have become acquainted with the managers of this remarkable success story observe that they have gained enormous self-confidence. Despite numerous irritations and some serious commercial setbacks—recently, the U.S. demands for textile restraint—they have learned to coexist, to their economic advantage, with Japan and the United States. They look boldly for economic opportunity everywhere, and many of the architects of this system display conspicuous indifference toward the "politics" of President Nixon's visit to Peking. Rightly or wrongly, they consider Taiwan's destiny to lie, almost regardless of politics, in the successful economic management of Taiwan itself. Successful pursuit of this destiny would cause Taiwan to achieve $1,000 per capita GNP—the threshold for passing from a devel-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

oping to an advanced economy—by 1980. Taiwan's leaders believe that this achievement can resolve strains between Taiwanese and Mainlanders and even make possible the future accommodation of the province of Taiwan with the other provinces of China. A worldwide retreat to the protectionism of the 1930s would likely reverse trends and shatter this confidence. War, or serious fear of it, would certainly do so.

This, then, suggests something about the Taiwan growth model. But to envisage Taiwan as a functioning province of One China, it is necessary to cross the Taiwan Strait.

III

During the ten years from 1960 to 1970 the gross national product of the People's Republic of China—at almost $80 billion—may not have grown at all. Exports may have slightly declined. Per capita GNP fell. Early in the decade, Peking felt the impact of the precipitate withdrawal of Soviet participation in China's industrial growth. It attempted an amateurish Great Leap Forward, then beat an unruly retreat. It sought quick perfection, then allowed erosion of its commune system. From 1966 to 1969 the Cultural Revolution brought dislocations of China's entire production and institutional structure. Schools closed down. Colossal transfers of population took place. Transportation was unreliable. There continued, nevertheless, production related to national defense: nuclear technology, some missile delivery capabilities, and for the world's third largest air force.

But until quite recently, Peking presented the impression of an introspective, slogan-obsessed, xenophobic society, grossly mismanaging its affairs, with politics always master over economics. Serious anxiety over threats to its borders—lent justification by blood spilled on the banks of the Amur and Ussuri in the spring of 1969, by U.S. bombing raids on Laos and North Vietnam, and by occasional Republic of China commando forays on the Chinese east coast—caused uncertainty in Peking as to the allocation of priorities. It was a question how much emphasis should be placed on production for national defense and how much for egalitarian distribution of national resources to meet welfare needs. A high level of saving was maintained. There was steady capital formation. However, there appeared to be great disparities in the efficiency of industrial laborers engaged in both essential and "make-work" production processes.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Throughout the decade, however, China did arrange to avoid famine.

The reporting of American newspapermen who visited China last spring, and recent observations of many other careful China watchers, now raise doubt that the economy of the People's Republic of China was in as deep a state of general stagnation and disorientation during the decade of the 1960s as earlier reports suggested. Despite the strong tides of distracting and often contradictory Maoist exhortation, some ideas about national growth may have been evolving that were essentially pragmatic, and often innovative—particularly for a very large country.

With a population of over 750 million that is growing at more than two percent annually, Peking has had to cope with the nightmarish necessity of feeding 15 million additional mouths every year. Authorities all over the country are now administering what may be the most comprehensive and effective national family planning strategy in the world. There has been ambivalence. There were some setbacks during the Cultural Revolution. And Mao Tse-tung, noting the force of tradition in the countryside, warned Edgar Snow not to exaggerate China's achievements. However, there is good evidence that all forms of contraception, abortion and sterilization are legalized. The pill is widely and freely available. A once-a-month pill is being used. Social pressures are exerted to postpone the age of marriage—to 25 years for women, and 28 for men. In some parts of the country, ration cards for families are not issued to cover family requirements beyond those of father, mother and two children.

China's scourge has been famine. And Peking's literate leaders doubtless have pondered the way dynastic historians have associated famine with loss of the Mandate of Heaven. In any case, communist Chinese authorities have avoided famine. For a large part of the decade of the 1960s one-third of all of China's foreign-exchange earnings was used for the import of food and fertilizers. Often severe malnutrition could not be avoided. But in bad years undernourishment was distributed evenly. In 1970, Chou En-lai could tell Edgar Snow that China's rice production had reached a higher level than ever before in its history and that China had laid aside a stockpile of more than 40 million tons.

Meanwhile, current estimates of China's industrial activity suggest that during 1970–71 there has been an overall 15 percent surge in output, attributable in part to under-utilization of plant

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for many years, and in part to creation of new investment capital in rural areas. And, although investment in heavy industry had been cut back from what it was in the 1950s, China's steel production reached 18 million tons, or about two times prewar Japan's. With the matrix of heavy industrial plant and engineering talent which has been considered essential for security purposes, China produces all of its essential military hardware, and supports a nuclear establishment.

Meanwhile, the work ethic, in a sheer primitive sense, has been glorified. City populations are mobilized for work in the country. Professors are taken from classrooms to work on farms and then brought back, often claiming to have gained a new and ennobling consciousness of the needs of the total society of which they were a part. Professor Yang, of New York University, a Nobel Prize winner for physics, reports that Chinese scientists find that exposure to mundane "experimental" situations enhances the fertility of their theoretical disciplines.

New means of spreading technology have been devised. Workers from small towns and villages, deep in the country, are brought to serve brief apprenticeships in large, modern city factories. Thus, they get short periods of exposure to machinery not yet available in their home towns. Stimulated by visual observation and first-hand experience with new techniques of production, they undertake improvisation and modest invention of crude but improved productive processes upon their return to their villages. One reporter visited a shop where burned-out electric light bulbs could be brought to have filaments replaced.

Prior to 1959, Peking had abandoned the Soviet growth model with its bias toward creating large centers of industrial production which required heavy investment in transportation. Chinese authorities reduced the need for investment in transportation by investing steadily over the years in small-scale electrical generating capacity which they installed near local markets, in rural areas throughout every province of China. During periods of the year when farms needed artificial irrigation, generators pumped water. In off seasons, electric power illuminated previously dark huts and homes, and contributed to the gradual mechanization of an increasingly diversified home industry. Writing about these trends, Tillman Durdin of *The New York Times* reported that:

Communes feature different and varying kinds of industry. Many make

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

trucks and chemical fertilizer. Most generate their own electricity by means of elementary-up-to-sophisticated installations. Commune industrial operations are naturally less efficient than big mass-production establishments, but they make maximum use of rural manpower, diversify the rural economy, educate the rural populace in modern industrial practices, give rural youth satisfying opportunities to move from monotonous farm tasks into more challenging industrial-type work, facilitate distribution in a country short of most means of transport, and promote the self-reliance and the decentralization of the economy and of economic authority that are major present-day objectives of the regime. (*Problems of Communism,* September-October 1971.)

Last September the world press reported a mystifying spectacle of power rearrangement within Chinese communist leadership circles. Tensions were suspected among service chiefs and between them and party and administrative authorities. And, inasmuch as the Chinese army had had a very large civic action responsibility and seemed to many observers to have been the administrative matrix upon which much national planning recently depended, the stability of government seemed to be at stake. John Stewart Service, returning in mid-autumn from Szechuan and other more frequently visited parts of China, reported that he saw or heard nothing to suggest unusual political or military activity, and that what he observed in Szechuan refuted suspicions that Durdin and other foreign correspondents had been shown "Potemkin villages" in East China. China's nuclear achievements have been the work of an ideologically and functionally protected—a separate—community of sophisticated Chinese scientists and engineers.[1] However, if otherwise China's present economic system is the result of basic "crawling" responses to practical necessity—as it seems to be—rather than the product of obedience to rigid development blueprints, it is unlikely that its operation has been much affected even by the disappearance from the political scene of Mao's heir and his three top service chiefs.

IV

One clue to how planners in Peking and Taipei may be assessing differently the consequences of Peking's new membership in the United Nations and President Nixon's visit to Peking may lie in trade statistics. The present value of foreign trade for Tai-

[1] One student of China offers the intriguing thought that Mao Tse-tung has invested in an incipient nuclear weapons capacity because to do so was really cheaper than to invest in a vast panoply of conventional arms such as tanks, warships, submarines, etc., which might otherwise be China's equipment requirements as a major power.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

wan and the People's Republic of China stands about equal at some $4 billion. Thus, exports as a percentage of gross national product are about 25 percent for Taiwan's 14 million people and about two percent for the People's Republic of China's 750 million. The contrast in trade dependence is a revealing index of the degree to which one is outward-looking and the other inward-looking. Taiwan, oriented toward trade and growth, will survive its departure from the United Nations as a significant participant in the commercial and financial life of the international community, not even very dependent upon foreign investment to sustain its growing economic powers. Accession to the United Nations will not much affect the way the People's Republic of China tries to attain self-support for its huge population—preserving national safety and sacrificing growth, if necessary, in order to further the cause of high morale and "cultural" development.

In Peking's order of strategic priorities the protection of frontiers and the recovery of lost territories have always come first. After that, Peking has sought de facto and de jure recognition of its big-power status. Only thereafter, and then only as a means to achieve larger strategic ends, Peking has cared about belonging to and operating within international organizations. Its admission to the United Nations on October 25, 1971, came as a great and unsought surprise. Curiously, Taipei's priorities may not have been much different, even if its tactics were. On such matters as Tibet, Mongolia and the claim to certain islands of the Ryukyu chain, Peking and Taipei have always talked alike. Their positions are *Chinese*. And Peking's purpose during the noisy and frightening 1958 Taiwan Strait confrontation was more to separate Taipei from Washington than to separate Quemoy from Taiwan. (Ironically, a result of the clamor was to separate Peking and Moscow as nuclear allies.) Before, during and after the Quemoy crisis, Mao and Chiang looked upon that island alike: the linchpin that made Quemoy and Taiwan parts of One China. An exposed garrison of 65,000 Nationalist troops on Quemoy, extremely vulnerable to blockade or air envelopment, has been offered as hostage to that concept. A change in Quemoy's present status would strengthen the possibility of a permanently separate and independent Taiwan, which neither Chiang nor Mao desires. But, allowing for the history of their common aim, what practical system, short of one imposed by

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

military conquest, might bring in sight either Chiang's or Mao's idea of One China?

Professor J. K. Fairbank has often referred to a tradition of Chinese suzerain authority over semi-autonomous territories. He can envisage arrangements between Peking and Taipei which would permit Taiwan to administer a social and economic system very different from that found elsewhere within the People's Republic of China, while general authority for the defense and foreign policy of China, including Taiwan, would be exercised by Peking.

It may have been toward such a political goal that Dr. Kissinger said on November 30 that Chinese authorities in Peking and Taipei should now work out arrangements. He may have been encouraged to consider this practical on the strength of Chou En-lai's observation to Seymour Topping that: "Chiang Kai-shek is opposed to the so-called Two Chinas and is also opposed to One China and one independent entity of Taiwan. In the past we have been allied with Chiang Kai-shek, and we became hostile to him, but on this question we have our common point—there can be only One China. So a way could be found."

He may also have been encouraged by what Ross Terrill had reported to be the Chinese view of the Taiwan problem: remove the American military presence and the "political gulf between Peking and Taipei . . . will be closed by give and take between the two sets of Chinese, in a process of reabsorption that could stretch out over decades."[2] However, it would be a mistake to pass lightly over the practical difficulties of any such modus operandi, in economic, let alone ideological terms. Taipei and Peking—both assuming Washington's sure support of Taipei in most situations—have been warring and skirmishing with each other for over 20 years. They have no economic relations. And many will say that it makes little sense to expect economic relations between them to become interesting or practical at any early date.

It may be useful, however, to recall how Peking has come to regard Hong Kong, and nearby Macao. These British and Portuguese colonies are egregious symbols of everything that Maoist doctrine condemns. They were seized by Westerners under shameful circumstances that remain profoundly humiliating to all Chinese, not just the ideologues of Maoist China. And today

[2] *The Atlantic*, January 1972.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

both colonies accommodate Chinese renegades, deviationists and out-and-out enemies of Peking. Nowhere else in the world does classical laissez-faire capitalism, with all its "wealth, wickedness, and predatory competition," operate in a more pure form. Almost all travelers are stunned by the contrast between frenetic Macao and Hong Kong, and the austere, egalitarian and morally obsessed populace living on the Kwantung plains just across the colonial borders.

Hong Kong and Macao are vulnerable, and were Peking inclined to seize them, it could do so in a matter of hours. Upon at least two occasions during the 1960s Peking could have gained effective control over the administration of Hong Kong with little risk, if any, that the international community could or would have retaliated. In 1962, when food shortages in southwest China caused large-scale migration of undernourished Chinese into these territories, and in 1967 when excesses of the Cultural Revolution brought about reckless resort to violence within Chinese communist organizations everywhere, Hong Kong nearly found it impossible to cope with these threats to its administrative capability. If the Chinese authorities had then cut off Hong Kong's mainland water supplies, the local authorities could not have furnished a basis for survival, not to mention civic order, for its four million inhabitants. Still, Peking permitted the anachronism of colonial Hong Kong to survive on "Chinese" territory. In 1967, Lisbon asked Peking to devise a dignified way for Portugal to be divested of responsibility for Macao, and Peking refused. Thus, Peking has spurned an opportunity to correct the "unequal treaties" upon which Hong Kong and Macao depend. Could it be because, regardless of history and ideology, Hong Kong and Macao are too valuable, left just as they are?

About one-third of Peking's foreign-exchange earnings come from sales to Hong Kong. This was, incidentally, almost exactly what Peking paid for its heavy food imports through the 1960s. Once only a trade and banking center, Hong Kong amazed the world by its rapid industrialization. The present size and sophistication of its industrial banking and commercial activities and the free movement of persons and technologies which it permits, give the People's Republic of China the profit of continuing acquaintance with and exposure to the modernizing processes of a separate and nearby system. Such a system appeared to be of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

value to Peking, even if the principles guiding Hong Kong's political and economic life could not be administered in all of continental China—or perhaps because they could not be.

When the New Territories and Kowloon revert, under treaty, to Peking's authority in 1999, will they, and the general system which has caused them to thrive, still be too valuable to seize and stifle? And if Peking were now to ask the same kind of question about Taiwan, could it not insist that Taipei reduce or liquidate its military establishment, but then let the Taiwan economy continue to operate independently from Peking's economic controls? Could not arrangements even be made to give to Taiwan a preferred access to trade and to invest in the mainland market?[8]

Nothing in the Chinese press—either on Taiwan or the China mainland—gives the slightest hint that Chinese planners are thinking in terms of any future economic coöperation between Taiwan and the mainland in what might be, in effect, a Taiwan Free Port Area of the People's Republic of China. In fact, most foreign observers are inclined to believe, notwithstanding the intriguing possibilities suggested by Dr. Kissinger's November press conference, that Taiwan with its growing affluence was likely to drift, with American acquiescence, toward Japan-oriented independence. Or, they believed that Peking would seize Taiwan, sooner or later, through intimidation, subversion or outright assault, and thereafter make it submit to Peking's overall authority.

But Peking's attitude toward Hong Kong justifies hesitation in jumping to either of those conclusions. Long before the "expulsion" of the Republic of China from the United Nations, thoughtful Chinese on Taiwan were ridiculing the notion of return to the mainland by military means and envisaged a return of Chinese on Taiwan to their homeland as highly sophisticated, ideologically agnostic technocrats. Implicit in that dream seems

[8] Taiwan and pre-World War II Shanghai have had similar growth experiences. Could they arrange to operate—like China's nuclear community—somewhat separately from the rest of Peking's continental system? Shanghai's present reputation for extreme "leftist" deviation from many Peking-directed policies makes this possibility now seem sheer fantasy. But for many decades Shanghai traders, bankers, industrial managers, technicians and workers, whether at work in Shanghai or finding new homes elsewhere, have been prime movers in accelerated modernization throughout continental China, and also for more than a generation in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Visitors to great cities that have suffered military assault or the invasion of radicalizing ideas—Leningrad, Warsaw, Hamburg, Yokohama, to mention a few—glimpse indestructible qualities in them. Some believe Shanghai to be such a city.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to have been the expectation of "dynastic changes" on the mainland and the emergence there of a new liberalizing leadership. It was recognized that whether guided by Mao or his successors, Peking would control the timing and terms of such an event. Were Mao himself to permit it, Peking's motive might be twofold. First, it would end ambiguities as to military commitments and intentions in the Taiwan Strait which encourage the drift of Taiwan toward independence and the prospect of major war at a time when greater threats to China's safety bear down upon Peking from the north.

Second, it would gain China a modernizing Taiwan Free Port Area and economic system, at last under the security and foreign policy control of Peking itself. Meanwhile, in Taipei one anxiety about moving toward peaceful coexistence would overshadow others that are obvious: Can a government in Peking which has suffered repeated upheavals over the past 20 years be expected to deliver on an arrangement which present leaders might enter into with Taipei?

The United States should ponder the costs and gains for the international community were Peking induced to progress toward a One China dual economic system. With a growth-oriented foreign trade and investment sector made up, functionally, of Hong Kong's four million and Taiwan's 14 million, linked perhaps with Shanghai's 12 million, trading preferentially with a Chinese continental system—still, for strategic and ideological reasons, necessarily committed to full employment and cultural egalitarianism—this One China could constitute an economic and social force of formidable maneuverability on the international scene. Its "export-oriented" sector alone might soon match the economic powers of a Holland or a Belgium.

Under present assumptions, Japanese projections of mainland China's foreign trade forecast a value of only $8 billion by 1980; American projections are far lower. "China trade," including the trade of Hong Kong and Taiwan, and mainland China's trade through these entrepôt areas as well as directly with various foreign countries, provide dynamic possibilities which could alter dramatically previous notions of China's trade potentialities. And, no less important, movement in this direction would reassure China's neighbors that Peking is truly committed to its five principles of coexistence because it is ready to abide by their spirit even within the One China system itself.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Peking insists that it must reclaim Taiwan, but that assimilation could be a lengthy process. It is fair to ask what might be going on, economically, during that time. Taipei has had a good experience with its own Free Port Area at Kaohsiung. Perhaps that could persuade Peking to try the same model with Taiwan. Or, if the mutual gain from trade is clearly recognized, perhaps the German *Zollverein* of the early nineteenth century might be the model—or, a payments union under which foreign-exchange earnings could be pooled.

If Peking and Taipei were to proceed, despite great difficulties, toward understandings on arrangements for economic coexistence, this could create the precondition which might justify Taipei and Washington in terminating the 1954 mutual defense treaty. This would end the anomaly of Washington trying to relax tensions and normalize relations with the People's Republic of China, while being committed, as a matter of history, law and honor, to mutual defense arrangements with what Peking regards as one of China's provinces. It might go far toward easing Prime Minister Sato's difficulties in proceeding toward normalization of Tokyo's relations with Peking, blocked now by Peking's insistence that Japan repudiate its peace treaty with the Republic of China.

There can be, strictly speaking, no normalization of relations between Peking and Washington until the United States defense treaty of 1954 with the Republic of China is terminated. If the American intention to carry out the obligations of that treaty is seen as uncertain and ambiguous, Seoul, Tokyo and perhaps even our NATO allies would begin to suspect that the United States is entertaining the possibility of adopting new attitudes toward all treaty commitments. For this reason, if no other, the White House must believe—and Peking would probably honor the motive—that neither national interest nor world order would be served by a United States betrayal of its contract with Taiwan.

Moreover, against the history of past antagonisms, Washington must fear that even mutually advantageous economic arrangements for coexistence between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China within a commonly understood and accepted frame of One China might require, for a while, an external guarantee that such arrangements would not serve aggressive or subversive purposes. The Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 remains such a guarantee for Taiwan and the Pescadores,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and within its terms and tradition, the United States furnishes military assistance, stations personnel on Taiwan, and has created links between Taiwan and surrounding United States base areas. Washington, Peking, Taipei and Tokyo would all gain if there were credible self-perpetuating understandings to demilitarize the Taiwan Strait because the real self-interest of all participating parties would be obvious. Having participated in such understandings, the United States could then totally remove its involvement in the military establishment on Taiwan and terminate the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty. International participation in provisional guarantees during a period of transition would end when both Peking and Taipei desired to remove all foreign participation in their relations with each other.

If we take seriously Chou En-lai's anxieties about a Washington and Tokyo sponsorship of Taiwan independence, some eventual pattern of accommodation of this sort is very probable if only because its alternative is likelihood of a war from which all of the countries of northeast Asia would suffer deeply, and only the Soviet Union—if even it—might benefit. Meanwhile, the matrix for the refinement and elaboration of future security understandings could be the peaceful coexistence of the economic systems of Taiwan and the People's Republic of China.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE ESSENTIAL DOMINO: AMERICAN POLITICS AND VIETNAM

By Leslie H. Gelb

AS Henry Kissinger has written, public support is "the acid test of a foreign policy." For a President to be successful in maintaining his nation's security he needs to believe, and others need to believe, that he has solid support at home. It was President Johnson's judgment that if the United States permitted the fall of Vietnam to communism, American politics would turn ugly and inward and the world would be a less safe place in which to live. Later, President Nixon would declare: "The right way out of Vietnam is crucial to our changing role in the world, and the peace in the world." In order to gain support for these judgments and the objectives in Vietnam which flowed from them, our Presidents have had to weave together the steel-of-war strategy with the strands of domestic politics.

Neither the Americans nor the Vietnamese communists had good odds for a traditional military victory in Vietnam. Given the mutual will to continue the war and self-imposed American restraint in the use of force, stalemate was the most likely outcome.

This common perception had a critical impact on the strategies of both sides. It meant that the "winner" would be the one whose will to persist gave out first. Hanoi's will, because of the nature of its government, society and economy, and because the North Vietnamese were fighting in and for their country, was firmer by far than Washington's. Washington's will, because of the vagaries of American politics and the widespread dislike of interminable and indeterminate Asian land wars, presented an inviting target. For both sides, then, U.S. domestic politics—public support and opposition to the war—was to be the key stress point.

American public opinion was the essential domino. Our leaders knew it. Hanoi's leaders knew it. Each geared its strategy—both the rhetoric and the conduct of the war—to this fact.

Hanoi adopted what seems to have been a two-pronged strategy to cause U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam by playing on American domestic politics. The first aim was to try to convince Americans that unless U.S. forces withdrew, the killing of Amer-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

icans would never end. Hanoi's leaders seemed to have hoped that as the war dragged on, Americans would come to see a hopeless portrait of corrupt Saigon leadership and an ineffective South Vietnamese army. At the same time, Hanoi would seek to demonstrate a willingness to match force with force at ever-increasing levels. If the American public, or significant minorities of the public, could be convinced of these factors, continuation of the war by the U.S. leadership would become bad politics.

The second aim of Hanoi's strategy, as I imagine it, was to provide a face-saving exit for American leaders. It would not be enough—indeed, it might be dangerous from Hanoi's view—to leave official Washington in a situation where withdrawal could only mean defeat. That might lead to unlimited escalation of the war. American leaders had to be assured that withdrawal could take place without severe withdrawal symptoms. From time to time, Hanoi offered settlement packages that were not without appeal. These proposals, however, did not appeal to our leaders because they were not looking for a face-saving way out, but for a noncommunist South Vietnam.

Perhaps the surest sign that Hanoi's strategy made sense was that our own leaders also believed that American politics was the Achilles heel.

Officials rarely write memos with any explicit reference to domestic affairs, and seldom even talk about them except to friends and newspapermen off-the-record. The unfounded but nevertheless potent myth about politics stopping at the water's edge creates great pressure to keep one's mouth shut, to think and speak of foreign affairs as if it were something sacred. After all, foreign policy deals with the security of our nation, and this is no subject for narrow political advantage. President Truman once told a State Department official who dared to speak directly on the subject that he should not tell him about domestic problems, but about "what is right."

The public literature emanating from the inner circles is nearly silent on the connections between foreign policy and domestic politics. And officials are almost as wary of talking about domestic politics as they are of writing on the subject. We get glimpses of those few instances in odd ways. For example, the point of Kenneth O'Donnell's article in the August 7, 1970 issue of *Life* is to assure us that President Kennedy was waiting for the right moment to pull out of Vietnam. That right moment for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

President Kennedy, O'Donnell declares, was after the 1964 presidential elections when the issue could no longer be used against him. Or, we hear from close associates of President Johnson that on a few occasions he would guardedly talk on the subject. Later, in his memoirs, he wrote:

> . . . I knew our people well enough to realize that if we walked away from Vietnam and let Southeast Asia fall, there would follow a divisive and destructive debate in our country. . . . A divisive debate about "who lost Vietnam" would be, in my judgment, even more destructive to our national life than the argument over China had been. . . . Our allies . . . throughout the world would conclude that our word was worth little or nothing . . . [Moscow and Peking] could not resist the opportunity to expand their control into the vacuum of power. . . . With Moscow and Peking . . . moving forward, we would return to a world role to prevent their full takeover of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East—*after* they had committed themselves.

Few will deny that what our Presidents chose to do or chose not to do in Vietnam was very much tied to domestic politics. Yet, the myth is potent, and official silence on the subject prevails. Presidents suffer because the connections between foreign and domestic affairs, while talked about privately, are not treated in a systematic way. So far as one knows, critical assumptions about what will or will not garner popular support are left unchallenged. For example, nowhere in the executive branch of government did one feel free to do a paper which said "Here is how the right-wing could be contained if we accepted Hanoi's best offer." In this way the President is supposed to "keep his options open." As was the case in Vietnam, however, he may succeed in trapping himself. Another cost of this silence is that analysts trying to piece decisions back together for history are left without evidence.

Academicians and public-opinion experts have helped to perpetuate the myth in their own way by "demonstrating" that foreign policy simply is not a salient issue to the voter and that whatever the President says and does goes. Presidents have, I think, known better. Citizens may not single out national security affairs as the basis for their votes—although war and peace issues often are so mentioned—but the security area inevitably plays an important part in determining their overall impression of how the President is doing his job. Moreover, communications leaders and "élites" judge the President's performance with regard to national security, and the mood which they convey to the public affects public appraisals of the man in the White House.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

II

On the surface, it seemed that our Presidents should have no special problems about U.S. goals in Vietnam. While no one presumed that Asian land wars were popular, there was evident general acceptance of U.S. worldwide security responsibilities among the public, press and Congress. And yet, problems did arise.

One problem grew out of how to talk publicly about U.S. goals without tying our hands in Saigon and in negotiations. In National Security Action Memorandum 52 of May 11, 1961, President Kennedy approved the objective of "prevent(ing) Communist domination of South Vietnam." In NSAM 288 of March 17, 1964, President Johnson's objective was defined as "an independent non-Communist South Vietnam." But our leaders did not choose to use this language when talking to the American people. Public statements of goals came closest to the private formulations in phrases like "stopping aggression." The classified language of the NSAMs was apparently deemed too negative and not in line with the American tradition. Something positive and more in keeping with American mythology was required, and so the public goals became "self-determination," "free elections," and "permitting the South Vietnamese freely to determine their own future."

As a practical matter, self-determination language tended to commit Washington to the existing Saigon government—perhaps to a greater extent than even those who backed that régime desired. Washington's representatives in Saigon made much of the necessity and virtue of holding elections. Elections, so Saigon's leaders were told, would help to sell the war to the American people. When Saigon's leaders obliged, held elections and predictably won them, Washington found itself confronted with a government that had become "legitimate." And this legitimacy conferred upon the winners increased bargaining strength. The Thieu and Ky power groups were thereby better able to resist pressures for reform. Legitimacy in American eyes also invested their régime with an enhanced voice in negotiations. As an ally, Saigon had the right to consultations. As a legitimate government, Saigon expected and received the right to approve the beginning of negotiations and the terms of settlement. As a consequence, attaining a settlement that did not ensure the perpetuation of the incumbent Saigon régime became highly improbable.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Although it must be said that many Washington policy-makers were not troubled by these problems, there were also many who both shared official aims and wanted reform and flexibility. These people found themselves without leverage.

A second problem was how to talk publicly about goals without unleashing pressures for the unlimited use of force. While the objective of a noncommunist South Vietnam was specific, our leaders did not want to employ maximum force to achieve it. President Johnson prohibited use of U.S. ground and air forces in Cambodia, ground forces in Laos, invasion of North Vietnam; he also restricted air power in the North. He did not want to risk a wider war and he sought to minimize civilian casualties. But unlimited ends, in time, are bound to lead to a call for unlimited means and the possibility always existed that popular frustration or passion would bring about irresistible demands to make means consistent with ends.

A third problem developed in 1966 as the ends of the war themselves came into question. From this point on, President Johnson was faced with a delicate choice. On the one hand, he could have chosen to wave the "bloody flag" and infuse the war with popular emotion. This, in the President's estimation, would have lit right-wing fires to win the war, thus eroding barriers against the all-out use of force. And once these barriers were torn down, so Lyndon Johnson apparently reasoned, right-wing demands could not be controlled. Such a strategy also would have been incompatible with the President's political style, which emphasized consensus above all. On the other hand, he could run parallel to this line by challenging his critics with innuendo and with the argument that fighting locally in Vietnam was preventing the outbreak of large-scale aggression elsewhere. President Johnson picked this course. Instead of insinuating that his critics were traitors or communists, he called them "nervous Nellies" and "prophets of gloom and doom." Instead of holding parades down Pennsylvania Avenue, he held award ceremonies in the Oval Office. As the war dragged on, however, none of this was sufficient to quell the growing opposition.

III

The fact that the war was dragging on related in part to the historical roots of the conflict in Vietnam and to the means which Presidents Kennedy and Johnson chose to fight it. Gradual esca-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lation was the chosen strategy for fighting the war. This fitted in intellectually with the Kennedy-Johnson military doctrine of flexible and controlled response. In Vietnam, it meant a "slow squeeze" bombing policy for North Vietnam and an attrition policy for South Vietnam. Decisions about means, however, were based upon judgments about both the least risky way to fight the war and the best way to maintain public support at home.

The constraints which domestic politics imposed on the air war against the North were aimed at minimizing civilian casualties and the loss of pilots. This meant avoiding key population centers and other highly defended areas. Such constraints were reinforced by diplomatic judgments which sought to minimize the risk of confrontation with China and Russia. (All this, however, did not prevent the bombing of most fixed targets and the dropping of more explosive tonnage than in all World War II.) The strategic decision to bomb in a gradual but rising pattern (Rolling Thunder) rather than a simultaneous whole system campaign (the Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS] eight-week plan) was probably made on diplomatic grounds.

It is also true that the bombing itself became a salient political issue as pressures to begin negotiations increased. While American right-wing and governmental leaders kept insisting on major concessions for stopping the bombing, doves argued that it should be stopped only in return for Hanoi's promise to begin talks. Whether and on what terms to stop the bombing emerged as the most symbolic political issue of the war in 1967 and 1968.

Domestic politics imposed a dominant constraint on the size and development of the ground war in the South as well. As many U.S. servicemen as possible could be sent to Vietnam as quickly as possible for short terms of service, subject only to a presidential prohibition against calling up the Reserves. In accordance with established military procedure, U.S. force posture was designed to expand by means of Active Reserve and National Guard call-ups. But to do so would be to disrupt lives of many American families. Because the President did not want to incur this political liability, he chose to deplete and weaken U.S. forces stationed in Europe and America and to increase draft calls. The burden fell on the young and the poor; for this and other reasons, political opposition to the war tended to congeal around these groups and their legislative allies. Not until March 1968 did the JCS and their political allies outside the govern-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment succeed in forcing the President's hand on the Reserve issue, and then he acceded only to a 25,000-man call-up.

If, after 1965, force decisions called for the *maximum* possible, given domestic and diplomatic constraints, domestic politics dictated the *minimum* necessary disruption of American life. This was the case not only with respect to Reserve call-ups, but with respect to the economics of the war. President Johnson wanted guns and butter. He did not inform his chief economic advisers of the fall 1965 decision to achieve a force level of 175,000 men. He resisted pressures for increased taxes throughout 1966. Finally, in late 1967, he asked for a ten percent surtax, but this fell far short of paying for the mounting costs of the war. Moreover, he refused to let congressional leaders call it a war tax. Short-run prosperity was purchased at the price of long-run inflation.

Domestic politics also impelled the leaders of the Johnson administration to become fire-fighters. Actions in Vietnam, if not dictated, were often shaped by daily criticisms at home. The many false starts on the pacification program came in response to charges by legislators and journalists that Johnson was not doing enough about "the other war." If legislators insisted that Saigon's forces do more of the fighting, willy-nilly, the size of those forces was increased. No matter that the issue was quality, not size. Size could be fixed faster. And so it was with many other issues as the Administration sought vainly to paper over critical television reports and front-page news stories with short-run solutions.

But short-term fixes and a policy of not demanding domestic sacrifices were not enough. The President also had to manipulate time horizons carefully. Just as Hanoi tried to portray the war as never-ending, Washington had to feed the impression of near-term winnability. The public would not stand for gradualism if it promised only open-ended fighting with continued U.S. fatalities. Thus was born the policy of controlled optimism. Pressure from the White House was felt throughout the government, into the field, down to the very bottom of the command structure. Show progress politically and militarily! Visitors to the Oval Office would be treated to a look at President Johnson pulling Ambassador Lodge's or Ambassador Bunker's "weekly nodis" cable out of his inside jacket pocket and hearing how things were getting better. Pointed questions about when the war would end

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were side-stepped if possible. Only if answers had to be provided would the truth be admitted. (Fortunately for Administration strategy, the news media made little of these isolated revelations.) Admitting to the public that the war would take time, officials seemed to have reasoned, would play into Hanoi's hands. So, whenever possible, the Administration assured the public of ultimate success. Some officials were allowed to climb out on a limb and predict imminent victory. Others volunteered their genuine optimism. The net effect was to lead the public to think that the end was near. But the dilemma of this strategy could not have been lost on our leaders. Optimism without results would only work for so long; after that, it would produce the credibility gap.

IV

Behind the fall into the credibility gap and beyond the President's domestic strategy, there resided a vital and unquestioned assumption—that America was basically hawkish and that the forces of conservatism, if not reaction, would always prevail over the liberal groups. This assumption probably underpinned President Kennedy's remarks to Kenneth O'Donnell and Senator Mansfield in 1963 that he was waiting until after the next election before changing direction in Vietnam. In the ensuing years, President Johnson occasionally lectured reporters and his own aides on the politics of the war. He is supposed to have told them that they were worrying about the wrong domestic opposition. They were worrying, so the stories ran, about the liberals and the doves, but the real problem was the conservatives. They had "done in" President Truman over China. They still held the reins of power in the congressional committees. They were the difference between the success and failure of Great Society legislation. And waiting in the wings was latent right-wing McCarthyism, threatening to strike at all that liberals held dear if a President of the United States ever lost a war. Although none of these stories can be taken at face value, the point is there—the nation, in the opinion of our leaders, would not tolerate the loss of a "free" country to communism.

Were Presidents Kennedy and Johnson correct in their estimation of American politics as essentially conservative? Was the strategy of gradualism consistent with these assumptions? And was this strategy the best way of convincing Hanoi that they had the public support necessary to stay the course in Vietnam?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The evidence on the first question is mixed. For the assumption that U.S. politics were essentially conservative, we have the facts that: professional politicians widely held this view; conservatives did influence the Congress disproportionately to their numbers; President Truman did suffer because of China and Korea; public opinion polls from 1954 until a year ago did show a majority of Americans against losing South Vietnam to communism. Against this assumption, we have the facts that: the alternatives in many of the Vietnam polls (unilateral withdrawal or annihilation of the enemy) gave the respondent little choice; other polls showed a majority against losing to communism, but also showed a majority against using U.S. forces to accomplish this; polls on foreign affairs strongly tend to follow the presidential lead; the President's overall popularity was dropping in the polls; and the majority of Americans eventually did turn against the war, or at least against fighting at any sizable cost in lives and dollars.

Perhaps the answer is that our Presidents were right about the conservative thrust of American politics until March 1968, and that it took the experience of the Vietnam War to deflate public passions about losing countries to communism.

The answer to the second question—did the strategy of gradualism fit the assumption of hawkishness?—is yes, but more than that as well. On the surface, the strategy was directed toward the right wing. As the war went on, gradualism did become the functional equivalent of escalation. And escalation, in turn, was supposed to meet not only the increasing military needs in the field, but appease the hawks at home as well. Yet, the right wing was not satisfied. They always wanted much more than Johnson would give. And the President must have known that this would be the case, for his strategy was much more complex than a simple effort to placate the Right.

On a deeper level, gradualism was designed to control both the Right and the Left. With respect to the management of the domestic aspects of the war, it rested implicitly on the belief that asking the public to swallow the war whole would backfire, leading to irresistible pressures either to win or get out. It was the product of the old consensus game. The key was to stake out the middle ground. Everyone was to be given the illusion that the war would soon be over. The Right was to be given escalation. The Left was to be given occasional peace overtures. The middle

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

would not be asked to pay for the war. The Right would be assured that South Vietnam would not be lost. The Left would be frightened into submission by the specter of McCarthyism. But the key to the whole strategy was phasing.

The right-wing reaction was the ultimate nightmare. This was to be forestalled and the hawks controlled by not losing, by escalating and by promising victory. But given these parameters the immediate problem was to keep the doves, the liberals and the Left in line.

In the short run, President Johnson was more wary of the Left than of the Right. The McCarthyite nightmare might come to pass if the United States lost Vietnam. But it could happen only if the doves and the Left first gained the ascendancy, only if their opposition to the war spread to the middle and across to the Right. The Left and the liberals were the only ones who would openly press for withdrawal, for "losing." The Right would be unhappy, disgruntled, but they would never press the case for withdrawal to the public. The Left and the doves would—and, to a large extent, they prevailed.

V

All this raises the final question—was the President's strategy the best way of making Hanoi believe that U.S. Presidents would be able to continue the war until North Vietnam quit? My guess is that Hanoi's leaders not only were confident they could outlast gradualism in the field, but also were aware that such a strategy was a sign of the domestic political weakness of our Presidents.

The "slow-squeeze" approach showed Hanoi two things. On the one hand, it signaled that America could always do more militarily, while on the other, it revealed that the President would not do all that was necessary to win. A step-by-step strategy of threat can spring either from conviction or endemic weakness. U.S. policy toward Vietnam sprang from both. Manipulation by force or "compellence" had great appeal as a war strategy. But with each passing year of war the domestic political position of the President grew weaker.

Over time, the use of threats could not hide the President's fear that the fulfillment of his threats would be as costly to the United States as to North Vietnam. Going all-out to win apparently presented President Johnson with a double nightmare. If the public went along, it might portend war with China or Rus-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sia and a garrison state at home. If the public balked and wanted to "bug out," a McCarthyite reaction might ensue. And yet, going less than all-out would not be enough to win militarily—at least for many years. Only by accepting the risks of using maximum force and only by asking for domestic sacrifices could President Johnson have convinced Hanoi that the United States had crossed the threshold from a policy of questionable persistence to a war of no return, and that the American commitment to the war was irrevocable.

Thus, President Johnson's dilemma was stark. He would not try maximum force to win, because that would risk World War III. He would not replay Vietnam as China 1949, lose it and take the case to the public, because that would risk another round of McCarthyism. He would, as a last resort, replay Vietnam as Korea, hoping to outlast the other side and getting them to agree to stay on their side of the line—and risk wearing down his nation and countrymen.

President Johnson could look back at the Korean War and think it was bad, but not as bad as losing China. Harry Truman was roundly attacked for his self-restraint in fighting the Korean War—and yet, most Americans saw it as a courageous decision, *and* the history books were filled with praise for the beleagured President. China ruined President Truman. That is, it ruined him politically at that time—and its "loss" did ignite McCarthyism. But in the perspective of those very same history books, President Truman's decision to back away from the corrupt régime of Chiang and accept the tide of Mao was hailed as his most courageous and wisest hour. Lyndon Johnson did not see it that way. He would continue with middle-course actions in Vietnam, playing off Left and Right against one another at home. This strategy satisfied neither hawks nor doves; nor did it face down the North Vietnamese. The costs were staggering and are still incalculable—as are the costs of what might have been had the United States withdrawn or gone "all-out." And yet, President Johnson played his hand well enough to prevent the essential domino from falling and to persist in his policy.

VI

On January 25, 1972, President Nixon publicly revealed two peace proposals which Henry Kissinger had made secretly to Hanoi. One proposal dealt with an overall settlement, including

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

free elections "run by an independent body representing all political forces in South Vietnam," with international supervision, and with President Thieu stepping down from office prior to the vote. The second proposal, a military settlement carved out from the overall settlement, offered "a total withdrawal from South Vietnam of all U.S. forces and other foreign forces . . . within six months" provided that Hanoi agree to a phased return of U.S. prisoners of war and an Indochina-wide ceasefire "implement(ing) the principle that all armed forces of the countries of Indochina must remain within their national frontiers." Certain ambiguities in these proposals with respect to the powers of the electoral commission, the timing of the mutual withdrawal, future U.S. military aid to Saigon, and the phasing of a settlement, could indicate a new American flexibility. Still, the President did make clear that Hanoi had ignored and, in effect, had found both packages unacceptable. Hanoi has long opposed both elections controlled by other than a coalition government and a ceasefire-mutual withdrawal as too risky for its supporters in South Vietnam. Yet, Americans were bound to see the President's offers as reasonable, as a fair compromise. The President did manage to quiet Vietnam critics.

But the history of popular and political reaction to presidential peace overtures is filled with peaks and valleys. Both Johnson and Nixon have been able to gain renewed support in the short run only to lose it as their proposals proved non-negotiable and as the realities of the war again reassert themselves. As American troop levels decline, U.S. bargaining power evaporates. While a good case can be made that either of the "new" offers are in Hanoi's interest to accept, Hanoi seems likely to continue to reject them. Their aim appears to be not only withdrawal of the direct U.S. military presence, but the cessation of all military assistance to the Saigon régime, including naval and air support from beyond Indochina itself. At this time, the odds are they will settle for nothing less. The war will go on. And because the politics of the war are so fragile, it still behooves us to take a closer look at where we stand on Vietnam in America.

President Nixon has defined the U.S. objective in Vietnam in the same overall terms as did President Johnson. In his February 25, 1971, "Foreign Policy Report," President Nixon affirmed that with respect to both negotiations and Vietnamization, "We seek the opportunity for the South Vietnamese people to deter-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mine their own political future without outside interference." With the invasion of Laos and with ever-receding possibilities for a negotiated settlement, the goal of Vietnamization was clarified to mean "providing a reasonable chance for the South Vietnamese to defend themselves." Some were led to believe that this meant American forces would be totally withdrawn with the President hoping for a "decent interval" to elapse after that full withdrawal and before a communist takeover, so that our responsibility for the collapse of the Saigon government would be diminished. Others interpreted it as merely an indication that we are progressively turning over the fighting to the Saigon government. Still others saw it as the old objective of "an independent noncommunist South Vietnam" and as a way of preserving the Thieu régime. Dressed in new, moderate words because the war itself is being deeply questioned, the Nixon goal has occasioned more controversy than President Johnson's. But it has also afforded the President the flexibility necessary for troop reductions.

By May 1972, the U.S. troop ceiling in Vietnam will be 69,000 men. And the President has promised another troop withdrawal announcement before that time. If Hanoi continues to reject the Nixon peace proposals, Vietnamization will result in the maintenance of two American residual forces as long as is necessary: one in Vietnam providing essentially logistical support, and the other (not counted as part of the force ceiling) in Thailand and on carriers off the Vietnamese shore providing air power. It certainly includes continuing economic and military assistance to Saigon at close to $2 billion per year as well.

The Vietnamization policy has produced a different domestic political problem than President Johnson's policy of escalation. For President Johnson, the problem was how many troops could be put into Vietnam and profitably employed despite tenuous domestic support. For President Nixon, the problem has been how few troops can be withdrawn while maintaining a military balance in Vietnam but still assuaging the growing domestic opposition.

The issue for both Presidents was how to balance military risks in the field with conflicting political risks at home. President Johnson, who was not faced with serious domestic opposition to the war until March 1968, took few risks with the situation in Vietnam. After opinion turned against the war, President John-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

son paid for this earlier decision with the loss of political strength. President Nixon has been assuming risks on both scales. He has taken chances with popular support by ordering the invasions of Cambodia and Laos and the "protective reaction" bombing strikes against North Vietnam. But he has also run risks in South Vietnam by reducing forces faster than the U.S. military deemed safe. The combination of moves has led to a reduction in American deaths and casualties (from over 500 per week in 1968 to about 50 per week at the beginning of 1972) and costs (from about $25 billion in 1968 to about $7 billion for 1972). The military situation has remained stable in Vietnam. For the President's purposes, his strategy has been an apparent success at home and in Vietnam—at least in the wake of his January 25th speech.

On one level, President Nixon seems to have succeeded in neutralizing Vietnam as a prime issue in the forthcoming November election. As Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird said in a television interview: "The American people understand the difference between addition and subtraction." U.S. troops have been withdrawn from Vietnam on schedule and even ahead of the schedule of presidential announcements. The winding down of the war and the steep drop in American casualties, according to this view, have defused the opposition.

VII

Political pundits have observed what was there for all of us to see—the general subsiding of active criticism of the President's Vietnam policy. Such criticism no longer dominated the news media in the week preceding Nixon's China visit. Because they seemed to illustrate the consequences of the President's policy, the invasion of Cambodia and the subsequent tragedy at Kent State in 1970 probably represented the high point of opposition. But a curious phenomenon developed thereafter. While opposition to the war widened throughout the United States, the group of active critics seemingly narrowed to the political Left. More Americans were against the war, but fewer were doing anything about their beliefs. President Nixon reaped another political benefit from Cambodia—it defused right-wing criticism of war policy. Conservatives seemed gratified that this sanctuary finally had been invaded and pleased by the subsequent U.S. troop reductions. Unlike Johnson, Nixon did not have to worry about his right flank from this point on.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

While questioning of the war by Congressmen and Senators became more widespread, and while amendments were passed which placed limits on U.S. involvement in Cambodia and Laos, the McGovern-Hatfield Amendment to set a deadline for withdrawal of all American forces failed by a larger vote in 1971 than in 1970. The political thrust of congressional opposition did not succeed in compelling the President to accept total withdrawal by a certain date in exchange for POWs only, but it did succeed in making escalation of the war more improbable and in hastening troop reductions. In other words, congressional opposition to the war increased, but legislators still showed themselves ready to follow the President's lead as long as U.S. troops were being withdrawn, U.S. casualties were being reduced and as long as it looked as if Vietnamization was working.

On a different level, however, Vietnam seems to remain a major political issue. An October 1971 Gallup report ranked Vietnam right behind economic problems and well ahead of crime, race, poverty and other matters on the list of "the most important problems facing this country today." One Harris poll showed that a majority of the American people believed that the war in Vietnam was immoral. A February 1971 Gallup poll found that 61 percent believed that the war was a mistake while only 28 percent felt that it was not. More revealing are the responses in Gallup's August 1971 report where it was asked: "Suppose one candidate for Congress . . . said that he favors getting *all* U.S. armed forces out of Vietnam by July 1 of next year, and he is opposed by a candidate who says we must leave about 50,000 troops there to help the South Vietnamese. Other things being equal, which candidate would you prefer?" Sixty-one percent favored complete withdrawl, while 28 percent wanted to leave troops and 11 percent had no opinion. More importantly for President Nixon, Gallup claimed in his June 1971 report that the President faces a "giant-size credibility gap on Vietnam." In response to the question: "Do you think that the Nixon administration is or is not telling the public all they should know about the Vietnam war?," 24 percent said "is" and 67 percent said "is not." And despite the President's promises to end the war, 51 percent of the respondents believed that the war will last two years or more, or never end. At bottom, President Nixon's credibility gap has the same sources as President Johnson's—promises of an end to a war that does not end.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The results of these polls notwithstanding, critics of the war themselves seem to believe that the President has captured the electoral high ground. Most of these critics have switched the terms of their attack from arguing that the President's policy will not work to arguing that it is immoral and will only perpetuate the war and the consequences of the war. This tacit concession to the progress of Vietnamization and to the political success of the President's latest peace proposal at once evokes the true feelings of the critics and their political weakness. Their moral argument assumes a strong public interest in Vietnam, but in reality it seems to be that while the American public is increasingly opposed to the war, the majority really does not want to hear about it. Moreover, if the plight of people in Biafra and more recently in Bangladesh—to say nothing of the My Lai massacres—did not touch the moral sensitivity of even a fraction of Americans, it is doubtful that the specter of Vietnamese killing Vietnamese would stir the national conscience either. As long as fewer Americans are in Vietnam, fewer Americans are being killed and the cost of the war is being reduced, opposition to the President's policy will be unlikely to change that policy.

All of these political calculations are based on the assumption that the situation in Vietnam in the fall of 1972 will not be appreciably different from what it is early this spring. What would happen politically in the United States if the situation were deteriorating in one way or another? One scenario would have the North Vietnamese stepping up their military attacks, defeating the Saigon government forces, and on the verge of nullifying Vietnamization. Such an eventuality might lead many Americans to believe that four years of Nixon's policy had been for naught, that essentially the United States was back to where it was in 1965. It is unlikely, however, that Vietnamization will prove to be such an immediate failure. The North Vietnamese forces are weaker and the Saigon forces stronger than most critics had predicted they would be a year or three years ago. Therefore, the kind of collapse posited in this scenario is highly improbable. But should it come to pass, latent opposition to the war would be rekindled and the President would be in a very difficult position at home.

A second scenario would have the North Vietnamese launching countrywide offensives with spotty victories, and the United States in retaliation carrying out a continuing program of air

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

strikes against population and population-related targets in North Vietnam. This scenario seems more likely than the first. President Nixon has promised on many occasions to take "decisive action" in the event Hanoi increases the tempo of fighting in the South, and he has on a number of occasions carried out that threat. While it is true that past congressional, media and popular reactions to these "protective-reaction" bombing raids against North Vietnam have not been widespread, the image of U.S. planes hitting new targets in North Vietnam right before election time would remind the American people that the war was still going on. Latent opposition to the war would again emerge, to the probable disadvantage of the President.

If the war heats up in the summer and fall, it will be a political issue in the November elections. And it will be a bitter issue. Neither Republicans nor Democrats will want for superlative and invective. But no matter who is elected President in 1972, Vietnam will continue to take its toll on American society. If President Nixon is reëlected and the war grinds on indeterminately, the youth and the intellectuals of our nation will become ever more alienated. This is not a large group of people, but they are precious to the national conscience. If a Democrat is elected who is prepared to meet all of Hanoi's demands, end the war and not provide the Saigon government with any assistance whatever, he will be charged with having "snatched defeat from the jaws of victory." President Johnson's nightmare of the right-wing reaction could well become a reality.

The only somewhat hopeful way out of this dilemma is for President Nixon now to share responsibility with the present Congress in offering the sole proposal that still might break the negotiating deadlock—a terminal date for the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and an end to all U.S. bombing in Indochina in return for the safe withdrawal of forces and the phased return of POWs. As I write, the President has not yet made this proposal. The nation, I believe, would unite behind this approach. Such unity would not be without impact on Hanoi's leaders, whatever *their* internal differences are, at this moment, with respect to a settlement of the war. For while Hanoi's leaders may not be able to agree to propose such a solution, they may be able to agree to accept it.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WHOSE CENTURY?

By Thomas L. Hughes

The world of the 20th century, if it is to come to life in health and vigor, must be an American Century . . . our Century.—Henry Luce, "The American Century," *Life,* February 17, 1941.

DESPITE many qualifications, there are several senses in which Mr. Luce was right—senses in which this has turned out to be the American Century, far beyond anyone's poor power to add or detract. In all the unfolding indices of quantitative preëminence, the United States is indeed a new kind of power in the world. Our gross national product, our massive output of the food the world needs, the unequaled scale of our technology, the burgeoning talents that still pour by the millions from our troubled educational system, the qualitative skills of our manpower, the seed money with which for years we have capitalized the new world bank of the social sciences, the manifold horizons of the computerized century—all these and more testify to the steady pulsations from contemporary America which circle and recircle the globe. They evoke demands and cravings for things American, often precisely among those very people and governments most vitriolic about official American policy. America's great twentieth-century technological revolution sweeps across sovereignties, beats against Walls, and eats away at Iron Curtains. The full implications of this peaceful, pulsating phenomenon for those whose lives and livelihoods have hitherto been at the whim of managed societies—as well as for the interests and ambitions of those in charge of such societies—remain to be fully tested.

But there is much more to the century than that. Centuries have many dimensions. If the world's prominent men of a century ago were to rise today from their graves and look around them, who would be the most surprised? Who among them, politicians all, would be most transfixed by the ironies of history and the vagaries of circumstance? Where today would they find their lineal descendants? How far would they have to travel to feel at home again? Who continues their tradition? Across what cross-cultural leaps?

There is the assassinated Tsar Alexander II, interred in St. Petersburg, awakening in Leningrad. How much of the sur-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

roundings are Lenin's? And how much are Peter the Great's?

There is Cecil Rhodes, the impatient imperialist, in his tomb in Bulawayo. What sanctions, if any, would he employ against the cowboy champions of white supremacy who have taken over his Rhodesian patrimony and broken with his Queen?

There is Lincoln in Springfield, perplexed about another North-South war 10,000 miles away in Vietnam. Is his first groping reaction really a misconception that America has been committed to a secessionist cause?

There is Bolívar in his pantheon in Caracas. Like many others he discovered that life was unfair. Would he still be sure, as he once was, that to "serve a revolution is to plow the sea?"

There is Bismarck at Friedrichsruh. He is entitled to smile with self-satisfaction over the continuing triumph of blood and iron, but the pursuit of his prophetic principle devoured Prussia in the process and cut his capital city in two.

There is Hung Hsiu-ch'uan, leader of the Taiping Rebellion, whose peasant revolt once swept 11 provinces of China. He was ruling in Nanking in the 1860s. If he had waked in that city during the Cultural Revolution a hundred years later, he would have found a familiar fratricide.

These were among the leaders of the age a century ago. They all tried "to make history, not write it"—in Bismarck's words—"to set the clock of evolution at the right hour." But since then many clocks have struck, turning success into failure for some, defeat into victory for others. For still others slumber remains simply slumber. They and their work testify to the uniqueness of history, to the great moments which never recur, to the fate which each man has at the hands of his successors, to the tricks and the toll of the centuries.

Here, in microcosm, lie some large questions: *Whose* century has it been? *Whose* century will it be? But behind these questions lie the other ones: *Which* century was it then? *Which* century is it now?

I. Which Century

In 1900 there was a great argument over whether that year marked the first year of the twentieth century or the last year of the nineteenth. But beyond the artificial dates which the calendar sets, there are many ways to think about a century. Thus we now know that the nineteenth century began in 1815 and that it actu-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ally ended in 1914, not 1900. It is plausible that the twentieth century is already over—that the problems of the 1930s, forties, fifties and sixties have more to do with one another than with a new century which has already arrived. In a world of agitation, it is hard to tell when, if ever, a new century is far enough advanced to be irreversible—when the turbulence has jelled sufficiently for characterization. Centuries overlap and phase into one another.

Even worse, a century, like beauty, shifts with the eye of the beholder. Thus Victor Hugo aspired to live for a *future* century. He represented "a party which does not yet exist," civilization. "This party will make the 20th Century," he said, "and from it will issue first the United States of Europe and then the United States of the World." More often, however, people have preferred to live in *past* centuries, like those described by Gilbert in "The Mikado":

> The idiot who praises, with enthusiastic tone,
> All centuries but this, and every country but his own.

Some things are immune through centuries of change. For instance, there exists a papyrus dating from the Ptolemaic era, second century BC, with the following instructions warning the ancient Egyptian bureaucracy, as it were, against writing 47 volumes of putative Pentagon Papers: "To the King one should not write long reports nor deal with all kinds of problems. Instead one should report only what is necessary and urgent in as concise a form as possible." For bureaucrats, such testimony to the enduring dilemmas of the bureaucracy through the centuries may be reassuring.

In the field of actual warfare, a new century has often conquered not only through unconventional weapons but also through organizational innovations. In ancient Greece and at the end of the Middle Ages the knights were vanquished by the phalanx, which in later days succumbed to more mobile units, even simple guerrillas. By contrast, in the political and economic fields, innovations often succumb to inertia. How many other revolutionaries and reactionaries alike have come to appreciate the poignancy of Andres Bello's summary of the Latin American wars of independence: "In the wars of independence against Spain, there were no victors and no vanquished. The Spanish constancy defeated itself."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Twentieth-century politics and economics are a mosaic of all the centuries when it comes to motivation, organization, attitudinal affinities and capacity for coöperation. One may ask of a foreign head of state, of a diplomatic colleague passing in the hall, or of their wives at the dinner table: Which century are you in? Whether we and our contemporaries are actually living in the same century, are willing to work in the same century, and are coming to grips with the same century, will largely determine whose century our successors will say this has been. Yet often, these days, only a wizard can conjure up what is present, what future, what past, and what is merely daubed here and there with a twentieth-century brush.

Today, for example, if we ask what most of the world's three and one-half billion people are doing, it would be true to say: Most of them live in Asia, are poor, are ill-fed, are sick, are illiterate, lack freedom, are proud, fear war, and feel neutral in many contests which others think vital. But most people in the world could have been described that way a century ago or ten centuries ago. In a sense, the century never belongs to the people who live in it. The City of the Rich and the City of the Poor was an Aristotelian distinction, not an invention of the hapless Lin Piao.

The receptivities and tolerations of both governments and people have to be mutually calculated and recalculated, never in entirely satisfactory ways. The rates and magnitudes of current United States assistance to Latin America, for instance, run headlong into nineteenth-century banking systems, eighteenth-century commercial codes, corporate arrangements based on familial patterns of ownership, and investment attitudes of a low-risk, high-yield, short-term nature like mercantilist seventeenth-century England. Sometimes we find ourselves trying to infuse contemporary notions of credit, fertilizers, coöperatives and storage systems into an ancient Indian culture predating the arrival of Columbus in America.

The conflicting elements of many centuries bounce off the politics and economics of the present. Thus we have all had lessons in accommodating ourselves to certain unwelcome facts of life. What looks like leadership to some may look like exploitation to others; what here looks like help, may there be seen as interference; what to the provider is assistance, may to the receiver be intervention. On the Texas border, we may call

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

it the Rio Grande, they the Rio Bravo. We may consider ourselves a Good Neighbor, they may think of us as the "Colossus of the North." As the Dictator Porfirio Díaz used to say, "Poor Mexico! So far from God, so close to the United States."

The culture problem is a human problem, not a scientific one, and it is the child and victim of many centuries. Hence, half-seriously, one can say that the twentieth century is currently made up of fourteenth-century farmers, fifteenth-century theologians, sixteenth-century politicians, seventeenth-century economists, eighteenth-century bureaucrats, nineteenth-century generals and twenty-first-century scientists.

Some people—perhaps some centuries—have a much greater facility than others for self-deception, wishful thinking and false expectations. Thus one has to consider whether a strenuous effort to clarify every element in the picture really helps or hinders mutual objectives. One may legitimately ask which combination of the centuries in which societies provides the most forward motion on basic problems at a given time. Therefore it is also true that many of those most vociferous in laying claim to the century operate on a base which is only faintly in touch with the verbal gloss they employ. In a sense, every would-be claimant presses his claims to the century under false pretensions.

Many of the world's contemporary politicians do so doubly, for neither their cause nor they themselves are clearly contemporary. Just as the current century contains residual elements of all preceding centuries rolled into it, so we may also consider, as John Morley did in his "Life of Gladstone," that "Every man of us has all the centuries in *him*." Many of the leaders are born in the wrong century, serve the wrong governments and talk the wrong tongues. Many are perhaps only dimly aware of how much more at home they would have been abroad at some earlier point of history. Some of them, in unexpected places far beyond Europe, are perfectly cast for leading roles in latter-day analogues to the seizure of Silesia or the partitions of Poland. Others would gladly proclaim some new Pragmatic Sanctions of their own. Still others would happily grace a new Congress of Vienna, yearning even this late in history for another world restored.

But if the question—Which Century?—still vexes analysts and actors alike, how much more insidious, elusive and provocative is the question evolving from it: Whose Century will it—should it—be?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

II. A Century of Governments?

Whose century? Three and one-half billion people implicitly ask that question. Suspended over them all, asking the same question, are some 145 governments. These governments provide many contrasts in the manner of their arrival and their prospects for stability.

They vary widely in their approaches to poverty, pollution and the population explosion; in their reaction to prejudice, racism and crime; in their efforts for more health, housing and human dignity.

They differ dramatically in their commitment to democracy, social justice, nonviolence, economic growth, law and order, and peace.

They show marked contrasts in their enthusiasm for, or resistance to, demands for equal access to wealth—or even to the propriety of asking how 100 percent of the world's people can get at 100 percent of the world's resources.

These governments have varying stakes in East-West tensions; in the Sino-Soviet rift; in the United Nations; in NATO and the Warsaw Pact; in the OAS and OAU; in SALT and disarmament; in trade and aid; in frequency allocation and weather modification.

They differ in their dependence on, or independence from, the United States and the Soviet Union, although most are deeply affected by what the superpowers do or fail to do.

They form shifting constellations of agreement and disagreement on issues full of consequences for others. They all want to change the policies of others toward themselves, often in different and inconsistent ways.

Each government is nervous about the absence of fixed points in the world horizon to which many of them were formerly accustomed. Each worries about a possible decline in the interest and attention of others. Each differs from the others in the degree to which it desires to be respected, feared or admired. Each probably overestimates its own role. Each government, even the autocracies, is concerned with domestic demands, and each wants to interest others in its domestic survivability. Each must consider how to mesh domestic requirements with the fast pace of world affairs. Each must grapple with priorities. Each must decide whether to go for long-term or short-term results. Who will initiate what? Who will gamble between the penalties and re-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

wards of inaction? Each is in a box, but some are in bigger boxes than others.

Many governments are uncertain representatives of the viewpoints their people hold. Many of their people are increasingly uncertain about what their governments really think. Many governments include bureaucracies which are privately anxious about the reliability of their political leaders. Many of the leaders lack admiration for the bureaucracies which they theoretically control. Many fail to distinguish between declaratory policies and actual policies. Many are tempted toward claims and commitments beyond their capacity. Many fail to recognize the policy points of no return.

Some governments are in doubt which rift to heal, or which détente to encourage. Some are engaged in making progress through sham. Some are adept at the techniques of divesting responsibility. Some will find the complexities so overwhelming that they will simply be overcome with indecision. Some will be the century's "laughing heirs."

Most governments will pursue several policies at once. Most will be looking for points of identification, appeal, connection and mutually acceptable involvement. Most will consider that they have a mandate for change, but they are increasingly aware that patterns are different, and that the world is moving Left and Right at the same time. Most will crave frequent consultation and the reassurance that comes from easy access.

All governments govern countries where certain important public questions have traditionally been badly posed. All are worried about the East-West division between the communist and noncommunist worlds. All are caught up in the North-South racial division between the colored and the less-colored people of the world. All must grapple with the North-South economic division between the low-income nations and the so-called developed ones. All would prefer to line up with the ascending rather than the descending forces in history. Yet all, whatever their doctrines, probably believe that nothing in history is really inevitable until after it has happened.

All are betting on different answers to the question: Whose Century?

The answer to the question remains elusive, whether viewed from the perspective of peoples or governments. Thus governments may think of themselves as sovereign and equal, but each

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

government has long understood that some governments are more sovereign and equal than others. Governments exert disproportionate claims to the century. They also enhance or frustrate their people's claims to the century in disproportionate ways. This much has always been true. But I should like to suggest that we are now witnessing another, more grossly disproportionate, development which will have profound and unpredictable consequences for the character of the century. I have in mind the steady reduction of the old-style role of government in the Western world without a symmetrical or compensatory development elsewhere.

III. A Less Governmental West and the Rest

When Adam and Eve left the Garden, Eve reportedly turned to her husband and said, "Adam, we live in an age of transition." Today in the West we may be leaving the familiar garden of intergovernmental relations where by definition only a hundred-or-so flowers can bloom. It would be too much to call this familiar intergovernmental world a paradise like Eden, for diplomats or for anyone else. But for over a hundred years we in the West have used its forms, imposed them on others, organized the world's commerce and investment around them, and built our international institutions of war and peace upon them.

Today this familiar intergovernmental world is crumbling, beginning in the West where it itself began. Here, breaking through the intergovernmental crust of what we used to call international relations are pluralist manifestations of many assertive kinds. Together they are reducing, relatively speaking, the roles of Western governments. And they are also making life more difficult for many international institutions whose organization and well-being have, until now, been predicated on the reliability of certain Western governmental roles. These new de-governmentalizing manifestations are by no means coherent or consistent. They often appear Janus-faced, hydra-headed or omnidirectional. They themselves are engulfed in adversary cultures. They involve differentiating and integrating tendencies alike.

Thus the contemporary flight from foreign policy may take on various forms of rejection and reassertion, and become neo-isolationist and neo-transnational as well. For example, the significant domestic opposition to unpopular foreign policies that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has been occurring in Britain over entry into the Common Market and in the United States over our fiasco in Vietnam can spill over into either a frustrated, localized retrenchment or into a new frontier-crossing politics of the Left. The *Weltschmerz* of the intellectual insurrection and the exuberance of the youth revolt can too. At another level, the growth of the multinational corporation can evoke a transnational economics on the Right, as well as provoke a reaction opposing it on both the Right and the Left.

The governments of Western democracies are discovering that their people are deficient in the deference that governments used to think was their due. Governments devoid of credibility confront citizens devoid of patriotism. Patriotism! It is not only not enough any more. It is not only the last refuge of scoundrels. To today's avant-garde, scoundrels are the only patriots around—surely a thin base of reliable support for Western governments cumulatively under siege. These governments preside with deteriorating effectiveness over societies which at one and the same time threaten to become too proud to fight, too sophisticated to agree, too democratic to be directed, too assertive to acquiesce, too liberal to be led, too complicated to be consistent, and too élitist to accept majority rule.

Democratic societies can, of course, burst their own societal bounds of toleration. Deeply felt oppositionist tendencies, for instance, while less than sufficient to capture the state, may prove more than sufficient to immobilize it. *E pluribus unum*—one out of many—can depreciate at least as fast as the American penny which carries that maxim on its reverse face. At minimum, today's democratic, affluent societies in the West face explosive new struggles for identity and coherence as the individuals and groups within and between them sort out their contemporary purposes and priorities. Their diverse publics are diversely interested. Old forms have become demonstrably less useful as practical guides for significant personal behavior. Old forums may likewise become perceptibly less useful as the relevant terrain for future decision-making.

The most striking fact about the resulting new relationships is that they are less and less international in the old intergovernmental sense. Western governments and the intergovernmental institutions extrapolated from them are by no means the exclusive or even the centrally active elements. Instead, as often as not,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

these elements are extranational and nongovernmental in character. Compared to what has gone on before, the new forces now sweeping across Western life are marked by the bypassing of government by ever larger portions of the population, and by the explicit rejection of government by many. Whether governments—including some governmentally based international organizations—are ostracized or simply ignored, the feeling is inescapable that the proportionate importance of governments in the daily life of the West is dwindling. Nationally and transnationally, their pivotal position is eroding. Certainly Western governments do in fact preside less and less effectively over the burgeoning pluralisms emitted by Western societies.

In a sense, of course, the depolarization of world politics has been occurring simultaneously with the polarization of domestic politics in the West. The latter process, often indistinguishable from the degovernmentalizing phenomenon previously mentioned, is bound to cut unevenly across the competitive claims to the century, be they popular or governmental or both. For the time being basic forces are loose in the West which are precipitating a new asymmetry in world affairs. Western societies are internalizing much of their combative energy and disputatiousness, nongovernmental and antigovernmental sentiments are popular, and the Western governmental component itself is diminishing in the totality of transnational relationships.

The world of formal intergovernmental relations will continue, of course, even among Western capitals, if only because no one can think what ceremonial life would be like without it. Yet the result of all this internal combustion will be a less governmental West. The affluent democracies will be living in a halfway house to transnationalism.

But it will be a transnationalism putting the West out of phase with the rest. No comparable degovernmentalizing tendencies will have taken hold in the authoritarian governments of the ideological East or the nation-building governments of the developing South. Metternich, a European from the Rhineland, felt that the Hapsburg Empire did not belong to Europe. "Asia," he said, "begins at the Landstrasse," the road out of Vienna to the East. Today, in a notably different setting and with momentous new forces at work, one can visualize a future where the residual Metternichian world of intergovernmental relations will itself begin at the Landstrasse, with networks of governmental

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and bureaucratic traditionalism spreading out from it for hundreds and thousands of miles over the lands to the East and the South.

Peoples and states in the East and South may indeed have little else in common except for the vital similarity that their governments still remain their ultimate representatives externally. In dealing with Western governments, however, they will be dealing with only one of the components in the Western picture, by no means the exclusive or even "responsible" agent for the society they are said to represent.

For in the West the virtues and defects of pluralist democracy will be thriving in unpredictable profusion, puncturing pretentiousness and splintering sovereignties. An old contrast is likely to spring up again between that part of the world where, in certain fundamentals, governments immobilize their people, and that part of the world where, in certain fundamentals, the people immobilize their governments.

Eventually, of course, the decline of governments in the West may erode the stability and affect the continuity of government roles in the East and South. But in the period just ahead, these phenomena will continue historically out of phase. The unevenness of the change will amplify the contrasting vibrations from and between the new-style transnational relations in the West and the older-style intergovernmental relations of the East and South. For the time being these tendencies will remain asymmetrical and will introduce unbalancing, even destabilizing, elements in world economics and politics. The strategic implications could be unsettling if this dichotomy applies, as it would seem to do, to America in her declining superpower role on the one side, and to the rising or remaining power roles of China, Japan and the Soviet Union on the other.

On a more universal scale, the totality of international relations will also partake of this house-divided phenomenon. The old mythologies of state sovereignty will be less convincing than ever before. International institutions, already suffering from severe constituency imbalances of sovereign size, wealth, power and weight, will have to begin to come to terms with the newly destabilizing effects of factions flourishing in the West.

Whatever else it may signify, the transnational phenomenon in the West, simply by deëmphasizing governments, will be pioneering and evocative. It will carry large and unpredictable

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

implications for the whole world: for politics and personalities, for economics and cultures, for war and peace. It adds new and disturbing dimensions to the unanswered question: Whose Century?

When Metternich confronted his imperial master with a troublesome proposition, Francis I would postpone a decision by responding: "Darüber muss man schlafen." Indeed, "Let's sleep on it" eventually became the Emperor's motto for all questions of state. Whose Century was difficult enough to discern when we were on the threshold of transnational politics. Today with its arrival, we have an occasion portentous enough to require deep and serious thought. We too will have to sleep on it before coming to any hasty conclusions. Diplomats and other officials in the West, however, will find when they awake that the forms no longer fit, that the rules no longer work, that the old government-to-government cake of custom has been broken, and that earlier notions of how societies are represented—central questions of Who, Whom?—must be fundamentally revised.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BEYOND SALT ONE

By Herbert Scoville, Jr.

ALTHOUGH President Nixon's goal of achieving an initial agreement at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) before the end of 1971 failed to be realized, it still appears likely that at least some limitations will be negotiated by the time that he and Premier Kosygin meet in Moscow in May. After SALT recessed in Vienna the President reported in his state of the world message on February ninth that a consensus is developing that there should be a treaty setting comprehensive limitations on anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) and an interim agreement to freeze certain offensive arms.

The primary objective of an ABM limitation is to foreclose the acquisition of missile defenses with nationwide coverage, which might raise fears about the continued viability of a mutual deterrent posture. The treaty will probably be constructed along the following lines. The number of ABM interceptor missiles will be restricted to between 100 and 300. The lower value would be more satisfactory from security, arms control and economic points of view, but even the higher value would prevent the acquisition of ABM systems which could threaten either nation's deterrent. The argument about whether to retain 100 or 300 interceptors is spurious, since neither level will provide any realistic protection. More important would be limits on the location and perhaps also the number of large, high-performance ABM radars, which are most critical for a nationwide defense because of their size, time for construction, and expense. They would be almost impossible to deploy secretly. Under a treaty, their locations would probably have to be restricted to the Moscow area for the Soviet Union and the neighborhood of Minuteman sites for the United States; otherwise fears could be generated over a possible clandestine deployment of a nationwide ABM system.

The nature of a possible agreement on offensive weapons is much less clear, and the details may even be left for further negotiation. Former Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, in a press conference on October 21, 1971, said that an agreement on ABMs by themselves might be acceptable if it were a useful step toward the longer-term objective of containing the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

offensive buildup. This would then become a high priority follow-up action to the first stage of SALT. It is more likely, however, that there will be some agreed limitation on the total numbers of ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles based on land). This could be in the form of a numerical ceiling or a freeze at existing levels. From the American point of view, it would be extremely useful to include in this numerical limit a sub-ceiling on the very large Soviet SS-9 type ICBMs. The new, very large launchers, about 30 of which have been reported to be under construction in the last year, would fall within this category. Such a sub-ceiling may present certain difficulties for the Soviets unless the United States is willing to accept some similar restraint, but they may be satisfied with their present force level of slightly more than 300 operational or under construction.

The United States also is reported to be seeking a halt on Russian submarine construction even though they still lag considerably behind the United States both quantitatively and qualitatively in operational submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Since the United States is unlikely to be willing to forgo its conversion of the Polaris to the Poseidon missile, which has four times the payload and ten to 14 MIRVs (multiple warheads each capable of being aimed at a separate target), the chances of agreement in this area do not appear very promising. However, they would be somewhat improved if the Russians were allowed to complete those submarines now only in the early stages of construction, since they would then have numerical but not qualitative parity with the United States. A failure to limit submarine missiles is not serious since these are considered as primarily deterrent weapons because they are invulnerable and would be difficult to use in a coördinated and accurate first strike against the opposing deterrent. The complete destruction of the other side's strategic forces by the nearly simultaneous launchings from about 30 submarines and follow-up firings to correct for initial failures presents extraordinary operational difficulties.

It is most improbable that the first stage of SALT will place any qualitative restrictions on offensive missile systems, apart from a possible limit on the number of large SS-9 type missiles. The replacement of existing weapons by new models will be permitted and, if the experience of the Limited Test Ban Treaty is representative, will be encouraged as a safeguard against possible violations. Certainly there will be no restrictions on MIRVs. The

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

United States will be free to continue its Poseidon submarine missile and Minuteman III ICBM deployments with MIRVs, and the Soviets to begin testing and deploying MIRVs as well.

Even with an agreement of this limited nature, SALT will have made important strides toward slowing the arms race and stabilizing the present state of mutual U.S.-U.S.S.R. deterrence. The ABM limitation by itself will guarantee a continued secure deterrent posture on both sides regardless of what type of offensive programs are allowed to continue. MIRVs can threaten only the fixed land-based force and not the mobile submarine missiles which, by themselves, are more than adequate to provide an assured retaliatory capability as long as ABMs are kept small. There are no technological advances in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) which could provide in the foreseeable future a capability of destroying almost simultaneously an entire missile submarine fleet.

However, since there will be no controls on MIRVs, in time the ICBM and bomber parts of the deterrent force may come to be considered vulnerable. While at the moment there do not appear to be any reasonable methods by which both these weapons systems can be destroyed in a surprise attack—a Russian strike against our bomber force would alert the Minuteman ICBMs, or vice versa—nevertheless, some authorities have suggested that so-called "pin-down" tactics might be used to accomplish this objective. These tactics involve the maintenance of a continuous barrage of submarine-launched warheads exploding above our Minuteman fields, not to destroy but only to prevent the launching of the ICBMs. These explosions would have to be timed to coincide with a submarine missile attack on our bombers and continue for a minimum of 30 minutes until their ICBMs could destroy our Minuteman silos. While such an attack would involve immense and extremely wasteful expenditures of weapons and require extraordinary coördination, planners using worst-case assumptions may come to take it as more than a fantasy when, and if, the force levels become very large. In sum, even though a first-stage SALT agreement would be a major milestone, many additional actions will be required to permit it to endure and expand.

II

If the preceding picture of the strategic situation following an

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

initial SALT agreement is generally correct, there should be two main follow-through objectives for our unilateral defense planning and future arms-control negotiations. First, we should make every effort to assure that neither side takes any actions which could erode the mutual deterrent posture established by SALT. In fact, every effort should be made to strengthen it still further. Areas of potential concern should be narrowed or eliminated wherever possible either by unilateral decisions on weapons programs, further arms limitations, or even by exchanges of information. For example, the construction of a large space radar might be misconstrued as part of an ABM system unless this was carefully explained to the other side.

This objective, however, may not always be very easy to achieve since SALT will probably not limit the qualitative arms race in any significant way. Unless care is exercised by each side in its weapons programs, actions that might appear to the other side as threatening its deterrent could be taken in the name of protecting against possible treaty abrogation or violations. Thus, development of a new MIRV guidance system might be construed, perhaps incorrectly, as an attempt to obtain a first-strike capability. Similarly, new sophisticated radars for anti-aircraft defense might appear to be ABMs in disguise. Soviet replacement of their present ICBMs by new hardened launchers could be misinterpreted as an attempt to circumvent a ceiling on large missile launchers. President Nixon's reference, in his state of the world message of February 1971, to a hoped-for alternative to a retaliatory attack against Russian cities could also be misconstrued as an attempt to erode the deterrent posture by providing a nuclear-war fighting capability.

Since most of these troubles will result from the failure of SALT to place any restrictions on qualitative improvements, a second major objective would be to move on to arms-control measures directed at rectifying this omission. This presents many difficulties in view of scientists' innate desire always to seek technological innovation. Research and development will be justified as a possible hedge against breakthroughs or cheating by the other side. After the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, expanded programs were even demanded in order to maintain the viability of the weapons laboratories in the event the Treaty was abrogated.

Limits on qualitative improvements present particularly diffi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cult problems in the area of verification. Many important modifications of weapons systems result in no observable changes in the characteristics of a weapons system. For example, a missile guidance system can be made more accurate by substitution of a better computer inside the missile. Furthermore, research and development in the laboratory phases are difficult to monitor and easy to conceal or screen under the guise of legitimate activities. No amount of even intrusive inspection appears practical to provide assurance that secret research and development programs are not under way. One cannot station an inspector at every research facility; even if there, he could easily be misled. Only when a weapon or a component reaches the stage of field or flight testing does it become visible and even then not always adequately verifiable. However, limitations on field tests offer a good place to start in curbing the seemingly endless desire to make technological improvements.

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

Under a SALT agreement as visualized above, the submarine missile systems become, even more than at the present time, the primary component of the deterrent force. Therefore, every effort should be made by both unilateral decisions and multilateral arms-control actions to maintain and, where necessary, strengthen it. As long as ABMs are severely limited, the only threat to this weapons system can come from anti-submarine warfare. At the present time there is no technology which can in the foreseeable future place in jeopardy simultaneously a submarine force of 30 to 40 vessels, even if they did not employ countermeasures. However, in time, with concentrated effort, new developments might give rise to fears on this score, and efforts should be made to foreclose such an eventuality. Therefore, restrictions on anti-submarine warfare capabilities should be sought in much the same way they have been sought on ABMs. To date, very little attention has been paid to this area of arms control.

By comparison with ABMs, however, controls on anti-submarine warfare will be very much more difficult to achieve. In the first place, extensive, albeit strategically ineffective, anti-submarine systems are already available to both the United States and the Soviet Union as well as many other countries, and secondly, anti-submarine defenses have tactical as well as strategic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

military applications. For example, they are a key element in the protection of surface shipping, both naval and merchant, in a protracted warfare situation such as in World War II or even in more limited conflicts as might occur in the Mediterranean. Despite these drawbacks, there are a number of arms-control measures which can guarantee still further the indefinite viability of the submarine missile deterrent force. Fortunately, any anti-submarine warfare system, if it were to have dangerous capabilities, would have to be very extensive, would take a long time to build and would be obvious to all concerned. A clandestine anti-submarine warfare program to negate the Polaris deterrent would be impossible.

One control measure would be a limitation on the number of so-called hunter-killer submarines, *i.e.* submarines designed to follow and destroy other submarines. A large number of such ships would be needed in order to have a reliable capability to eliminate almost simultaneously 30 or more missile submarines. The continuous tracking of ballistic missile submarines, either by other submarines or surface vessels, might be forbidden in an arms-control agreement. Another approach might be to designate certain ocean areas that did not include the sea lanes normally traveled by merchant and naval vessels as regions within which anti-submarine operations would be banned. The stationing of acoustic detection systems and submarine tracking ships and aircraft would not be allowed in these areas, which could then be used for the invulnerable deployment of the submarine missile deterrent forces.

Parallel to these measures, research and development could be continued on advanced submarine missile systems which would decrease their vulnerability to possible future anti-submarine measures. The American Underwater Long Range Missile System (ULMS) programs are examples of this. The most useful advance in this field would be the development of a new missile (originally nicknamed EXPO, now called ULMS I) with a longer range than Poseidon in order to permit the submarine to launch its missiles from larger ocean areas less subject to anti-submarine attack. This missile should be designed with a capability of being launched from existing Polaris submarines to avoid the very expensive requirement of replacing the existing fleet. In the longer term, if a threat to submarines should develop, quieter and less vulnerable, or smaller but more numerous,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

submarines might be other approaches. However, the present threat from anti-submarine warfare is not sufficiently near or even well defined to require construction and deployment decisions on these new weapons in the near future. Ship construction now would be a waste of scarce funds and might result in building weapons designed against the wrong threat. There is not even a requirement for a new missile at this time, and it is hoped that a race in this area can be avoided.

RESTRICTIONS ON IMPROVEMENT IN EXISTING SYSTEMS

With ABMs frozen at low levels, the need to improve further existing offensive strategic weapons systems may be largely eliminated. More advanced weapons would be required only if one were seeking to acquire a first-strike or nuclear-war fighting capability. And this would merely serve to increase the risk that a nuclear disaster might occur. Therefore, it is incumbent on both the United States and the Soviet Union to take such actions as possible to halt the qualitative arms race either by agreed measures or, more practically, by reciprocal unilateral actions. An agreement that no missile system could be upgraded by any change in its external configuration would be very useful, although it would not halt many improvements. Such a restriction would apply not only to the missile itself, but also to the characteristics of the launch site. Since only those changes that could be observed from the outside would be banned, such an agreement could be verified adequately by national or unilateral means. It would prevent the replacement of existing systems by those with radically new characteristics such as the substitution of much larger missiles for the present models.

Thus, the Soviets could not supersede their obsolescent early ICBMs with the newer SS-11s and SS-13s or even their SS-9s with still larger missiles (a possibility that has caused so much concern in some circles during the past year). The United States, however, would not be permitted to convert any more Polaris missiles to Poseidons. This would not, of course, prevent replacement of single warheads by MIRVs or improvements in accuracy, but these changes would be restricted within the envelope of the presently deployed models.

A still further and more useful step toward qualitative restrictions would be to place limits on the number of missile test firings that either the United States or the Soviets could conduct

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in any one year. A complete ban on test firings would probably not be feasible because of the necessity to conduct a number of tests in order to assure the reliability of deployed systems and to train crews. However, if the quota on allowed firings was kept reasonably low, to perhaps ten or even 20 per year, this would certainly place restrictions on development programs for new systems. Such an understanding could be monitored by our existing unilateral capabilities, and it could be reinforced by an understanding that the firings would be announced in advance and occur only on specific test ranges. An agreement of this type would strongly inhibit the development of MIRV systems, particularly those with high accuracy. A specific ban on MIRV testing would be highly desirable, but the overwhelming American lead in this area and our previous reluctance to negotiate seriously on such a ban do not allow much optimism for its success.

REDUCTIONS IN NUMBER OF WEAPONS

Once an agreement has been reached to limit ABMs, it will become apparent that the present number of offensive launchers, presumably the ceiling agreed to in SALT One, would be more than adequate to provide a deterrent force. This would be even more obvious if MIRVs were allowed. In time, it might be hoped that either by agreement or by gradual, reciprocal, unilateral phase-downs, the number of these launchers could start being reduced. Since fixed land-based ICBMs will eventually come to be believed vulnerable, they should be the first candidates for elimination. Cutbacks would have not only security value, but also important international political implications. They would show that at least the nuclear powers were willing to take steps to decrease the very large size of their present arsenals. This would be extremely valuable in promoting our policies on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

Of course, if the reduction reached a point where the number of land-based ICBMs became very small, then the vulnerability of this part of the deterrent to a first strike would be quite great; however, this would not be serious as long as the submarine deterrent remained secure. For this reason, it would not be wise to reduce the submarine missiles until a very much later period at which time all five nuclear weapons countries might be party to the discussions. Reduction in the size of the ABM systems even further than promised in the first stage of SALT would

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

also be a very useful factor in strengthening the deterrent. Intercontinental bombers could also be decreased, and new aircraft for replacement could be dispensed with, saving large sums of money.

FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS

The Soviets originally sought to include in SALT limitations on Forward Based Systems (FBS), *i.e.* those shorter-range nuclear delivery systems based in forward areas which have, nevertheless, the capability of striking the Soviet Union. However, they have apparently dropped this requirement, postponing negotiations on such systems to a later date. The fact that only the United States has such systems presents a serious problem in negotiating their control, and they should probably be tackled not in SALT, but as a part of agreements on European security and mutual and balanced force reductions.

However, their consideration cannot be indefinitely neglected since, to the Soviets, they must always be seen as a threat to their national survival, and they are unlikely to agree to any further significant reductions in strategic forces until they are dealt with. A first step might be a U.S. undertaking not to enlarge these forces. The phased redeployment of such aircraft back to the United States in exchange for Russian withdrawal of both nuclear and conventional forces in Eastern Europe would appear another useful approach to this problem. Reduction in their numbers could be traded off against reduction in Soviet shorter-range missiles which threaten European centers. The British and French nuclear forces would also have to be taken into account. The negotiation of limitations on armaments stationed in Europe has extraordinarily difficult and complicated political ramifications and cannot be expected to produce early results. However, the time has come to make serious moves in this direction.

COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

An arms-control measure which would have beneficial effects far beyond the U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic balance would be the achievement of a complete ban on nuclear weapons tests. The achievement of qualitative restrictions on delivery systems has proven extremely difficult, but a comprehensive nuclear test ban would be a step to limit improvements on many of these. While both countries undoubtedly have warheads which are satisfactory

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for their first-generation MIRVs and ABMs, a test ban would inhibit the development of many second-generation systems. This could be particularly helpful to U.S. security. The Russians may not yet have developed warheads for a MIRV system that could threaten the Minuteman deterrent, since they have not yet had the first test of such a delivery system. A nuclear test ban in the near future would probably prevent the Russians from having warheads with the necessary yield, weight and dimension to be used in a missile which dispersed more than three accurate MIRVs.

It is also unlikely that the Soviets would have already developed a warhead for an advanced ABM system which might be clandestinely deployed under the guise of an air-defense weapon, since prior to an initial ABM agreement at SALT they would have had no requirement to do so. Thus, a comprehensive test ban treaty would provide increased confidence that the ABM limitations at SALT were being honored. Fears have also been expressed that, without testing, our stockpiled nuclear weapons would become unreliable. However, in the past, deterioration due to aging has been checked by dismantling weapons; never have we conducted nuclear tests solely for the purpose. If a complete ban on testing were, over a period of years, to decrease confidence in the reliability of offensive warheads, this would only enhance the existing state of mutual deterrence, since it would reduce confidence in an ability to carry out a first strike.

In addition to such effects on the U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic balance, a comprehensive test ban treaty would be an important factor in reinforcing U.S. nonproliferation policies. It would make much more difficult the acquisition of a reliable nuclear force by a non-nuclear nation. Continued nuclear testing by the United States and the Soviet Union will inevitably mean that advanced weapons technology, which may be of marginal value to them, will eventually be available to many countries and to many people. Furthermore, restraint on the part of nuclear powers would provide additional inducement for the non-nuclear nations to accede to the nonproliferation treaty (NPT). A country such as India, which has refused to sign the NPT, might find it extremely difficult politically to refuse to adhere to a comprehensive test ban treaty since it has been a key element in its past disarmament polices.

Neither France nor China is likely to adhere initially to any

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

test ban treaty, the former primarily for political reasons and the latter because it still requires considerably more development to acquire a varied nuclear arsenal. While unfortunate, this still does not significantly reduce the value of the treaty, which would once and for all end the continuing attempts of the United States and the Soviet Union to advance nuclear weapons technology. China is still so far behind both the United States and Russia that it is inconceivable that any unilateral nuclear testing on her part could require additional tests by either of the other two nations within the next ten to 20 years. Our more than 500 tests over 25 years have provided us with a large stockpile of weapons-design information. Nuclear weapons to deal with the U.S.-U.S.S.R. confrontation are more than adequate to handle the slowly emerging Chinese nuclear capability—or in the case of Russia with that of France as well.

In the unlikely event that this were no longer true in the distant future, any treaty would undoubtedly have an escape clause similar to that in the Limited Test Ban Treaty which would provide the right to withdraw if extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty jeopardized our supreme interest. The unlikely occurrence of a Chinese or French nuclear breakthrough would certainly fall into this category.

Finally, the negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty is not only militarily and politically opportune, but it is also timely from a technological viewpoint. The results of U.S. research and development programs have now demonstrated major improvements in seismic capabilities to detect and identify nuclear tests. The value of on-site inspections, and the risks from clandestine testing, have now been very greatly reduced. While there will always be some threshold below which an occasional secret test might be conducted, the risks from a violation of this type would be more than overbalanced by the gains from halting all tests of high yields.

III

An important outgrowth of SALT can be the continued exchange of views on strategic policies in order to reduce misunderstandings. This might be maintained by the continuation of SALT negotiations or by some newly established mechanisms. Even with the best of intentions on both sides, many legitimate unilateral actions may be taken which could look threatening to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the other side or seem to be violations unless explanations can be provided. This will be particularly significant since continued qualitative improvements will probably not be forbidden in the first stage of SALT.

For example, the Soviet Union might choose to begin deployment of mobile ICBMs in order to decrease the vulnerability of their land-based missiles to American MIRVs. To the United States this might look like a Russian attempt to increase secretly the size of their force since it is more difficult to count the number of mobile missiles deployed at any one time. It is not practicable to have simultaneous observation of the entire Soviet Union. Conceivably, the Russians might be able to reassure American authorities by providing information to reduce uncertainties on the total number of missiles deployed. Similarly, the U.S. development of new methods for penetrating an ABM could look to the Russians like a system for attacking Soviet ICBMs. An American explanation of the purpose might reassure the Russians, who in turn might be able to provide information which could alleviate our concerns about their air defenses.

With or without an arms-limitation agreement, the most important element in keeping the strategic arms race from getting completely out of hand has been the ability of both nations to have accurate information on the deployed weapons of the other side. For years now our Secretaries of Defense have been reporting with little argument the number of Soviet ICBMs and missile submarines deployed and under construction. Only on future programs or intentions have there been differing opinions. Without this information it would have been impossible even to have contemplated the type of agreement being discussed for the first phase of SALT. If for any reason these capabilities were lost, then any SALT agreement would be in serious jeopardy.

It has been reported by some sources, but never confirmed, that the Soviets have tested a space vehicle which might be capable of intercepting a satellite. Any such system would be susceptible to countermeasures. However, if either nation were to interfere with the other's systems for gathering information, this would be a very serious act, perhaps only just short of war. Certainly, satisfactory reassurances against any recurrence would have to be provided or the entire SALT agreement would soon break down. Since it would be at least several years before such loss of information could provide an opportunity to obtain a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

meaningful strategic advantage, there would be ample time to take countermeasures. Perhaps one of the outcomes of the first phase of SALT, or of the next, could be an understanding that neither side would take any steps to negate unilateral information-gathering systems that do not infringe on national sovereignty.

IV

Even if the first phase of SALT succeeds only in holding ABMs to a low level, it will have a major effect in slowing the strategic arms race and ensuring the continuation of a mutual deterrent posture. However, since at best the restrictions on offensive weapons will be quite limited in scope and probably place little or no controls on qualitative improvements, further steps will be needed to strengthen and broaden the agreement. Decisions on unilateral weapons programs as well as further arms limitations must be made with an eye toward ensuring that the application of new technologies does not weaken deterrence. Actions justified as safeguarding against abrogation or violation of a treaty must not be allowed to destroy the original purpose of the agreement. Continued bilateral consultations will be required to clear away misunderstandings.

An initial agreement at SALT, even if limited in scope, can mark the beginning of a new era in the nuclear weapons age. Opportunities will be opened up not only for halting the upward march of the arms race, but also for redirecting it downward so that the risks of a nuclear conflagration are reduced and the economic burdens of weapons programs lightened. Many of the new measures proposed will not be arrived at easily. Strong pressures for new weapons programs as hedges against possible treaty violations will have to be resisted vigorously. Complacency after an initial agreement must not be allowed to slow the drive toward further limitations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NUCLEAR BALANCE IN EUROPE

By Walter F. Hahn

THROUGHOUT its existence, the Atlantic Alliance has reflected a complex and dynamic process—a "transatlantic bargain." The former U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Harlan Cleveland, has described this "bargain" as partly an understanding among the European members of the Alliance, but mostly a deal between them and the United States. NATO, he contends, is an arena of organized controversy. "Each year the mix of NATO defense forces and the character of allied political collaboration change, adjusting to the shifting technology of war and to . . . the tides of domestic politics in each of the fifteen NATO countries. But while the bargain changes, the constant is a consensus among the allies that there has to be a bargain."

This notion helps explain how NATO has survived over the years of crises, both external and internal, that, measured by the historical yardstick of alliances, might long ago have ripped apart a less cohesive pact. Yet the optimism can be overdrawn. Beneath the periodically rough, periodically serene surface of the Alliance an undertow has steadily gained strength. The "transatlantic bargain" is strained by "transatlantic drift"—a growing divergence between the security interests and perceptions of the United States and those of its West European partners. Unless the Alliance soon addresses, and takes steps to redress, the basic causes of this drift, all of the temporary accommodations among the Alliance partners may finally fail to prevent an ultimate crisis of mutual confidence.

The fact of transatlantic drift has long been recognized. Indeed, the massive literature on the Atlantic Alliance yields by now almost a standard lexicon of perceived causes. Thus, it is alleged, the "cement of fear" which bound NATO in its formative years has crumbled with greater stability and détente. As the once devastated and helpless European members of the Alliance have regained their economic muscles and political self-confidence, they have progressively chafed under and rebelled against American domination. Their resentments have been fueled by economic rivalry and fiscal quarrels with the United States. Even more fundamentally, it is contended, the national interests of the United States and those of Western Europe have

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gradually strayed in separate ways, prodded by historical momentum, geography and contemporary power. While European horizons of policy and influence have narrowed to continental dimensions, American interests sweep the globe and seem to focus, if anywhere, on Asia.

All of this may be more or less true, and its impact on the Alliance is undeniable. Yet, since NATO is first and foremost a security "bargain," we must look for fundamental causes of the drift not so much in external factors, but rather in fissures in the security consensus itself. A central cause has been the faltering faith of our European partners in what they have embraced as *the pillar of their security: namely, the NATO strategic-nuclear* deterrent.

II

The emphasis on the NATO strategic deterrent may be difficult to understand, especially in the light of the by now chronic preoccupation in the Alliance with the question of American conventional force levels in Europe. This in itself bespeaks a general flaw in the NATO consensus: our mutual failure to understand each others' interpretations of it. The unhappy truth is that in more than 20 years of give-and-take in the Alliance, neither side in the NATO partnership has ever bluntly and honestly spelled out its basic assumptions and expectations of the Alliance bargain. As a consequence the Alliance debate has been couched in ambiguous euphemisms and slogans ("American presence," "flexible response," "realistic deterrence," "burden-sharing," etc.) which have tended more and more to obscure the real issues and motivations at stake.

The dialogue has been distorted primarily by disparate U.S. and European interpretations of the principles of "deterrence" and "forward defense" which have guided Alliance planning from the beginning of NATO, of the interrelationship of these two principles, and of their application to NATO force postures.

Except for the short-lived period of "massive retaliation" (1953–57), American policy in NATO has consistently embraced a concept in which effective deterrence has been more or less equated with effective defense—"that deters best which defends best." In its application to NATO forces, this American concept has been expressed in a relative emphasis on the build-up of effective NATO conventional forces.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In the immediate postwar period, this American stress reflected the extension of the wartime experience in which massed armies had triumphed over massed armies, as well as the gnawing uncertainties in the United States about the terrible new power it had unleashed over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Yet, already in the mid-1950s there began to emerge a rationale which took its cue less from traditional military thinking than from emergent changes in the global environment. This was the concept of "limited war"—the notion that potential conflict in Europe could be (and, by implication, should be) confined to European battlefields without flaring into a general conflagration between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The "limited war" concept as a strategy option grew in the late 1950s under the burgeoning shadow of Soviet missile power. It solidified with the advent of the Kennedy administration in 1961. The doctrine of "flexible response" propounded by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara encompassed a total strategy for NATO, whose aim was to muster a "countervailing" option for every aggressive option within the grasp of the Warsaw Pact. The stress of the new strategy, however, was on conventional ground forces. This was highlighted by American pronouncements, notably Secretary McNamara's warnings to the European allies (*e.g.* in Athens in 1962) that the Alliance could no longer rely categorically on the U.S. nuclear sword to deter all levels of aggression. The emphasis was implicit in the downward revisions of American estimates of the Warsaw Pact conventional threat, thus suggesting the viability of a NATO conventional strategy. And it was reinforced by the locks and double-locks placed on American tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

Furthermore, it was primarily from the platform of conventional strategy that the American campaign for greater European "burden-sharing" was launched. The basic themes of that campaign were (and continue to be) that the West European nations should shoulder a greater share of the conventional military burden, or should help defray the costs of maintaining U.S. forces in Europe, or both.

III

So much, briefly, for the basic themes in the American approach to NATO. In general, the West European policy-makers' view, as it evolved after 1950, has been markedly different.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In tracing this view, it must be remembered that NATO was formed just four years after the end of battle in Europe. Alert to the rumblings of a new and massive danger from the East, the governments of Western Europe, groping their way from war and postwar chaos, eagerly entered into the alliance offered by the United States in 1949. What they grasped for primarily was the U.S. commitment to their defense that was spelled out in Article 5 of the NATO treaty and which radiated from America's relatively undamaged national power, her victorious armies and her armadas of bombers, now armed with atomic weapons. From the beginning, "deterrence" in NATO was equated by the West European members with the American commitment, and primarily the awesome atomic dimensions of that commitment.

Not that the Europeans did not accept the idea that something more than the overall American protective guarantee was needed—and was needed on the ground in Europe—to stem the tide of the Red Army. As General André Beaufre, one of the group of early planners of the Atlantic Alliance, reminisces: "At the outset this concept of deterrence was founded on the threat of nuclear retaliation, although the instrument for powerful retaliation was not yet in existence and the threat did not yet have the absolute character it was to take on later. It therefore appeared that genuine deterrence would be the result of a conventional defense system capable of effectively protecting Western Europe."

And so the Europeans went along with the early, ambitious plans pressed by the Americans for the creation of massive NATO ground armies. Yet, they looked upon these goals with trepidation that has lingered to this day. Some of this was a result of "negative" motives: the unwillingness to squeeze the sacrifices demanded of them from their battered economies, combined with the defeatist view that it would be, in any event, impossible for the Alliance to match Soviet power on the ground. Perhaps even more compelling was the specter of a new war sweeping over Western Europe's already devastated landscape—a specter which almost rivalled in its numbing magnitude the threat of a Soviet takeover. This fear generated the abiding European schizophrenia on the question of NATO conventional strategy which has perplexed American planners to this day, and which might be expressed in the proposition: not enough

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NATO conventional divisions will convey Western weakness and invite aggression; too many NATO divisions will signal lessened reliance on the strategic deterrent and invite aggression. The simple European answer to the dilemma has been: whatever you do, rely on the strategic nuclear deterrent.

West European apprehensions eased with the embrace by the Eisenhower administration in 1953 of the doctrine of "massive retaliation," only to revive with the assumed "missile gap" of 1958–61. The fears subsided when the "gap" proved to be illusory, and rose again with the unfurling of the American doctrine of "flexible response." Henry Kissinger described the European reaction in the January 1963 issue of *Foreign Affairs:* "To our European allies, the shift in emphasis in American defense thinking after January 1961 was a cause of profound concern. Ideas about conventional warfare which we derided as outdated not three years previously were suddenly resurrected. The tactical nuclear weapons . . . were now sharply downgraded."

The 1960s were marked by explosive internal debate in NATO, climaxed by the defection of France from the inner sancta of the Alliance in 1966. NATO survived that crisis, albeit at the loss of the active participation of one of its most important members. The Alliance achieved ostensible harmony again in 1967, when the European members of the Alliance, after some six years of wrangling, formally accepted "flexible response" as the new Alliance strategy. But they did so with grudging reservations and with an interpretation of "flexible response" which continued to place a premium on the strategic-nuclear deterrent as the safeguard of the security of Western Europe. Above all, the acceptance reflected the deepening fear that failure to go along with this strategy would hasten the calamity of a large-scale American withdrawal from Europe. This fear persists, coloring and distorting (from the American vantage point) the signals emanating from Western Europe.

And these signals seem distorted even more by current West European détente policies. In this connection, another dimension of the "European view" also badly needs to be explained to Americans who have not shared the same historical experience. As the heirs of Talleyrand, Castlereagh and Bismarck, Europeans are keenly sensitive to the political shadow cast by military power. For centuries, this shadow has covered the chessboard of European politics—in the modern age, from Napoleon to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Adolf Hitler. There is recognition in Europe of the revolution which nuclear weapons have wrought in military power and its political utility. Yet, while appreciating (and, indeed, relying on) the blanketing effect of mutual nuclear deterrence on conflict, Europeans have not lost sight of the political implications of even subtle shifts in the nuclear balance of power.

This view explains in large part the preoccupation in Western Europe with "military balance" on the Continent as a prerequisite both of Western security and meaningful East-West relations. What West Europeans really dread—and what they have long dreaded more than the danger of a massive Soviet military sweep into Western Europe—is the threat which has been popularly characterized in Europe as "Finlandization." The term alludes to a process whereby the Soviet Union, acting in the context of its strategic-military superiority in Europe and subtly mixing threat with blandishment, would gradually establish hegemony over all of Europe.

The disparity in current American and European perceptions amounts to a scenario that is reminiscent of the fable of the blind man and the elephant. The U.S. administration has defended the current American military presence in Europe against congressional critics largely on the bases of "flexible response" and "realistic deterrence;" the official argument has been that the present bulk of American forces in Europe is needed to sustain a credible deterrent against aggression beneath the overhanging American-Soviet strategic-nuclear parity. While it is difficult to divine the motives of the critics in Congress, they seem to be animated largely by pique at our European allies for their alleged failure to carry more of the Alliance burden, and by the assumption that, in any event, Western Europe is safe from aggression. West Europeans, on the other hand, react with panic to the prospect of significant American force reductions because they see in U.S. troops in Europe the last measure of the American strategic-nuclear commitment to Western Europe—"the hostages to American intent."

The intent here, however, is not to spotlight the irony of clashing perceptions in NATO, but rather to argue that in order to endure, NATO must lean on something other, and more substantial, than an increasingly fragile crutch whose strength is gauged by the number of American soldiers on guard duty or in the Bierstuben and post exchanges of West Germany.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IV

The West European traumas can better be understood as a confluence of at least three basic fears and concerns. Each of these has functioned in its own right, but the three have intermingled and reinforced each other.

First and foremost is the fear in Western Europe that the United States is withdrawing its strategic-nuclear umbrella from Europe—in the morbid language of deterrence, that the United States is no longer willing to "risk Chicago for Paris."

A second fear relates to the presence in western Russia of some 600-plus medium-range missiles presumably targeted on Western Europe. This, too, is of long standing, dating back to 1956, when Khrushchev first brandished them against France and Great Britain during the Suez crisis. More recently, the growing preoccupation with this threat in Western Europe indicates European concern with their fate in the wake of a de facto American strategic disengagement from Europe. In that event, with American intercontinental nuclear forces kept at bay by Soviet long-range power, the Soviets would be able to wield their "Europe missiles" as a psychological bludgeon in a drive for hegemony over Western Europe (the prospect of "Finlandization" referred to earlier).

A third area of West European concern derives from more complex motives. Broadly expressed, this is the perceived lack of a European voice in the nuclear decision-making of the Alliance. This concern animated the search in NATO, beginning roughly in 1958, for a formula which would somehow cut the Gordian Knot of the NATO nuclear problem—the problem of how to reconcile the cherished nuclear prerogatives of the United States with the demands of Alliance partnership. The road of that search is littered with abandoned concepts and projects, *e.g.* the "Norstad Plan" of an integrated NATO nuclear force of mobile medium-range missiles under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), the proposals by the then West German Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss for a system of weighted voting in the NATO Council on nuclear decisions, the U.S. concept of a sea-based Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF), and the British-championed notion of an Allied Nuclear Force (ANF) which would embrace all of the long-range nuclear capabilities of the Alliance in the European area.

The search for a solution ground to a halt after the French

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

departure in 1966 amid the ruins of the American "MLF diplomacy." The muting of the NATO nuclear debate in recent years can be traced, in addition to the French defection, to a number of factors and circumstances: a sense of despair in Western Europe, following the MLF débâcle, that the question of "fifteen fingers on the nuclear trigger" could ever be solved; the palliative of the new NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) which opened an Alliance forum for greater information exchange and planning, if not shared decision-making; and the growing reluctance by West European governments to rub further what they recognized to be an exposed policy nerve in Washington, especially in view of the growing danger of a more general American retrenchment from Europe.

So much for the past strains in the West European sense of insecurity. How will they be affected by future prospects?

Only a modicum of empathy is needed to recognize that the realistic security outlook from Brussels, Bonn, London and even Paris is fairly bleak. The realization pervades these capitals that, in depending on the maintenance of the current U.S. force levels in Europe, they are leaning on a thin reed which may soon be snapped. As they watch current negotiating trends, hope is waning that any agreement from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) that might be struck between the United States and the Soviet Union will influence in any meaningful way (if at all) the disposition of Soviet medium-range missiles pointed at Western Europe. As for the future of the strategic weapons race in the absence of a comprehensive SALT agreement, Europeans listen with anxiety to voices—including those emanating from U.S. governmental circles—that forecast substantial shifts in the strategic-nuclear balance toward the Soviet Union by the late 1970s.

The hope has been rekindled in recent months of mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in Europe. The prospect, however, continues to be laced with suspicions and uncertainties. Why, one wonders, would the Soviet Union, never exactly known for altruism, be willing to pay a price for American withdrawals from Europe, the eventuality of which already seems to be accepted widely? Even should the Soviets approach the conference table with some measure of sincerity, the complexities and asymmetries of the European security equation are such (of a magnitude even greater than that faced in SALT) that negotiations

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

might at best stumble on for years. Furthermore, there is scant hope that the Soviets would toss their mid-range missiles onto the MBFR bargaining counter. Even if they did, what could NATO offer in return?

The more general hope has grown, particularly in Bonn, that the broader tides of détente and East-West confluence might sweep away the major sources of insecurity and instability in Europe. Even from the wistful vantage point of Bonn, however, the prospect of knitting any short-term gains of détente into a comprehensive new security system for Europe is at best a long-range one—and the dangers of insecurity and instability loom immediately ahead. The Brandt government's recognition of the short-range perils is mirrored in its almost doctrinaire stress on the need to sustain a European balance of military power as a prerequisite for a meaningful East-West confluence in Europe. The Federal Republic also shows its anxieties in leading the campaign to keep the American military presence solidly anchored in Central Europe.

V

In order to heal the transatlantic rift, NATO must come to grips with these European fears and concerns. A solution must meet at least the following criteria:

(1) It must embody a continued U.S. strategic commitment to the defense of Western Europe—at least for the next decade —and in more credible terms than are now embodied in the number of American forces encamped in Europe.

(2) It must entail the emergence of a credible counter in Europe to the Europe-oriented missile capabilities of the Soviet Union. "Credible counter" in this context does not suggest matching the Soviet missiles in kind and number. Required are NATO capabilities modest enough not to seem aggressive, but sizable enough to convince Soviet military planners that a Soviet nuclear strike against Western Europe will run the palpable risk of nuclear retaliation against the Russian homeland.

(3) Such capabilities must be responsive, in large part if not entirely, to the control of the potentially threatened West European nations themselves.

The dilemma which has haunted NATO's search for a solution in the past has been that of bracketing the first and third criteria—of creating an Allied Nuclear Force which could rec-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

oncile the cherished superpower prerogatives of the United States (with its insistence on retaining ultimate control) with the West European demands for co-determination. Clearly, the time for an "American solution," no matter how camouflaged, has long since passed.

Another alternative has become more prominent with the harbingers of Franco-British rapprochement: this is the notion of an independent European deterrent force based upon French and British nuclear capabilities. Andrew Pierre has analyzed this prospect searchingly in his article "Nuclear Diplomacy: Britain, France and America," in the January 1971 issue of *Foreign Affairs*.

This alternative may well represent a road-marker on the route to a long-range solution. Yet, in terms of critical shorter-range requirements, it falters on several grounds. Above all, the incubation period for really effective French and British nuclear-strategic capabilities is projected even by optimistic observers to stretch well into the 1980s. The nuclear programs of both countries (notably the French) face fairly formidable economic constraints and technological hurdles, which may be compounded by Soviet counterprograms and developments (for example, advances in missile defenses and anti-submarine warfare).

As Andrew Pierre implies, an active American policy of technological aid to its allies could shorten this incubation period. Yet, there looms also a political obstacle course. Even should Great Britain and France successfully embrace in the European Community, progress toward an effective nuclear combine between the two countries would take time and agonies of negotiations. Beyond that lurks the weightier question of the likely "Europeanness" of such a force or forces. Short of dramatic breakthroughs toward West European unification, would the West Germans (as a prominent example) be willing to trade doubtful American protection for the even more questionable safeguards of modest French and British forces?

In short, the American nuclear commitment must remain prominently in the picture. It must remain as a shield—a protective and encouraging shield—pending the necessary convergence of political trends and military capabilities on the Continent into the making of truly credible and cohesive European forces.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

VI

There is, however, a possible solution which would encompass the three criteria that have been postulated: a Tripartite NATO Deterrent Force of American, British and French nuclear capabilities within the framework of a broader Alliance enterprise.

In rough outline, the force might be composed of some 200 land-based, mobile ballistic missiles (*e.g.* successor systems to the presently deployed Pershing missiles) with sufficient range to strike the major population centers of western Russia from launchpoints anywhere in NATO Europe. The United States, Great Britain and France would each contribute one-third of the total number of nuclear warheads in the force. As far as its domestic legal constraints permit, the United States would extend to its allies the technical assistance they need to muster their warhead contributions.

The proposed size of the force reflects an estimate of the number of targets to be covered in peacetime by that portion of the force (probably one fourth) which is on "Quick Reaction Alert" (QRA). Thus, since about 20 percent of the population of the Soviet Union resides in its 40 largest cities, most of which are in western Russia, a QRA force of about 50 missiles would appear to constitute a reasonably credible deterrent. Warhead design would be keyed to "countervalue" use (*i.e.* against population centers); consequently, the force would have only a limited capability as a "counterforce" system and would clearly signify retaliation rather than aggression.

The missiles would be mobile, self-contained firing units, capable of being launched from unprepared sites, connected via satellite communications to NATO and national control centers, and with warhead security ensured by electronic means. The launchers, control systems, and perhaps the missiles themselves, would be developed and produced by a NATO consortium, with the costs shared by the participating nations.

The force would be deployed on the territories of NATO members that elect to participate in the plan. Although obvious political constraints would bar countries like Norway and Denmark, at a minimum the enterprise might embrace (in addition to France and Great Britain) the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the Benelux nations. The precise distribution of the force among participating countries would be negotiated within the Alliance. As a general rule, simplicity would dictate that in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

most cases the arrangements between warhead-providing and host countries be kept bilateral (for example, missiles in the Benelux countries might be equipped only with British warheads, and those in Italy only with French warheads). The one exception might be the Federal Republic of Germany, where a case could be made for contributions from all three providing powers.

A key aspect of the plan would be the decision-making and control arrangements governing the force. These would focus on two principles:

(1) The three nuclear powers would retain the custody and control of their nuclear warheads. Although planning for the force would be coördinated by SACEUR (especially with respect to common target lists), each of the three nations would retain ultimate decision-making power over the use of its nuclear warheads, wherever deployed, at all times.

(2) The non-nuclear host countries would own and control those launchers and missiles that are deployed on their territories. Thus they would wield veto power over the use of weapons on their soil (similar to the power they now wield with respect to U.S. nuclear weapons assigned to national forces). Over time, they would probably gain increased influence in nuclear decision-making through their evolving bilateral relations with providing nations, as well as through broader Alliance institutions.

This design would satisfy the three criteria of the NATO nuclear solution suggested earlier. The American participation in the enterprise would demonstrate tangibly a continued U.S. nuclear commitment to Western Europe. The force would provide a credible counterweight (in both European and Soviet eyes) to Moscow's Europe-oriented missile forces. In the light of its modest size and clearly retaliatory function, it would do so without realistically conveying aggressive or provocative intent. Finally, the scheme would open the way to a meaningful nuclear role for Europe in NATO.

The formula of equal American, French and British contribution to the force need not be fixed over time. Until the French and British were able to muster their shares of the nuclear warheads, the United States would probably shoulder the main burden. In time, once the British and French reached their assigned quotas, the European share could be gradually increased. In short, the plan is open-ended, and points the way to an even-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tual "Europeanization" of an effective nuclear deterrent in Western Europe.

VII

The emphasis in the above plan on land-based as contrasted with sea-based forces is keyed to the objective of broad Alliance participation in the enterprise, particularly by the non-nuclear powers—an objective which is inherently more elusive in the case of a sea-based alternative (as the MLF experience has shown). Land-based forces also serve more aptly the important criterion of deterrent visibility, especially with respect to the American participation. Yet, visibility obviously works two ways: while the West Europeans have learned in the main to live with the presence of nuclear weapons on European soil, local sensitivities and other political considerations may well constrain the scope of new missile deployments. If this proves to be the case, then there would still be the option of augmenting whatever level of land-based deployments is deemed tolerable by the Alliance with explicit French, British and American commitments of sea-based (submarine) forces to the common deterrent. Whatever "mix" of forces might finally be agreed upon, the "tripartite principle" of equal French, British and American contributions should be the governing one.

Despite these considerations, the scheme as outlined would face some formidable hurdles. Thus, technical problems undoubtedly would interfere with coördinated development and production of the necessary weapons components (warheads, missiles and launchers), with infrastructure (storage sites, bases, electronic communications, etc.) and with the physical security of the weapons themselves. But their solution would seem to lie clearly within the "state of the art."

There is the question of the burden, and how to share it. Clearly, the kind of force that has been proposed will not be cheap. Yet, as has been suggested, the West European resistance to past American demands for burden-sharing has been motivated in large part by the belief that the part of the total burden pressed upon them by the United States has not really been keenly relevant to their perceived security requirements. The plan proposed here would cater more directly to these requirements. There is no question that, given the will, the allied economies can shoulder the load.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It will also be argued that the entire thrust of the plan defies the trend in Europe toward rapprochement with the Eastern bloc. There is little doubt that the scheme would draw Soviet fulminations. To carry through, the West European governments would have to brave not only some chilled winds from the east, but also likely domestic reactions.

The West German government, in particular, would probably face grave decisions. A decade ago the West Germans led the faction within the Alliance which pressed for a "hardware solution" to the NATO nuclear problem. Yet the times and leadership have changed. Largely in deference to *Ostpolitik,* the present Brandt government has, if anything, downplayed the Federal Republic's participation in NATO nuclear strategy. At the same time, however, Bonn continues to have the heaviest stake among the European allies in military balance on the Continent and in a visible and unstinting American strategic commitment in Europe—for the sake of the hard and durable dictates of security as well as real bargaining power in *Ostpolitik.* Critically at issue in Bonn, as well as elsewhere in Western Europe, is the willingness to look beyond the immediate and short-term promises of détente toward the longer-range requirements not only of security and stability, but also of confident bargaining with the East.

The United States, too, would confront difficult decisions. The proposal implies a sharp reversal of the spirit (if not the declaratory letter) of past American policies in NATO: particularly the American anxiety to keep the nuclear genie in NATO securely locked in the American bottle. Then, too, the arrangement that has been suggested would in effect be a *volte-face* for us, from our contemptuous reaction to de Gaulle's similar concept of the late 1950s of a three-nation "directorate" in NATO. Yet, times and realities have changed, and they demand adjustment of U.S. priorities. The plan offers not only a way of translating past American lip-service to a "two-pillars" concept of NATO into rational Alliance policy, but, more important, portends a more stable transatlantic relationship.

With regard to its cherished nuclear prerogatives, the United States must finally face up to the fact that the nuclear genie has long left the bottle and is catering to the ambitions of other, friendly nations. The fundamental choice is between encouraging these ambitions to be harnessed coöperatively to an Alliance solution (where they can be amenable to American influence) or

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

permitting them to continue to stray into uncertain, national directions.

There is the weightier question of impact on U.S.-Soviet relations. As has been suggested, a hostile Soviet reaction to the plan is predictable. Yet, in the light of ostensible current trends in the SALT negotiations, there is no reason to believe that technically the formation of such a force should upset the negotiations. The most that seems to be expected today from SALT (beyond possible agreement on ABM) is some general U.S.-Soviet understanding on overall limits to the strategic-offensive capabilities of the two countries. Depending on how such limits would be defined, the United States would have two general choices. If the Soviets continue to insist that their medium-range missiles in western Russia are not "strategic," because they are not aimed at the United States, and therefore are beyond the pale of SALT, the United States could similarly argue that its contributions to a nuclear force in Europe would be "regional" and therefore not "strategic." If, on the other hand, the agreement on an overall limit did embrace Soviet Europe-oriented missiles, the United States could make its own contributions to the allied force compatible with the given limit by in effect "transferring" the needed warheads to Europe from other parts of its nuclear inventory.

But, the argument will be raised, such technical justifications will not lull Soviet "sensitivities." Though one should be sensitive to Soviet "sensitivities," there is a limit to catering to Soviet anxieties (real or professed), and that limit must be determined by hard-core American interests. There is no reason why we cannot tell the Soviets in all frankness: "You want to regulate strategic-nuclear parity between ourselves, but at the same time wield your massive strategic sledge hammer over our allies in Europe. So long as you deem your medium-range missile forces in Europe inviolate, we and our allies reserve the right to create a counterweight which is modest by any comparison with your capabilities."

Finally, the plan would undoubtedly draw domestic fire in the United States. Questions would be raised about the legalities of America's nuclear coöperation with allies in the light of the nonproliferation treaty and U.S. domestic legislation. Offhand, there do not appear to be any real legal hurdles. The nonproliferation treaty does not bar the sharing of nuclear know-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

how (as contrasted with the actual transfer of weapons and their control) between existing nuclear nations. Great Britain already qualifies as a recipient of American information-sharing under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, as amended in 1958. France could similarly qualify, if the President (probably with the coöperation of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee of Congress) were to make such an interpretation.

More telling, in any event, might be the broader political pressures in the United States. Although the caprices of American domestic politics are difficult to predict, there is bound to be an outcry against the plan, and American participation in it, on a host of grounds: legality, the alleged perils to U.S.-Soviet relations, a restrictive interpretation of nonproliferation, the larger issue of American commitments and "involvements" abroad, etc. Coping with these pressures would be the function, as always, of effective leadership. At the very least, however, the U.S. administration would be in a position to wield against the leading congressional critics of American NATO policies a telling argument: namely, that the plan portends not only a possible solution to the elusive issue of more equitable burden-sharing in the Alliance, but that it also points toward a gradual and eventual "Europeanization" of the security problem of NATO Europe, and a commensurate easing of the American military investment and obligations.

The imperative of effective leadership applies to NATO generally. The Alliance, as a unique and unprecedented enterprise in history, was created by enlightened and courageous leadership. It will take the same, if not greater, measures of imagination and boldness to chart a viable future.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BIG BUSINESS AND "DEPENDENCIA"

A Latin American View

By Osvaldo Sunkel

THE winds of economic nationalism are blowing strong in Latin America. This is evident in the nationalist and progressive régime in Peru, the rise and fall of the leftist government in Bolivia, the changes of policy in conservative countries like Colombia and Argentina and the spectacular election of a socialist government in Chile. There are also the numerous acts of nationalization in various countries, most of which have gone largely unnoticed, while others like the nationalization of petroleum in Peru and Bolivia, natural gas in Venezuela, aluminum in Guyana and copper in Chile have reached the headlines. Furthermore, there are restrictive foreign investment statutes unanimously endorsed by the Andean Pact nations, the limitations of various kinds imposed on foreign subsidiaries even in countries, like Mexico, otherwise favorable to foreign investment, the unaccustomed incisiveness of the Latin American protest against President Nixon's New Economic Policy voiced in the meetings of the Special Co-ordination Commission of Latin America, the Inter-American Economic and Social Council of the Organization of American States and the World Bank-International Monetary Fund Annual Conference, as well as the formal withdrawal of Argentina from the Inter-American Committee of the Alliance for Progress.

This last act, which does not come from a socialist Allende or a nationalist General Velasco Alvarado but from the conservative General Lanusse, marks the final collapse of the Alliance for Progress. Based on the assumption of cold-war confrontation, the Alliance was designed ten years ago to stop Castro's influence and win friends in Latin America. Now both the Alliance and the cold war are over, and there have been neither communist nor capitalist victors. The politico-ideological confrontation has been replaced to a large extent by an economic confrontation between the national interests of Latin America and those of the United States. The recent burst of nationalism is in fact a reaction to long-term and increasingly intolerable dependence on foreigners. The development strategy of industrialization as a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

substitute for imports was supposed to free the economy from its heavy reliance on primary exports, foreign capital and technology. It has not only failed to achieve these aims, but has in fact aggravated the situation and nature of "dependencia."

In its initial period, from 1930 to around 1955, the strategy stimulated the growth of a significant manufacturing industry and of the corresponding national entrepreneurial class. But subsequently industry was taken over to a large extent by foreign subsidiaries, with the result that much of the benefit expected from industrialization has gone abroad in payment for capital equipment and in a transfer of profits, royalties and other financial payments. This has effectively denationalized and eroded the local entrepreneurial class. Although the massive penetration of foreign firms has accelerated growth rates, especially industrial, it has also accentuated the uneven nature of development: on the one hand, a partial process of modernization and expansion of capital-intensive activities; on the other, a process of disruption, contraction and disorganization of traditional labor-intensive activities.

Disguised and open unemployment—that process of internal polarization and segregation which has been termed "marginalization"—has therefore been rising; together they account for levels estimated at over 25 percent, and they are still increasing. Owing to this and to the fact that the development strategies pursued aimed at the formation and strengthening of a reliable middle class, income seems at least as heavily concentrated in the hands of the wealthy as it was 20 years ago, allowing them consumption levels and patterns similar to those of the middle classes of developed countries, while the gap between high and low incomes in towns and in the countryside appears in most cases to have widened.

Things obviously went wrong with the development policies and strategy pursued after the Second World War. In a nutshell, the essence of its logic was that rapid economic growth could be achieved by protecting and stimulating industry, which eventually, and with the aid of appropriate government action, would induce the modernization of other sectors of the economy. This, in turn, would improve the social conditions of the people, more or less following the pattern of the industrial revolution in Western Europe and North America.

Apparently something important had been overlooked which

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hindered both the implementation and even an adequate understanding of the process. In the conventional approach to underdevelopment, the unit of analysis has always been the national economy in isolation, treated as if it existed in an international vacuum. Myrdal, Singer, Nurkse, as well as Prebisch and numerous economists from underdeveloped countries and U.N. agencies such as the Economic Commission for Latin America and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) have emphasized the significance of the foreign trade structure of these countries—raw material exports and manufactured imports—as causing instability, stagnation, deteriorating terms of trade and balance-of-payments difficulties. They have also pointed to foreign financing and technical aid as having a significant influence on the rate of growth and the equilibrium of the underdeveloped economy.

New studies of "dependencia" in industry and related sectors have led to a greater recognition of its nature and effects. To begin with, local development and modernization are seen not in isolation but as part of the development of an international capitalist system, whose dynamic has a determining influence on the local processes. Therefore, foreign factors are seen not as external but as intrinsic to the system, with manifold and sometimes hidden or subtle political, financial, economic, technical and cultural effects inside the underdeveloped country. These contribute significantly to shaping the nature and operation of the economy, society and polity, a kind of "fifth column" as it were. Thus, the concept of "dependencia" links the postwar evolution of capitalism internationally to the discriminatory nature of the local process of development, as we know it. Access to the means and benefits of development is selective; rather than spreading them the process tends to ensure a self-reinforcing accumulation of privilege for special groups as well as the continued existence of a marginal class.

In other words, this approach considers the capitalist system as a whole, as a global international system, within which national economies—nation-states—constitute sub-systems. These are not completely separated from each other but partially overlapping, owing to the fact that national economies interpenetrate each other to some extent in terms of productive facilities, technologies, consumption patterns, ideologies, political parties, cultural activities, private and government institutions. According

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to this approach, it is no longer possible to assume that underdevelopment is a moment in the evolution of a society which has been economically, politically and culturally autonomous and isolated.

The present international panorama of countries at different levels of development is not simply an aggregate of individual historical performances; the development process is not simply a race which started somewhere before the industrial revolution and in which some countries reached advanced stages while others stagnated or moved slower. The "dependencia" analysis maintains that one of the essential elements of the development of capitalism has been, from the outset, the creation of an international system which brought the world economy under the influence of a few European countries, plus the United States from the late nineteenth century onwards. Development and underdevelopment, in this view, are simultaneous processes: the two faces of the historical evolution of the capitalist system.

II

During the colonial period, in order to extract the precious metals and obtain the tropical products needed by the metropolis, Europeans interfered with existing social relationships and reorganized local economies on the basis of slavery and other forms of forced labor. This created the basis for agrarian structures and institutions which have survived in some form until today. During the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century, the industrial revolution in Europe and later in the United States created a world economic system where Europe and the United States invested heavily in the production of food and raw materials in the rest of the world, while specializing at home in the production of manufactures. In Latin America, to the agrarian colonial heritage was added specialization in the export of staples and raw materials and with it another set of socio-economic and political structures and institutions, including the new dominant élites.

The breakdown of the nineteenth-century model of international economic relations during the two World Wars and the Great Depression opened for Latin American economies the period of import-substituting industrialization. This meant, in the larger countries of the region, the formation by the middle of the 1950s of a significant manufacturing sector, complete with

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

its entrepreneurial class, professional and technical groups and industrial proletariat, as well as the necessary and ancillary government and private financial, marketing and educational agencies.

But during this period, while Europe was being ravaged by war and economic crisis, the U.S. economy developed into the most powerful center in the capitalist world and expanded into the economies of both developed and underdeveloped countries, bringing about very substantial changes, particularly in the latter. At the same time the U.S. economy experienced important changes in its internal structure. Government intervention expanded considerably within the United States, accelerating growth, reducing cyclical fluctuations and contributing to a fantastic development of science and technology; all this helped produce large business conglomerates. Vast economic, technological and therefore political power has enabled the multinational corporation, through the control of the marketing and communication processes, to induce consumers and governments to buy the products which it is technologically able to produce in ever-growing quantities. Within certain limits it is thus able to plan the development of consumption.

These institutional developments in the United States are reflected abroad as the new multinational corporations spread throughout the international economy. Their activities follow a fairly definite pattern: first, they export their finished products; then they establish sales organizations abroad; they then proceed to allow foreign producers to use their licenses and patents to manufacture the product locally; finally, they buy off the local producer and establish a partially or wholly owned subsidiary. In the process a new structure of international economic relations is emerging, where trade between national firm Z of country A and national firm Y of country B is replaced by the internal transfers of firm Z to countries A and B, while firm Y vanishes from the picture.

As a consequence, free-market forces and/or national policies are gradually superseded by the multinational firm's plan. It is estimated that for the decade 1960–70 around a fourth of all manufacturing exports from the United States were intra-firm transfers, and this proportion is rising quickly. Moreover, while previously only the international primary product market was an oligopoly, this is now also becoming true of the international

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

market in manufactures. For the underdeveloped countries this means that outside control, formerly applied only to their exports, is also increasingly exercised over their imports. Lastly, the intervention by government agencies in the developed countries, which paved the way for business expansion in their national markets, now is being repeated internationally, as these agencies intervene increasingly in "world markets"—which is really a euphemism for other countries' markets—to support and protect the expansion of their firms.

The greatly extended economic role of the state takes essentially two forms: direct, bilateral, government-to-government relationships on the one hand, and international, multilateral economic organizations on the other. The bilateral relationship between a dominant and a dependent country corresponds closely to mercantilistic formulas. The dominant country tries to establish, enlarge and preserve exclusive privileges for its business interests, granting in exchange support of various kinds to the local social groups with which it is associated. The instruments of domination in bilateral relationships are well known: tied loans, technical aid, preferential arrangements with regard to transportation, communications, foreign investment, tariffs and so on. The multilateral relationship consists of a maze of international economic organizations. Some would like to see these set up in a hierarchical system, with organizations like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), where developed countries have a decisive influence, at the top. Regional organizations like the Organization of American States (OAS), which exist within one hegemonic system, and organizations among the developed countries such as the European Community would be kept independent from outside influence. World organizations where each country has one vote would be relegated to a rather weak position, much as are the organizations among underdeveloped countries of one region, the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Meanwhile, it has not been possible to create a formal global organization of underdeveloped countries—only the informal UNCTAD group, originally 77, now over 100.

Efforts to reorganize international relations to correspond to the transformation in the structure of the world economy have been clearly discernible in recent reports dealing with interna-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tional coöperation. This is not surprising, since it should be the function of the superstructure to provide the ideological rationale for the system, as well as to lay down the rules of the game and provide the institutional means for policing its implementation. The following quotation constitutes a good statement of an apologist for these trends:

> The international corporation is acting and planning in terms that are far in advance of the political concepts of the nation-state. As the Renaissance of the fifteenth century brought an end to feudalism, aristocracy and the dominant role of the Church, the twentieth-century Renaissance is bringing an end to middle-class society and the dominance of the nation-state. The heart of the new power structure is the international organization and the technocrats who guide it. Power is shifting away from the nation-state to international institutions, public and private. Within a generation about 400 to 500 international corporations will own about two-thirds of the fixed assets of the world.[1]

III

Following the transformations that have occurred in the new centers of the capitalist world—the U.S., European and Japanese economies—the system of international economic relations has experienced fundamental institutional and structural changes. As a consequence, the internal economic, social and political structures of the dependent underdeveloped countries have also experienced fundamental transformations. These transformations are the main factors behind the rising nationalism in Latin America.

As mentioned earlier, the large expansion of the U.S. multinational corporation in Latin America really gained momentum around the mid-1950s; but only in the late 1960s did it reach the stage of the wholesale process of buying up local firms and integrating affiliates closely with headquarters and with each other. A study of the operations of 187 transnational corporations in Latin America shows that while in 1945 there were only 74 of these firms with manufacturing subsidiaries in the region, in 1967 the number of their subsidiaries in the region had increased from 182 to 950, and the total number of subsidiaries from 452 to 1,924.[2]

This process has profoundly affected the Latin American

[1] A. Barber, "Emerging New Power: The World Corporation," *War/Peace Report*, October 1968, p. 7.

[2] J. W. Vaupel and Joan P. Curham, "The Making of Multinational Enterprise." Boston: Harvard University Division of Research, 1969.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

economy and society. While in the earlier period foreign investment in these countries manifested itself mainly in primary production and public utilities, in the postwar period extractive subsidiaries grew from only 38 to 56. The fundamental impact has therefore been in the manufacturing and related sectors, which have expanded considerably since the 1930s. In their growth they were faced with the need of starting almost from scratch to obtain a specialized labor force, highly qualified technicians, entrepreneurs, equipment, raw materials, financial resources, organizations for marketing, distribution, publicity, sales and credit, as well as technical ability to carry out all these tasks. In the process of industrial growth and diversification, these countries have been increasingly incorporating these elements from foreign sources.

From the nineteen-thirties through the early nineteen-fifties, particularly in the larger countries, immigrants and local entrepreneurs provided most of the skilled personnel; capital and financing came mainly from public sources, both national and foreign; know-how and technology were acquired through the purchase of licenses and technical assistance. All these producers contributed to the formation and strengthening of private entrepreneurship and industry. But in recent years there has been a reversal of these trends. Subsidiaries of foreign firms have provided a complete package of entrepreneurship, management, design, technology, financing and marketing. This has been the local counterpart of the institutional transformations indicated earlier in the mature capitalist countries and in the international economy.

On a more general level, import-substituting industrialization constitutes another way of setting the underdeveloped economies within the framework of a reorganized world economic system. The new system is formed, as before, on the basis of dominant (developed) economies and dependent (underdeveloped) economies, increasingly linked to each other through growing transnational interlocking of production structures and consumption patterns.

In the plants, laboratories, design and publicity departments, as well as in the planning, decision-making, personnel and finance organizations that constitute its headquarters—always located in an industrialized country—the transnational corporation develops: (1) new products; (2) new ways of producing

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

those products; (3) the new machinery, equipment and innovative methods necessary to produce them; and (4) the publicity needed to create their markets. In the underdeveloped country, the corporation establishes the subsidiaries necessary for the marketing, assembling or routine production of those goods. The import-substitution process of industrialization has therefore become the corporation's strategy for penetration of foreign protected markets, supported by external public and private credit, international technical assistance and ideological advice in respect to development policies and strategies.

Let us look at some of the economic effects of this process through the words of Professor Harry Johnson:

> The corporation . . . has no commercial interest in diffusing its knowledge to potential native competitors, nor has it any interest in investing more than it has to in acquiring knowledge of local conditions and investigating ways of adapting its own productive knowledge to local factor/price ratios and market conditions. Its purpose is not to transform the economy by exploiting its potentialities (especially its human potentialities) for development. . . . The main contribution of direct foreign investment will be highly specific and very uneven in its incidence.[3]

A. O. Hirschman, on his part, has pointed out that direct private foreign investment, by taking over local firms and displacing local entrepreneurship, may be harming the quality of local factors of production. Moreover, given the "complete package" character of subsidiaries, the foreign contribution may not be complementary but may instead be competitive with local factors of production, retarding or preventing their growth, and therefore decreasing the quantity of local inputs. His conclusion: "Private foreign investment is a mixed blessing, and the mixture is likely to become more noxious at the intermediate stage of development which characterizes much of present-day Latin America."[4]

The massive expansion and branch-plant nature of direct foreign investment has in fact some highly negative effects. In the first place, there is the process of vertical integration between the subsidiary and the headquarters. This means that flows of

[3] Harry G. Johnson, "The Multi-National Corporation as an Agency of Economic Development: Some Exploratory Observations," in Barbara Ward, Lenore d'Anjou and J. D. Runnalls, "The Widening Gap: Development in the 1970's." New York: Columbia University Press, 1971, p. 244 and 246.

[4] Albert O. Hirschman, "How to Divest in Latin America, and Why," *Essays in International Finance*, No. 76, Princeton University, November 1969.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

goods, finance, technology, etc. generally take place within firms, which have a natural tendency to prefer their own branches or affiliates as partners in any transaction, even if the country's interests are different. Their tendency is not to integrate with local suppliers or to share or adapt their technology, as Johnson points out. Furthermore, there is usually a market-sharing agreement among headquarters and the various subsidiaries and affiliates, which often means that branch plants are not allowed to export. Even the integration process in LAFTA or the Central American Common Market gives the subsidiaries located in the member countries a further opportunity to diminish the position of national firms.

Secondly, subsidiaries within one country tend to integrate horizontally, to conglomerate among themselves. Gaining control of finance, credit, markets and publicity means a considerable capacity to influence consumption patterns, not only of the higher income groups which can afford their goods, but also of lower income groups by way of the "trickling down" effect, thereby completely distorting their consumption patterns.

The control of the commanding heights of the economy also means, of course, the capacity to influence the allocation of resources in the public sector, frequently in the direction of providing the infrastructure needed for subsidizing the expansion of the foreign subsidiary. It also implies the capacity to acquire significant financial resources, private and public, with which to finance local expansion and foreign remittances, almost without the need of net additional foreign capital. In fact, between 1963 and 1968 only nine percent of the total funds used by the Latin American subsidiaries of U.S. corporations came from abroad. This, together with their negligible contribution to exports, inevitably leads to a serious balance-of-payments problem.

In the third place, foreign subsidiaries are usually able to extract oligopolistic profits from the exploitation of consumer and supplier markets. Moreover, as they keep most of their international transactions within the boundaries of the firm, there is a strong tendency to remit excess profits by manipulating the prices, kinds and quantities of these transactions.

Finally, the activities of subsidiaries in underdeveloped countries follow a definite life cycle. At the beginning the foreign firm may make a substantial contribution in capital, skilled personnel, technology, management, etc. But over time the cash out-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

flow becomes larger than the inflow. Moreover, among the various alternative ways of obtaining external coöperation, direct foreign investment in the form of wholly owned subsidiaries is the one that has the smallest educational effect because of its policy of retaining its monopoly of skills and technology. It is only as a consequence of the process of the country's development that local personnel learn modern management and technological skills. Eventually, the corporation's net contribution to the development capabilities of the country becomes negligible or even negative. When the technology of the activities in which the firm operates becomes standardized and well known, the subsidiary becomes an "obsolete" form of foreign ownership from the point of view of its contribution to the resources, abilities and technology of the country.

IV

While these and other negative economic effects illustrate clearly the "mixed blessing" that private foreign investment represents, it is the socio-political consequences that are of far greater importance and of a much more explosive character.

The massive penetration of subsidiaries of foreign firms into the industrial, financial, marketing and distribution activities has fundamentally changed the ownership pattern in most Latin American countries. Foreign firms have acquired a dominant position among medium and large firms in many if not all the main sectors of private economic activity. This implies a basic change in the social structure and the political system. As the economist Celso Furtado has pointed out:

> The process of forming a local entrepreneurial class has been interrupted. The best talents that emerge from local industries are being absorbed into the new managerial class. . . . National independent entrepreneurship is . . . restricted to secondary activities or to pioneering ventures which, in the long run, simply open up new fields for the future expansion of the multinational corporation. . . . The elimination of the national entrepreneurial class necessarily excludes the possibility of self-sustained national development, along the lines of the classical capitalist development.[5]

In other words, a significant part of the national bourgeoisie is being transformed into a private transnational technocracy, losing legitimacy as part of a national ruling class.

[5] Celso Furtado, "La concentración del poder económico en los EE. UU. y sus proyecciones en América Latina," *Estudios Internacionales*, Año I, No. 3–4, Santiago, 1968.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But Furtado's observation may be extended to all groups and social classes to gain a clearer perception of the crisis which is affecting the nation-state in Latin America. At the level of production, this crisis makes itself felt through the massive and extraordinarily dynamic penetration of the transnational firm with its subsidiaries and affiliates; at the technological level, by the large-scale introduction of highly capital-intensive techniques; at the cultural and ideological level, by the overwhelming and systematic promotion and publicity of conspicuous consumption capitalism; and at the concrete level of development policies and strategies, by the pressure of national and international interests in favor of an industrialization process aimed basically at providing consumer goods for the high-income groups.

This process of so-called modernization implies the gradual replacement of the traditional production structure, which is labor-intensive, by another of much higher capital intensity. Under these conditions, the process incorporates into the new institutions and structures the individuals and groups that are apt to fit into the kind of rationale which prevails there. It also expels those individuals and groups that have no place in the new productive structure or lack the ability to adapt to it. Therefore, this process not only prevents the formation of a national entrepreneurial class, but also limits and erodes the middle classes generally (including intellectuals, scientists and technocrats) and even creates privileged and underprivileged sectors within the working class, adding another serious difficulty to the creation of a strong labor movement.

In this process, some national entrepreneurs are coöpted as executives into the new subsidiaries; some professionals, forming part of the technical staff, and some specially trained employees are incorporated. The rest are left out. Part of the qualified labor supply will be brought in and the remainder excluded, adding to the growing problem of unemployment and underemployment. The effects of the disintegration of each social class have important consequences for social mobility. The marginal entrepreneur will probably be added to the ranks of small businessmen, or will abandon independent activity and become a middle-class employee. The segregated sectors of the middle class will probably form a group of frustrated lower-middle-class people trying to maintain appearances without much pos-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sibility of upward mobility and terrified by the prospect of proletarianization. The unemployed or underemployed workers will increase the numbers of those marginal to the economy and society, as in the lower middle class. Growing pools of resentment and frustration will certainly accumulate in both middle and lower classes.

Corresponding to this downward mobility there is also an upward mobility of a selective and discriminatory character. Some unemployed or underemployed are incorporated into the working class, some workers rise to the lower ranks of the middle classes and some sectors of the middle classes become small or medium-sized entrepreneurs. This upward movement probably tends to depress the wage levels, at least of unskilled workers and employees, and increases the anguish of the lower-middle and working classes.

Corresponding to this internal mobility is an international mobility between the internationalized sectors of developed and underdeveloped countries; these constitute in fact an international market for skilled labor. One side of this mobility is the outward "brain drain;" the obverse is the flow of experts and administrators sent into the underdeveloped countries to oversee the process of modernization and development described earlier. There may also be a flow of underemployed from Latin America in response to demands for low-salaried employees in developed countries.

V

The crisis of the nation-state which has been outlined above also affects the main institutions of society: the state, the armed forces, political parties, the universities, the Church. In Latin America, different countries have reacted in various ways to this crisis. In Brazil, leading groups and classes seem to have accepted "dependencia" and marginalization as inevitable and necessary ingredients of the process of development and modernization. An increasing share of the ownership and control of national resources and activities is being turned over to foreign firms and the government apparatus is being put at their disposal. This means not only the provision of infrastructural investments necessary for their expansion, but also the political and police repression needed to suppress the growing reaction and resentment to advancing denationalization, widening inequality and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

increasing marginalization. This development model could perhaps best be described as Dependent State Capitalism.

In other countries, owing to the different nature of preëxisting local conditions and other elements which cannot be analyzed here, certain social classes have reacted to the crisis by trying to oppose the above-mentioned trends. To do this they are trying to regain control over the economy. But this implies, in the first place, taking away the control of the state from the social groups which are more closely associated with the development strategy of Dependent State Capitalism. In the case of Peru this has been done by the nationalist elements among the military, and in Chile by a government elected with the support of large sectors of the working class and important sections of the middle class.

Having taken over the control of the state, these groups face three essential development tasks in correcting the main malformation inherited from the historical process of interaction with the international system: in the first place, this means transforming the agrarian structure, which is the fundamental root of inequality, marginalization and stagnation; second, using the primary export sector, which represents an underdeveloped country's most important source of capital accumulation, to support the expansion of heavy and consumer industries; and, finally, the reorganization of the industrial sector, essentially in order to orient it away from satisfying the conspicuous consumption of the minority into satisfying the basic needs of the majority.

In this process of structural reform, many well-established local and foreign interests will be affected. If there are foreign investments in the agricultural sector, they will be affected by agrarian reform. If there are foreign investments in the primary export sector, whether agricultural or mining, they will be affected by the need to control these fundamental sources of foreign financing. If there are foreign investments in the industrial and related sectors, as there increasingly are, the reorientation of industrial policy will affect subsidiaries of foreign firms. As the present level of industrial development has rested to a large extent on the power structures built around the main local and foreign industrial and commercial monopolies and the banking system, they are also bound to be taken over by the state. This will mean nationalizations and renegotiations with foreign interests.

It is interesting to note that international public opinion has

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

more or less become accustomed to the idea that structural reforms are necessary in agriculture, so much so that underdeveloped countries are urged to go ahead with agrarian reform. If foreign interests are involved, there may be protests but they would be considerably attenuated by the recognized need for an agrarian reform.

Even in the field of primary export activities it is being accepted that our nations have the right to control their most essential resources, and that the policies of subsidiaries of foreign firms do not necessarily coincide with the best long-term interests of the country. It seems, as Hirschman points out, that at a certain level of industrial and general development, our countries are also beginning to reassert their own interests in the fields of manufacturing, commerce and banking, where the foreign penetration is now greatest. The conflict of interest with foreign private investment in these sectors will be more or less intense according to whether the country will choose a socialistic development path, as in Chile; some rather progressive variety of state capitalism, as seems to be the case in Peru; or some less well-defined and more moderate variety, as in most other countries.

Whatever the case, the era of "creating favorable business conditions for direct foreign investment" as a general policy seems to be coming to an end. But even then, as is seen more and more with the socialist countries, possible coöperation with foreign firms is not totally excluded, even though there will certainly be little place for wholly owned subsidiaries of foreign firms or private foreign investment of the traditional kind. What is opening up is a new era of hard bargaining and negotiations, of pragmatic and detailed considerations of specific cases, of weighing the conditions offered by Japan, Europe, the socialist countries and the United States, of building up alliances with countries with similar interests (the Andean Pact, the Special Co-ordination Commission of Latin America, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries), etc. In short, what we are seeing is the assertion of the national interest of our countries in their international economic relations. The aim is greater autonomy, in order to achieve development without "dependencia" and without marginalization. To achieve this goal, the asymmetrical nature of the present system of international economic relations must first undergo a thorough reform.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE SPACE PROGRAM AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST

By Robert Jastrow and Homer E. Newell

IN 1900 the population of scientists and engineers in the United States numbered one in 2,000. Today the ratio is one in 120 and the figure is still mounting. Current federal expenditures for research and development are $15.7 billion. During the postwar era these appropriations built the American research establishment to a level of strength beyond that of any other nation. Throughout the 1950s and most of the 1960s the build-up continued without opposition. Recently the taxpayer has begun to regard the House of Science with a degree of concern, because the costs of technological programs have become staggering in the last few years. Painful choices are being forced on the Congress. Shall program A or program B be funded? Each is so expensive that it seems impossible to fund both. Which will advance the national interest more? The general value of research is also being subjected to a closer examination. At what level of support does science make its maximum contribution to society? If the science we have purchased so far has been beneficial, will twice as much science be twice as beneficial?

The space program is a case in point. On January 5, President Nixon announced that "the United States should proceed with the development of an entirely new space transport system . . . the space shuttle which gives us routine access to space by sharply reducing costs in dollars." The decision to proceed with the shuttle was based in part on the dollars-and-cents savings it would yield, which are estimated to run to more than $12 billion in the first decade of shuttle operations against shuttle costs of $8 billion for development and hardware. But a bargain in bananas only represents a savings if the customer needs bananas. Why does America need a space program? Why does she need a man-in-space capability? What is the relation of space to the national interest?

To some, space is, or should be, pure science; to others, it is prestige and the American image; to still others, space means national security. Most often space is identified with science, but when a comparison is made with funding levels in other branches of scientific research, it becomes clear that support given to the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

program involves other factors besides the public interest in pure science.

II

Initially, there was no doubt regarding the motivation for bringing the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) into being. The American space effort was conceived in a mood of national insecurity. It grew out of the paroxysm of humiliation and self-doubt experienced by the United States in the fall of 1957, when the first Sputnik went into successful orbit while shortly after, as the world watched, the first American Vanguard rocket collapsed on the pad in a sea of fire. Headlines shouted "Kaputnik" and "Flopnik." With the launching of Sputnik, the Soviet Union had entered a domain of the environment that seemed to be denied to the United States. In the years following, the Soviets rapidly expanded their control over the new region. Their efforts were climaxed in 1961 by the first orbital flight of a Russian cosmonaut. The position of the United States as a world power seemed threatened by this evidence of a major Soviet technical capability in being. World comment at the time suggested that on both sides of the Iron Curtain the two systems of government were being reëvaluated on the basis of the Soviet achievement.

NASA was two years old at the time of the Gagarin flight, and the space budget had reached the substantial level of $900 million. In retrospect, it is clear now that a billion-dollar budget was merely the entry fee into the race the Russians were running. On that budget, the United States was no longer falling behind the Russians, but neither was it catching up. An all-out effort was necessary, and the moon beckoned.

A landing on the moon seemed to have all the needed elements. It was a clearly defined goal and gripped the imagination; its achievement would recreate the image of U.S. technological leadership; it involved minimum danger of a military confrontation; and it would automatically give the United States a first-class man-in-space capability. At the same time, the lunar landing was so far beyond the abilities of either the United States or the Soviet Union in 1961 that the early lead taken by Russia in manned flight would not predetermine the outcome. The lunar landing project provided America with a chance to overtake the Soviet Union and brighten its tarnished image with a major first

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in space. All in all, a greatly strengthened man-in-space effort seemed the most efficient way of redressing the strategic imbalance created by Soviet mastery of the new technology.

These factors created Apollo. Its goal was not the landing on the moon per se, but the development of a U.S. capability to operate and maneuver in space with man, and to maintain our presence there in the face of vigorous activity on the part of another great power.

Throughout the 1960s the Soviet Union remained the main driving force behind NASA, but with the landing on the moon in 1969 the original Soviet threat seemed to fade. American interest diminished, and a phase-out of manned flight operations commenced. According to current congressional authorizations, the manned flight program comes to an end in 1973, after the second Skylab flight scheduled for that year.

The projected termination of manned flight in 1973 posed a major policy issue for the United States. A parallel can be drawn with the situation that faced the government in 1961. At that time, the United States was confronted with a major Soviet achievement—the first manned orbital flight—while its own program continued to lag far behind. In 1971 the United States was faced with the termination of its manned activities in space, while Russia gave every indication of driving ahead forcefully in this area. The Soviet Union launched twice as many satellites as the United States in 1971, put up the first space platform, and, while it suffered a serious reverse in the deaths of the Soyuz 11 cosmonauts, showed no signs of a slackening interest in manned space flight.

The presidential action must be viewed in this context. Concern with the general strategic posture of the United States would appear to have been the overriding consideration in the recent decision to proceed to the next stage in the development of manned space flight.

Once that decision was made, the space shuttle had to follow, for the shuttle represents the most economical means of continuing manned flight operations. It is a reusable rocket—in effect, a rocket-plane—which can be flown again and again, carrying scientists, engineers and satellites up into orbit and back down to a conventional jet landing—all at a substantial reduction in cost. The Saturn launches cost $55 million each, and the launch of the more advanced Titan 3C costs $24 million, whereas a shuttle

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

flight will cost $8 million and deliver considerably more payload for the money. It makes no sense to continue to rely on the rocket technology of the 1960s, when the experience gained in the Saturn-Apollo project and other U.S. space programs has shown the way to a much more efficient and lower-priced generation of space vehicles.

III

According to this analysis, a major force behind the space program as a whole is a concern for national security, and with the fact as well as the image of American technical and scientific strength vis-à-vis the Soviets. However, space is not the only government program important to the security and the technological strength of the United States. Can America afford the financial drain of matching the Soviet Union in every field of science and technology? Many Americans believe that this cannot be done without weakening other essential programs, such as urban reconstruction and education.

The question is one of values and priorities. From this point of view, is space a good place for the United States to put its money? What is the dollar return from the space program, relative to the potential return from the same amount of money invested in another sector of American society?

This question opens up an important avenue for discussion. Starting with the development of the Early Bird communications satellite in 1965, space technology has entered into the mainstream of the American economy with surprising rapidity. Today many observers predict that the U.S. investment in space will be repaid many times over. The list of promising space applications includes better weather forecasts, prospecting for minerals from space, better communications, satellites that monitor the atmosphere and lakes and rivers of the United States for pollution and are the only economically feasible means of doing so, and satellites that guide ships and planes to their destinations and provide traffic control over crowded air terminals.

IV

Better weather forecasting could yield several billion dollars a year as a result of increased productivity, mainly in the agricultural, transport and construction industries. Weather forecasting depends on the measurement of such atmospheric properties as

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pressure, temperature and the strength and direction of the winds throughout a large region. Currently this information is usually obtained by launching into the atmosphere small balloons containing weather instruments plus a radio to transmit results of the measurements to weather stations on the ground. In the future satellites will join the balloon network and expand weather coverage to a global scale.

At this point the reader may well register doubt. How can a satellite hurtling through space far above the atmosphere carry out measurements of such properties of the atmosphere as pressures and winds? Isn't it necessary to do the equivalent of raising a wet finger in the air itself to secure that information? Can the data really be acquired from a distance?

The answer depends on a little-known instrument called an infrared radiometer which is becoming a standard item of equipment on weather satellites. It is a well-known fact that satellites carry cameras to photograph the weather and provide early warnings of hurricanes and other disturbances. Less well known is the fact that the latest satellites also carry a delicate instrument which measures the intensity of the feeble emanation of heat which radiates to space from earth and its atmosphere. The sensitivity of these instruments is such that they could detect the heat from a flatiron at a distance of one mile. The heat radiated to space from the earth contains many different wavelengths, and each wavelength originates at different depths in the atmosphere as well as on the ground. By spreading out the measured radiation into its component wavelengths, the scientist on the ground is able, with the aid of a computer, to calculate the temperature of the air on the ground and at every level in the atmosphere.

Once the pattern of temperature variations is known over the entire globe, the scientist is in a position, again with the aid of a computer, to calculate the winds and the weather. The connection between temperature and winds is not obvious and requires some explanation. If the temperature of the ground were uniform all over the earth, there would be no winds and no weather. Winds arise because the sun's rays do not heat the ground uniformly. For example, the equator receives more sunlight than the poles. Where the ground is warmest, the air expands, rises and flows away. In this way temperature differences create winds. The actual situation in nature is considerably more complicated than this simple description suggests, but the basic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

theory is accurate. If the temperature pattern is known, the weather can be predicted.

In principle, the method can be applied without the aid of satellites. However, it would be prohibitively expensive to measure the temperature of the entire globe by ordinary methods. At present, extensive areas of the world are not covered by weather observations. Even in the United States the coverage is spotty, with only 70 balloon-launching stations for the collection of weather information. Large areas of the weather map are almost blank, including the polar regions and the oceans.

Unfortunately, much of the weather that blesses or afflicts the United States often originates in one of these blank regions on the weather map. The weather experienced by the West Coast generally comes from the Pacific Ocean, while the weather over the Midwest and the East Coast usually has originated some days earlier in central or western Canada. This fact prevents the meteorologist from making useful forecasts more than a day or so in advance, and even the one-day forecasts leave much to be desired.

Observations of the weather in the oceans and sparsely inhabited land areas surrounding the United States, impossible before the advent of weather satellites, should lead to a quantum jump in the accuracy and range of weather forecasts. Large savings through improved weather forecasting can be expected in the weather-sensitive sectors of the U.S. economy, because the volume of business in these industries is substantial. In agriculture, transportation, construction and roadbuilding, for example, the total annual volume in 1970 was about $270 billion, and estimated losses due to weather were in the neighborhood of $13 billion. A relatively modest reduction of 20 percent in these losses would correspond to a $2.6 billion savings. These circumstances lie behind the estimate of important gains to the U.S. economy from this single application of space technology.

V

Multibillion-dollar annual returns to the American economy from weather satellites may be matched by the yield from satellites employed in prospecting for valuable mineral deposits. The prospector and his burro are essential in the search for mineral deposits, but aircraft play an important supporting role, and so should satellite reconnaissance in years to come. In some cases

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

geological faults—cracks in the earth's crust which are likely to be associated with ore deposits—can be seen in photographs taken from orbit. In other cases the presence of a buried ore deposit is signaled by a particular type of rock on the surface. Experience shows that an ore deposit is often surrounded by a special kind of rock, known as the "host rock" for that type of ore. Since different kinds of rock reflect sunlight in different ways, wide-area photographs of the region taken from a satellite can reveal the telltale host rock that indicates an ore deposit.

The stakes are high in this game. One estimate places the yield from potential satellite discoveries of mineral deposits in the United States at $2 billion a year in royalties alone. The total value of mineral deposits discovered each year by ordinary prospecting on the ground in the United States, Canada and Mexico amounts to roughly $10 billion. It is possible that several times this sum could be the global yield from major improvements in mineral prospecting. Here we reach the neighborhood of tens of billions of dollars in direct economic benefits from a single application of satellites. These gains would dwarf the investment in the underlying space technology.

Mining activities in northern Canada illustrate the economics of satellite prospecting versus ground prospecting. A single rock outcropping near Kitt Creek in Ontario led to the discovery of the famous Timmons deposit, one of the world's largest bodies of copper, zinc, gold and silver. This single find is estimated to have a value in the neighborhood of $10 billion. The find was made by a lucky fluke when a prospector stumbled across a small outcrop of ore that give him a clue to the massive treasure-lode lying beneath the surface. Geologists believe that many deposits as rich as the Timmons find may exist in the area because it belongs to one of a number of belts of green schist—a type of rock deposit frequently associated with rich ore. The total area of the belts in this region is roughly 100,000 square miles. The terrain is too rough for jeeps or burros. Recovery of its mineral wealth requires systematic exploration of the entire region on foot, by prospectors stopping every hundred yards to collect soil samples for laboratory analysis. Tens of millions of dollars would be required to complete a survey of this one region. A complete exploration on foot is a workable approach in principle, but forbidding in practice because of the prohibitive cost.

The same analysis applies *a fortiori* to the still more difficult

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

terrains of Brazil, equatorial Africa and Southeast Asia, in which a heavy cover of trees and vegetation makes ground exploration exceedingly difficult and expensive. The available evidence suggests the presence of large deposits of mineral wealth in these regions. Again it seems incredible that a satellite hurtling through space hundreds of miles above the surface of the earth should be able to detect mineral deposits concealed by a heavy tree-cover. But an example will indicate how this might work. Research has shown that trees growing in metal-rich soil absorb the metallic elements of the soil into the structure of their cells. As a consequence, the tree leaves reflect sunlight differently from leaves on the same type of tree growing nearby in ordinary, metal-poor soil. The rest of the story is clear: Measure the intensity of reflected sunlight over a continental expanse of forested regions by means of instruments mounted in a satellite, and look for the critical patterns that betray the presence of mineral deposits.

As a test of this method, measurements have been made at tree-top level at a site near Copper Creek, Arizona. They show large differences in the reflected sunlight from two neighboring trees, one located in soil with a high abundance of copper and molybdenum, and the other growing nearby in ordinary soil. The tree growing in the metal-rich soil reflects twice as much yellow light as the tree growing in ordinary soil, but half as much blue light. This combination is an unmistakable sign of the presence of the metals. Such measurements obtained from a satellite can be used to guide the prospector to the mineral wealth of millions of square miles, with a great saving in time and money.

Aircraft can make the same measurement and are used for this purpose in surveys of small areas. Satellites acquire their unique value when a continent-sized area is to be surveyed. It is, of course, in these large-scale surveys that the greatest gains can be realized. The direct operating cost of an aircraft survey of the interesting areas of the earth, which total approximately 100 million square miles, would be about $300 million. The same survey could be carried out by a single satellite costing no more than $30 million. Additional savings result from the fact that each satellite photograph or radiation-scan covers thousands of square miles, revealing significant large-scale variations with unnecessary details suppressed. For many surveys the satellite detail is adequate, and consequently data-processing costs are far less than would be

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the case with the superfluous detail furnished by aircraft surveys.

Apart from costs, satellites are superior to aircraft because of the large area covered in each photograph or scan. Such an area is typically several thousand square miles. Airplanes usually cover no more than 100 square miles per photograph. Because many photos are needed to survey a large area, aircraft require the better part of a day to cover the equivalent of one satellite photograph. Consequently, different regions are photographed at different times of the day, and under different lighting conditions. If the area is large, and the survey lasts many days, the condition of the ground will vary from day to day because of local rain or snow. The intensity of the light reflected from the ground depends on these lighting conditions and ground conditions to a very great extent. The critical changes in intensity from place to place, which would indicate the presence of mineral deposits, are apt to be masked by the changes that occur from hour to hour and day to day during the course of an extended aircraft survey. Such difficulties do not arise in satellite prospecting.

The ability of the satellite to photograph large areas quickly and repeatedly makes it a very promising tool in the survey of other natural resources, such as crops, timberland, water and snow cover, which frequently vary day by day and from season to season. Crops offer a particularly interesting example because of the large losses experienced each year as a result of plant diseases. Infrared photographs taken from satellites can reveal plant diseases before they can be detected by the farmer on the ground, because a diseased plant or tree radiates a different level of heat to space, just as a feverish person experiences a change in body temperature. An estimated $840 million annually can be saved in the United States through the use of satellites for the detection of plant diseases, according to an IBM report.

VI

Communications satellites offer another fruitful field for the space program. Communications was the first area to be invaded by the new technology, and, together with weather forecasting, it constitutes one of the two areas in which satellites have already become an operational reality. The dollars-and-cents return to the economy from communications satellites is difficult to measure, but most experts agree that the gains promise to be enor-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mous, because improvements in communications exert an upward leverage on the entire gross national product (GNP) by accelerating the tempo of business life. The only question is, what will be the amount of the increase in productivity? Will it be as small as one percent? Translated into dollars in the GNP, that would mean a gain of $10 billion annually. The indirect financial gains from improved communications may exceed all other returns from space.

The relationship between efficient communications and satellites can be clearly seen in the recent history of transatlantic telephone charges. The table below shows the monthly rates for a leased telephone circuit between New York and Paris during the period 1959 to 1971. The rates remained unchanged for a number of years, but in 1966—immediately after the first communications satellite went into operation—monthly charges dropped sharply and have continued to drop since that time.

NEW YORK TO PARIS TELEPHONE RATES: 1959–1971

Year	*Dollars per Month*
1959 through 1965	$10,000
1966	8,000
1967	6,500
1968	6,000
1969	6,000
1970	4,750
1971	4,625

Although expanded cable service also contributes to the reduction in transatlantic phone rates, the coincidence of the sharp decrease with the onset of satellite operations is striking.

Arthur C. Clarke, who invented the concept of the communications satellite in 1945, has maintained a high reputation as a seer of technological developments and their impact on mankind. His judgment probably can be relied upon when he predicts: "What we are building now is the nervous system of mankind. . . . The communications network, of which the satellites will be modal points, will enable the consciousness of our grandchildren to flicker like lightning back and forth across the face of this planet."

VII

The three cases of weather forecasting, mineral resources and communications illustrate the economic value of space. The space shuttle enters the picture at this point because it affords

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the most economical means of realizing the benefits of the space program in the economic sphere. The shuttle moves back and forth between the earth and space environments. It carries a dual propulsion system—rocket engines and liquid hydrogen fuel for space flight; jet engines, kerosene and wings for the return to earth. Space shuttles can carry passengers and freight into orbit and down again at a cost per pound far below today's cost for a satellite launching or a manned space flight mission. The cargo bay, probably about 15 ft. x 60 ft. in dimension, will accommodate satellites and space platforms weighing up to 65,000 pounds and will provide a low-cost method for placing commercial or scientific satellites in orbit. NASA estimates that in the first decade of shuttle operations $5 billion will be saved in launch costs through its use.

Additional savings are expected to result from the reduced cost of the satellites themselves. The cargo bay of the shuttle offers a considerably gentler and less rigorous environment for delicate scientific instruments than today's conventional launch rockets. Much of the cost of building a rugged design into the satellite can be bypassed as a consequence.

A space transport system based on the shuttle also provides a means for repairing satellites in orbit, thus increasing their lifetimes, again at large savings. The new commercial satellites are expensive, and becoming more so as their capabilities expand. The first communications satellite placed in operation over the Atlantic—the Early Bird—contained 240 voice circuits and cost $8.2 million. The recently launched Intelsat IV supplies up to 9,000 circuits and costs $26 million. The advanced communications satellites proposed for a U.S. domestic system will cost about $50 million each. It seems extravagant to contemplate throwing away one of these expensive devices after a failure, when it can be brought back to earth in the cargo bay of the shuttle for overhaul, or even repaired in orbit by a technical team transported to the scene. Round-trip airfare for the overhaul is estimated to be about $8 million, but for this price the crew can salvage a $50 million satellite. The total savings resulting from the repair operations, plus the reduction in the cost of the satellites, is estimated to be $7 billion.

Some 20 U.S. satellites, each worth $30 to $50 million, will probably be in orbit in the 1980s, and each will play a critical role in some sector of American business and personal life. The

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

list will probably include eight to ten Comsats dedicated to domestic and international uses, four or more satellites dedicated to worldwide marine and air navigation and traffic control, two or more satellites devoted to surveillance of the earth's face for mineral resources, water, timber resources, forest and grazing lands, fishing, farmlands, and the monitoring of air and water pollution, and several satellites devoted to astronomy, geophysics, and other branches of pure science. Experience will tell whether to divide these functions among numerous separate satellites as they are today, or to combine them in a smaller number of large electronic complexes. In either case, a low-cost space transport system will be required to maintain and repair these satellites in orbit.

Replacement costs are not the only problem in satellite maintenance. When a space platform is responsible for air traffic control or for the communications traffic of a continent, it will not be possible to permit one of these critically important devices to go out of service for a day, an hour, or even a minute because a transistor has malfunctioned. If air traffic control over Kennedy, O'Hare and other major airports depends on satellites hovering overhead, interruption of service would require reverting for a time to the less efficient modes of control which even today are becoming inadequate, and which in tomorrow's world would be extremely expensive. In the 1980s it is likely that the U.S. satellite network will be constructed on the principle of a 100-percent guarantee of uninterrupted service.

Continuity of service could be ensured without manned flights by building spare circuits into each satellite, ready to take over when a failure occurs. The backup equipment might consist of duplicate electronics for all the parts of the satellite or it could consist of one or more duplicate satellites launched with the main satellite and available for service at any time. But when circuit A became defective and circuit B took over, it would still be necessary to repair circuit A promptly; otherwise the failure of the satellite would only be postponed. Of course, a three-fold or four-fold redundancy could be built-in, but that soon becomes a very expensive way of obtaining protection from interruption in service. The space shuttle system is likely to prove the cheapest way of keeping critical satellites in continuous operation.

Financial returns are not the principal criterion for judging the usefulness of the shuttle, for its prime importance lies in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fact that space is an arena in which several nations are, or soon will be, engaged. The United States must maintain a presence in that arena through a manned flight program to preserve its position as a world power. But the extensive use of space is becoming an economic necessity for every technologically advanced nation. The United States probably could not maintain a competitive position with other major powers in international commerce unless it made full use of the most advanced technologies available, including those of space—commerce-oriented satellites and the economics of the shuttle—in the conduct of its domestic and foreign affairs.

VIII

Some students of the space program have expressed the view that its impact will be felt in other respects than the cost-accounting of economic productivity versus technological investment. There has been much discussion of the influence of space exploration on the mind and spirit of man, as an extension of the revolution in thought that was initiated by Copernicus and continued by Newton and Darwin. A study of the history and pre-history of man suggests that the human drive is expressed through just such tentative movements out of the world of tried experience into a new world of untested promise.

Sputnik and the moon landing signaled the opening of a new frontier across which man can now travel into the endless reaches of outer space. The new frontier of space will not be closed quickly, for astronomical knowledge shows that billions of stars, some undoubtedly accompanied by earthlike planets, surround us in the galaxy. Space exploration has brought home to more people than ever before the reality of this vast complex of stars and planets. "Out there" is really there, a place that one can get to. Never again can we make the mistake of identifying our speck of planetary matter as the universe.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE SOVIETIZATION OF MONGOLIA

By Henry S. Bradsher

In November 1920, after Bolshevik armies had smashed White Russian forces in eastern Siberia, three young Mongolians went to Moscow to ask help against the recently reimposed Chinese control of Outer Mongolia. Vladimir I. Lenin received them. He advised them that the Soviets would help establish a separate state of Mongolia and it should be a Marxist one. "With the aid of the proletariat of advanced countries," Lenin had recently told the Comintern and paraphrased to his visitors, "backward countries may make the transition to the Soviet system and . . . to Communism, bypassing the capitalist stage of development."

Few places were more backward than Outer Mongolia, or less touched by capitalism. Once a remote province of China, it had been allowed to fall into decay after modern firearms reduced the importance of its mounted warriors to the Manchu empire. Chinese merchants, living in the nearest thing Mongolia had to a city, the monastery settlement at Urga, and traveling among the herdsmen, provided the only commercial interests in a practically self-sufficient, low-level subsistence economy. Most Mongolians, who totaled perhaps 550,000 sharing more than 600,000 square miles with some 100,000 Chinese settlers, lived from the livestock that they followed in seasonal migrations, fearing the blizzards and pasture icing that every four years or so cut back the herds' natural increase and sometimes brought famine to men and beasts. Some 40,000 men were directed to the monastic life.

Since Tibetan Buddhism was established in Mongolia in the sixteenth century the lives of lamas and laymen had changed little. Neither modern medicine nor modern agriculture had penetrated the roadless range. Diseases were rife and life short, but malnutrition was not a problem. Some travelers thought the nomadic Mongolians more prosperous than the average Chinese farmer, but it was a rugged life based on an economic pattern established before the time of Genghis Khan, seven centuries earlier. A Russian traveler, Ivan M. Maisky, found "a decay-fostering spirit of resignation and indifference."

The contrast with the Mongolian People's Republic of today is sharp. The 1,230,000 people still live simple and often rugged lives, close to the bleak weather and the inhospitable soil, but they are healthy, well doctored and, by the standards of less developed countries, fairly prosperous.

The change is the result of "the aid of the proletariat" of the Soviet Union to what is probably a far greater extent than Lenin envisaged. Mongolia has bypassed capitalism and entered the modern world not by the sacrifice of domestic savings, for there has never been much margin above consumption needs to save, but by outside aid. It now leads other developing countries by a wide margin in per capita aid received. In its fourth five-year economic development plan, 1966–70, aid was about $220 a year for each person, compared with an average $4.20 in the late 1960s for 80 noncommunist aid-recipient countries and the $36 of U. S. economic aid for each South Vietnamese citizen in 1970. Only France's aid to some of its former colonies in Africa came close

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to the per capita aid of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to Mongolia.

The Soviet Union has received in return political loyalty from Mongolia, but it has failed to get the small economic payments that it asked. Although details have not been made public, it appears that Mongolia has been unable in recent years to fulfill agreements to supply meat and other livestock products for the Soviet Far East. This failure has contributed to the general shortage of meat in the Soviet Union, one of the more noticeable shortcomings of the Brezhnev leadership's efforts to improve living conditions.

II

The fifth five-year plan for Mongolia is intended to avoid such failures in the future. The main blame for deficiencies in the production of livestock has been placed on bad weather—the blizzard problem still, and also drought in the late 1960s—although mismanagement and the lack of personal interest in collective herds have also been problems. The new plan was approved in June 1971 by the Sixteenth Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (as the country's communist party is called). While still stressing industrialization, it is a marked departure from Marxist economic doctrine as interpreted by Soviet theoreticians: agriculture is given a far larger share of investment capital than industry. The arm of the Soviet planning committee, Gosplan, which allocates aid to Mongolia and integrates its economy with that of the Soviet Union, can be seen behind this. Moscow needs meat, Mongolia produces meat, so investment is directed into improving the livestock industry in Mongolia rather than building up a wide range of industries which Moscow does not need. The basic question of whether it would make more economic sense to convert Mongolia, a land rich in coal and presumably other minerals, into a producer of a few specialized industrial products and leave livestock to less inclement climes of the Soviet bloc probably has not been considered because the Mongolian tradition is so firmly one of herds and herdsmen.

This increasing attention to agriculture parallels the trend in development economics in the West in the past decade to give more importance to a sound agricultural basis for modern industry. Some academic economists in the West credit Mao Tse-tung with being one of the first to see the need for spreading modern knowledge and implements throughout rural areas, and Leonid I. Brezhnev has personally identified himself with ending neglect of Soviet agriculture. So Mongolia is moving in phase with its two neighbors.

Soviet aid to Mongolia is so huge that it cannot be considered in normal terms of foreign aid. Rather, Mongolia is an investment that Moscow has made for 50 years and will continue to make into the indefinite future for political reasons. The investment can best be understood in Soviet domestic terms. There is a striking similarity between the economic relationship of Mongolia and the Soviet Union and that of the Soviet Central Asian republics and the central government in Moscow. The development pattern of Mongolia has many of the features of, say, Kirgiz, Tadzhik, Turkman or Uzbek, in terms of capital flow and investment priorities. Even the architecture of Ulan Bator, the capital built up from Urga in the last half-century, looks Soviet provincial. Just as Central Asia has been fitted into the Russian economy, at the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cost of considerable aid from European Russia, so Mongolia has been given a specialized role in the U.S.S.R. economy.

The aid which Lenin gave Mongolia to escape from Chinese control also had parallels in Moscow's dealings with Soviet Central Asia, and the Soviet republics of the Caucasus. It followed the pattern used by Bolshevik forces to end the brief independence of Caucasian and Central Asian parts of the Tsarist empire after the October Revolution (and later in Czechoslovakia in 1968). The technique was to find or invent someone inside the coveted area who would appeal for Soviet help and use him as the expendable front for an eventual takeover. Mongolian nationalists who wanted help to escape Chinese control were available. The legend of Mongolia's winning independence by the efforts 50 years ago last July of a small armed brotherhood of communists led by Sukhe Bator and Khorloin Choibalsan has been rewritten into both Mongolian and Soviet history books, but original Soviet accounts show that the Mongolians rode into Urga in the baggage train of the Fifth Red Army, which had the excuse of suppressing a psychotic White Russian commander there. The previous status of Outer Mongolia as a Chinese province saved it from the absorption that was the fate of those former Tsarist provinces which had sought independence.

III

The history of Mongolia is remarkable in that its colonial period came after the date celebrated for its independence. Chinese governors had largely left provincial government to the neglect of a degenerate Buddhist hierarchy led by the area's most revered incarnation, an astute man who declined into alcoholism. The Soviet Union moved to establish a firm lay government under its control while paying lip service to Mongolia's theoretical status as an autonomous Chinese region. Handy instruments for this were the Buryat and Kalmyk branches of Mongols. Outer Mongolia, whose predominant group is Khalkha Mongols, had and still has only a minority of East Asia's people of Mongolian ancestry. Inner Mongolia, now firmly part of China, has the most, but since the seventeeth century Russia has also had some in the Buryat region north of Outer Mongolia and as Kalmyk settlers on the lower Volga. They long offered a tool for the ambitions of St. Petersburg in the Mongolian world, and the new Soviet leaders made use of it.

Buryat and Kalmyk Mongols played the leading role in running Outer Mongolia in the 1920s, when two of the three men who had gone to see Lenin were executed. The third was not shot until 1939, when Choibalsan emerged from obscurity to conduct Mongolia's version of the Stalin purges and establish under the Soviet dictator's shadow a local version of his police state. By that time, the comparison with Soviet Central Asian republics could be carried a bit farther. Local Khalkha communists had been trained and their Khalkha opponents destroyed, so that it became possible for Moscow to put native leaders in charge of Mongolian affairs instead of Buryats and Kalmyks. Then the Soviet embassy in Ulan Bator seemed to play the role that in Central Asia was played by each republic's communist party second secretary of Great Russian blood—making sure that the ethnically different natives in the more prominent positions did the right things.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In those days the Soviet Union did little to help Mongolia. There was no incentive. China, weak and torn by civil war and the Japanese invasion, posed no threat to the insecure young communist régime, nor did it offer an economic lure. Mongolia itself could offer almost nothing to further the headlong Soviet drive to industrialization, except mutton and beef to eat and horses for the Red Army cavalry to ride. From 1921 until 1952, all Mongolia's foreign trade was with the Soviet Union (99 percent is still with communist countries). An adjustment of prices in January 1954 indicated that Gosplan had sold high and bought low from its captive market. In the first 27 years, little was invested in developing the Mongolian economy.

Following the Soviet pattern, a five-year plan was launched in 1931, but it quickly broke down over nomad opposition. As happened in the Soviet Union, owners slaughtered their livestock rather than surrender them to collective control. Local rebellions sputtered futilely. Most of the limited investment went into mechanization of a coal mine near Ulan Bator, an electrical generating plant it fueled, and a small industrial complex in the capital which it powered. The complex produced basics like shoes and cloth. (Expanded, it now produces 20 percent of the nation's industrial output with 5,000 workers.) For the country as a whole, there was almost no economic improvement. That had to await the emergence of communist China as a competitor for the affections of its old territory.

IV

In 1924 the Soviet Union signed an agreement with the Republic of China recognizing "that Outer Mongolia is an integral part of the Republic of China and respect(ing) China's sovereignty therein." But Moscow soon explained that it considered Mongolia's autonomy so wide within the theoretical Chinese sovereignty that it could conduct not only its own internal affairs but also foreign relations. In fact, Mongolia had no foreign relations because it was sealed off by Soviet domination. One rare foreign visitor reported finding the Mongolian "foreign ministry" to be only an unmanned letter-drop for the Soviets. At the close of World War II, Chiang Kai-shek's government agreed with Moscow to recognize the independence of Mongolia if a plebiscite showed that its people wanted it. The plebiscite naturally did, by 100 percent according to the official announcement. Four months later, on February 13, 1946, the Republic of China established diplomatic relations with Ulan Bator. But in 1950 the Nationalist régime renounced this and reasserted its claim to Outer Mongolia. By then it had retreated to Taiwan, where it has obstructed U.S. diplomatic recognition of the Mongolian People's Republic despite the Republic's admission to the United Nations in 1961. With the Nationalist retreat, a new factor appeared on the borders of Mongolia.

The Mongolian army, equipped, trained and controlled by the Soviet army, pushed into Inner Mongolia at the end of World War II, together with the Red Army. They showed no intention of leaving quickly. In the late 1940s and into the early 1950s, Stalin's government tried to repeat the old technique of using local appeals for help as an excuse for adding territory, but the efforts were hotly contested. Sinkiang, the western Chinese province which had been under de facto Soviet control in the 1930s was the target of one

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

abortive takeover attempt. The situation in Inner Mongolia grew increasingly confused, as the fading Nationalist government, the growing Chinese communist power and the combination of Soviet and Outer Mongolian agents sought to win the loyalty of various Mongol groups. One opening gambit was the formation of an "East Mongolian Government" in Manchuria by a Soviet general who was a Buryat Mongolian, but it did not last long enough to accede to Outer Mongolia.

Right up to Stalin's death in 1953, the Soviets apparently hoped to detach some areas from Inner Mongolia and add them to their satellite. A Soviet author asserted that year that there had been a spontaneous desire for this. But the communist government that was establishing itself in China in 1949 had no intention of yielding territory. Its own Mongolians, led by Ulanfu, who fell in the Cultural Revolution, held the area.

And then Peking counterattacked. In October 1952, the first agreement was signed in Peking for Chinese economic coöperation with Mongolia. This was the first in a long series of documents signed between Peking and Ulan Bator as two sovereign and independent capitals, indicating complete Chinese acceptance of the loss of Outer Mongolia. The point is not so clear, however.

Mao wrote in 1936 that, "when the people's revolution has been victorious in China, the Outer Mongolian republic will automatically become a part of the Chinese federation, at its own will." In his long, tough negotiations with Stalin in Moscow during the winter of 1949–50, Mao conceded Mongolia's independence, but when Nikita S. Khrushchev made his first visit to Peking after Stalin died Mao sought unsuccessfully to reopen the question. A decade later, in 1964, Mao raised the subject with visitors who quoted him publicly. The Soviets replied angrily with a *Pravda* editorial. Ulan Bator faithfully echoed the Soviet attitude with the additional fervor of its small population's fear of being submerged by the Han people, in the way that the Mongolians of Inner Mongolia have been reduced to a small minority.

The subject remains as obscure as the rest of Mao's territorial claims along the Sino-Soviet frontier. On the one hand, Chou En-lai's government conducts normal state business as if there were no claims. It signed a border treaty with Mongolia in 1962 and it asserts a reasonable desire to settle the Soviet boundaries on the basis of the status quo. On the other hand, Mao's ideas remain the guiding force in China, and Mao has never renounced his revanchist hopes. His neighbors may not rest easy.

▼

When economic planning began in 1948, livestock raising was still the basis of the economy. But techniques had changed little since the thirteenth century. The breeds of sheep, cattle, horses, camels and goats were poor—they were scrawny animals better adapted to survival on the open range than producing for market. There were almost no animal shelters, wells or cultivation to produce fodder for hard winters. With herds still mainly privately owned, the government lacked control over this essential element in any economic plan.

Perhaps in frustration at this, perhaps because Soviet Marxist doctrine seemed to require it, the first five-year plan allocated more money to industry

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

than agriculture while setting wildly unrealistic goals for both. But despite the failure to reach goals, a start was made toward modernization. In the second plan, compulsory elementary education was introduced and collectivization of livestock was largely achieved by peaceful pressures and incentives. Incentives included medical, educational, cultural and veterinary services in collective centers from which seasonal pasture movements now radiate.

Chinese aid began in the second plan. As industrialization developed, Mongolia's population (then approaching one million) could not build or staff all the projects being lavished on it in a Sino-Soviet rivalry. Chinese laborers were imported, beginning about the same time in the mid-1950s that Soviet troops ended their World War II garrisoning of the country. For a time Khrushchev seemed willing to concede China a larger role in Mongolia, although he later regretted and reversed this decision. Chinese laborers reached about 15,000 before the split between Moscow and Peking forced Ulan Bator to choose sides in the early 1960s; then the laborers went home.

The Soviets have lately contended that Chinese aid to Mongolia was not much good—most promised projects were never built, and those built soon broke down. By contrast, claimed one Soviet broadcast that praised Soviet-bloc aid to Mongolia, "we can definitely say that without this economic coöperation with the Socialist countries, nothing would have been built on Mongolia's vast plain." It is a fair claim. Even today, Mongolian exports pay for only about half the consumer goods which the country must import and none of its imported capital goods.

More than 30 percent of Soviet aid in the new fifth plan will be for agriculture, particularly livestock breeding. The emphasis on livestock became obvious after the worst blizzards in the history of the People's Republic killed almost four million head of livestock in early 1968. This reduced herds to below 20 million, the lowest level since 1931, and set off a chain reaction that hurt the entire livestock-based economy. But, according to Premier Yumzhagiyn Tsedenbal, who is also first secretary of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, weather does not deserve all the blame for continual failures to meet plan goals for increasing herds; irresponsible management and cattle theft are also contributory factors.

Problems with livestock and fodder production have been paralleled in industrialization. But progress has been steady if slow. Industrial output, nil in 1921, was approximately $400 million in 1970 by the artificial exchange rate. The early goal of converting from "an agricultural-industrial to an industrial-agricultural" economy is still mentioned officially, although the recent emphasis on agriculture throws the date of such an outcome (now set at the end of the 1970s) and even the goal itself into doubt.

Tsedenbal told the party congress last June that the goal remains "building Socialism" in Mongolia and that the primary step on this path "consists of solving the tasks of transforming the Mongolian People's Republic in the immediate future into an industrial-agricultural country." However, he also made the point twice in the same speech that this would take into account "the international Socialist division of labor and the steady growth of international coöperation between Socialist countries." This meant Mongolia would concentrate on livestock and some other contributions to the Soviet economy

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rather than hankering after a diversified economy with such things as steel plants.

Tsedenbal and Chou En-lai discussed a Chinese-sponsored steel plant for the third five-year plan, and in the early 1960s the Mongolians talked about a 300,000-ton plant as part of the new industrial city being built at Darkhan, north of Ulan Bator near the Soviet border. But after Chinese aid was withdrawn, the Soviets refused to indulge this whim of political rather than economic logic, causing the ever-loyal Tsedenbal some problems in answering awkward questions at home. Interestingly enough, a recent Moscow Radio attack on Chinese foreign aid programs, broadcast to South and Southeast Asia, criticized Peking for helping developing countries mainly with small and medium-sized factories of light industry. "The basis of the economic development of any country is its heavy industry and power industry, that is, big metallurgical and engineering plants . . . a national heavy industry is the foundation of a country's economic independence," the broadcast argued.

VI

The continual failures of Mongolia to meet its economic goals, and especially its inability to supply its meat quota to the Soviet Union, might have been expected to have had repercussions. Economic shortcomings have been the cause of the downfall of a number of political leaders in the Soviet bloc. And the failure of Mongolia's second plan probably was the main reason for the disgrace of Dashiyn Damba, who replaced Tsedenbal as the party's first secretary from 1954 to 1958, and several of his colleagues. But that was exceptional. The top leadership is too thin for the Soviets to indulge their dissatisfaction at waste of their aid money by sacking the culprits. And the workings of the Mongolian-Soviet Commission of Economic and Scientific-Technical Coöperation are apparently such that some of the culprits sit in Gosplan in Moscow.

The changes in the Mongolian leadership in the two decades since Choibalsan died are explainable mainly in terms of the country's geographic position between the Soviet Union and China, and by Peking's ardent wooing of Ulan Bator with aid. As a poor, weak and isolated country, Mongolia had only three policy choices in the 1950s and 1960s. The traditional stance (since 1921) of dependence upon the Soviet Union had been reinforced by a Russification of the leadership. Thus, language and cultural barriers made a second alternative, switching allegiance to China, rather remote. However, they still had a third choice—a neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute that would permit playing both sides for aid and establishing a separate identity in the wider world, as North Korea has done since Kim Il-sung escaped from control of his original Soviet sponsors.

This third possibility began to worry the Soviets in the late 1950s. The most notable demonstration of their concern came in 1962 when Mongolia celebrated the 800th birthday (more or less, the date being uncertain) of its most famous son, Genghis Khan. The strong nationalism evidenced then appeared a danger to Moscow's control. To Mongolian praise of the warrior as "a brilliant organizer, an able statesman and a great general," came agreeing echoes from Inner Mongolia. The Soviet Union, where historic memories of the Mongol

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Hordes are part of a "yellow peril" complex that is to this day a factor in the Sino-Soviet feud, replied that Genghis Khan was a bloody, reactionary ruler. Within three months the member of the Mongolian leadership personally responsible for the birthday celebration, Daramyn Tomor-Ochir, was purged from the party politburo and secretariat. The Soviets later linked the Chinese to the Mongolian mistake of fostering a "Genghis Khan personality cult."

In December 1963, the party's second secretary and the number-two man to Tsedenbal, Luvsantserengiyn Tsende, was removed from the secretariat and politburo and from a top post in parliament, the Great People's Khural. Accusations against him included careerism, intrigues and "often cunningly supporting nationalistic ideas." Although the case has never been publicly elaborated, it appeared to foreign observers that, aside from personal rivalry with Tsedenbal, Tsende was guilty of thinking that Mongolia might become neutralist within the communist world and continue to benefit from Chinese as well as Soviet aid. There is no indication that he or three party central committee members purged in 1964 and local officials replaced in 1965 purges were actually pro-Chinese. But to the Soviets, any hint of disloyalty in the widening Sino-Soviet rift would be readily interpreted as taking the other side.

The new Chinese foreign policy flexibility could create fresh strains on Mongolia's loyalty. China recently made new economic aid offers to Ulan Bator in an apparent attempt to regain some influence there. The Soviets have indicated concern over this.

The Mongolian leadership has been unchanged since 1965. The seven-man politburo as constituted after Tomor-Ochir's ouster was reëlected at the Fifteenth Party Congress in 1966 and again at last June's congress, and the five party secretaries were also renamed. It is a leadership of experienced party and government workers, heavily weighted toward economics—four of the seven politburo members, including Tsedenbal, had been chairman of the state planning commission at various times. A fifth, Jamsarangiyn Sambu, whose title of chairman of the Great People's Khural presidium is equivalent to president of Mongolia, is the author of the leading textbook on livestock care.

The commitment of this group to the Soviet Union intensified as the Sino-Soviet rift widened. In January 1966 the Soviet Communist Party's first secretary, Leonid I. Brezhnev, signed in Ulan Bator a 20-year Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Mutual Assistance, renewing an earlier treaty. Soviet troops, which had left a decade earlier, reappeared in 1967. The international Institute for Strategic Studies now estimates the Soviet forces in Mongolia at two divisions, but other sources report elements of a third division. Soviet medium-range missiles are believed emplaced there. Mongolia lies closer to Peking and some of the most important Chinese nuclear and missile centers than any point in the Soviet Union itself, hence its value to Soviet strategic planners. But Mongolia's 2,500-mile border with China, which divides the two-part Soviet frontier of 4,575 miles with China, adds potential problems for the Soviet high command.

Mongolia is estimated to have two mechanized infantry divisions totalling 28,000 men who are trained and armed by the Soviet Red Army. The army's share of the budget, which was more than 50 percent from before 1939 until

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

after World War II, dropped to just 2.6 percent during the beginning of economic development, but had risen to around seven percent at last report. This increase, due to the Sino-Soviet confrontation, presumably has been hampering development although troops have been used for civil construction projects like Darkhan.

Because of the new military strength on its Mongolian border, China has broken up Inner Mongolia in the last few years. Three leagues, or districts, from the northeastern end of the crescent-shaped province were added to Manchurian provinces and one league on the west was divided between Kansu and Ningsia provinces, according to indirect evidence. The purpose seems to be the realignment of military commands to run at right angles to the border —instead of one long command which lacked internal communications. The political effect is negligible. Mongolians had already become unimportant in the leadership of the province, where Chinese outnumber Mongolians by at least six to one.

Soviet broadcasts frequently accuse Peking of destroying Mongolian culture in Inner Mongolia. Whatever they think of the Soviet influence, the people of the Mongolian People's Republic are aware that Moscow has saved them from submergence by the Chinese in the way that other minorities within the People's Republic of China, such as Tibetans and the various Central Asian people of Sinkiang, are being submerged now. The Mongolian Constitution of 1960 has the remarkable provision that "every citizen of the Mongolian People's Republic must in every way strengthen the unity and cohesion of the peoples of the Socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union." The unity is their protection, regardless of the price.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RECONSIDERATIONS

GENOA REVISITED: RUSSIA AND COEXISTENCE

By Evgeny Chossudovsky

HALF a century ago, on April 10, 1922, Luigi Facta, Prime Minister of Italy, solemnly opened the International Economic Conference at Genoa. Lloyd George, the prime mover of the Conference, was among the first speakers. He called it "the greatest gathering of European nations which has ever assembled," aimed at seeking in common "the best methods of restoring the shattered prosperity of this continent."

Though this rather remote event has by now been forgotten by many, the evocation of it is justified. For a study of Soviet attitudes at that Conference throws light on the origins and evolution of the notion of the peaceful coexistence between countries having different economic and social systems, a major concept of Soviet foreign policy which no serious student of international affairs can nowadays afford to ignore. Therefore, to look at Genoa afresh from this particular angle may perhaps add to the understanding of Soviet foreign policy and economic diplomacy, including their more recent manifestations.[1] The author was also anxious to assess the relevance of this first multilateral encounter between Soviet Russia and the Western world to current efforts, a half-century after Genoa, aimed at promoting coöperation across the dividing line. To undertake the task in these pages is not unfitting: the first issue of *Foreign Affairs,* published only a few months after the Conference, carried a then anonymous article by "K" entitled "Russian After Genoa and The Hague," written in masterly fashion by the review's first Editor, Professor Archibald Cary Coolidge. I am grateful for having the privilege, on the eve of the golden jubilee of *Foreign Affairs,* to revert to this early theme, even if from a different standpoint and at a more comfortable historic distance.[2]

The Genoa Conference was convened as a result of a set of resolutions passed by the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers meeting at Cannes in January 1922. The principal among these was Mr. Lloyd George's Resolution.

Author's Note: The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the U.N. Secretariat, of which he is a member.

[1] An added inducement has been the recent appearance of hitherto inaccessible writings by Lenin on questions related to coexistence and the Genoa Conference in the fifth edition of his "Complete Works" (issued during the period 1967 to 1970), as well as of further relevant material, some of it originally confidential, contained in the first comprehensive collection of official papers on Soviet foreign policy, "Dokumenty Vneshnei Politiki SSSR." This fresh evidence has made it possible to trace from the "inside" a particular process of policy-making.

[2] When working on this essay, I learned from the memoirs of Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "Peace and Counterpeace" (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), that Lenin carefully read and marked certain articles in the first number of *Foreign Affairs,* particularly Coolidge's essay.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In the form in which the draft was adopted on January 6, it provided for the summoning of an Economic and Financial Conference "as an urgent and essential step towards the economic reconstruction of Central and Eastern Europe." All European states, including the former Central Powers, were asked to attend. Special decisions were adopted to invite Russia and the United States. Russia replied in the affirmative. Indeed, the young Soviet Republic accepted this call with eagerness and alacrity for reasons which will become apparent as we proceed. On the other hand, we are told that Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes informed the Italian Ambassador in Washington on March 8 that, since the Conference appeared to be mainly political rather than economic in character, the United States government would not be represented.[8] However, the U.S. Ambassador in Rome, R. W. Child, was appointed observer. American oil and other business interests were represented by F. A. Vanderlip. In the opinion of Soviet historians, the U.S. refusal to take part was motivated mainly by hostility toward Soviet Russia and fear that Genoa might strengthen that country's international position. The United States at the time was adhering firmly to the policy of economic blockade and nonrecognition of the new Bolshevik régime. On May 7, 1922, Ambassador Child wrote to the State Department that he considered his main function as observer at Genoa would be to "keep in closest possible touch with delegations so as to prevent Soviet Russia from entering any agreements by which our rights would be impaired."

Russia was to have been represented by Lenin himself in his capacity as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. Lenin had closely supervised all the preparations and undoubtedly intended to go to Genoa. He stated publicly that he expected to discuss personally with Lloyd George the need for equitable trade relations between Russia and the capitalist countries. But in naming Lenin as its chief delegate, the Soviet government entered a proviso that "should circumstances exclude the possibility of Comrade Lenin himself attending the Conference," Georgy Vassilievich Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, the deputy head of the delegation, would be vested with all requisite powers. In the end, public concern over Lenin's personal safety, pressing affairs of state requiring his attention, and the deterioration of his health, made it undesirable for him to leave Moscow. However, he retained the chairmanship of the Russian delegation and directed its activity through almost daily contact. (*The New York Times* entitled its leader on the opening of the Conference "Lenin in Genoa!") Chicherin serving as acting head of the delegation was aided by such outstanding Soviet diplomats and statesmen as Krassin, Litvinov, Yoffe, Vorovsky and Rudzutak, who together formed the "Bureau" of the delegation.

All eyes turned with curiosity on the People's Commissar when he took the floor, after star performers such as Lloyd George and Barthou had made their inaugural speeches. In keeping with the diplomatic etiquette of those

[8] In the opinion of Professor Coolidge, as stated in his article, this deprived the Conference "of half its value for Moscow . . . . We may well surmise, therefore, that the absence of American representatives seriously affected the conduct of the Russians both at Genoa and The Hague. They now felt they had less to gain by making concessions and accordingly less reason for making them."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

days, he wore tails. Issue of the Russian nobility and for some years archivist in the Tsarist Foreign Ministry, Chicherin as a young man had broken with his past and espoused the cause of revolution, ultimately siding with Lenin and the Bolsheviks. *Un homme génial* and a diplomat of consummate professional skill, he combined wide knowledge of world affairs, sophisticated erudition and artistic sensitivity with burning faith in communism and a single-minded dedication to the defense of the interests of the Soviet state. Having spoken in excellent French for some twenty minutes, he proceeded, to the surprise and spontaneous applause of the meeting, to interpret his speech into English.

Though Chicherin had hardly looked at his notes during delivery, his statement had been most carefully prepared. Lenin himself had approved the text, had weighed each word, formulation and nuance. Chicherin's declaration was the first made by a Soviet representative at a major international conference on the agenda of which the "Russian question" loomed large and to which the Soviet Republic had been invited. It was truly a historic moment.

Chicherin told the Conference that "whilst themselves preserving the point of view of Communist principles, the Russian delegation recognizes that in the actual period of history which permits of the parallel existence of the ancient social order and of the new order now being born, economic collaboration between the States representing the two systems of property is imperatively necessary for the general economic reconstruction." He added that "the Russian delegation has come here . . . in order to engage in practical relations with Governments and commercial and industrial circles of all countries on the basis of reciprocity, equality of rights and full recognition. The problem of world-wide economic reconstruction is, under present conditions, so immense and colossal that it can only be solved if all countries, both European and non-European, have the sincere desire to coördinate their efforts. . . . The economic reconstruction of Russia appears as an indispensable condition of world-wide economic reconstruction."

A number of concrete offers (combined with proposals for a general limitation of armaments) accompanied this enunciation of policy, such as the readiness of the Russian government "to open its frontier consciously and voluntarily" for the creation of international traffic routes; to release for cultivation millions of acres of the most fertile land in the world; and to grant forest and mining concessions, particularly in Siberia. Chicherin urged that collaboration should be established between the industry of the West on the one hand and the agriculture and industry of Siberia on the other, so as to enlarge the raw materials, grain and fuel base of European industry. He declared, moreover, his government's willingness to adopt as a point of departure the old agreements with the Powers which regulated international relations, subject to some necessary modifications. Chicherin also suggested that the world economic crises could be combated by the redistribution of the existing gold reserves among all the countries in the same proportions as before the war, by means of long-term loans. Such a redistribution "should be combined with a rational redistribution of the products of industry and commercial activity, and with a distribution of fuel (naphtha, coal, etc.) according to a settled plan."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Such was, in essence, the first considered presentation by Soviet Russia of what came to be termed the policy of peaceful coexistence between the capitalist and socialist systems, linked with a specific program of practical action, made in an intergovernmental forum. But the genesis of the concept goes back much further. As long ago as 1915, Lenin, in the midst of the First World War, which to him was above all a clash of rival imperialist powers, in a celebrated article entitled "On the Slogan for a United States of Europe," had foreseen the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country. In so doing he proceeded from an "absolute law" of the uneven economic and political development of capitalism, especially during its imperialist phase. Lenin came to the related conclusion that the "imperialist chain" might first snap at its weakest link, *e.g.* in a relatively backward country like Tsarist Russia with a small but concentrated and rapidly expanding capitalist sector, a desperately poor peasantry and a compact and politically conscious working class pitted against a decaying ruling élite. Though the break in the chain would set in motion a process of revolution, that might take time, possibly decades to unfold, depending on the specific conditions obtaining in each country. The socialist state, meanwhile, would have to exist in a capitalist environment, to "cohabit" with it for a more or less prolonged period, peacefully or nonpeacefully. In another article dealing with the "Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution," published in the autumn of 1916, Lenin developed this theme further by concluding that socialism could not achieve victory simultaneously in all countries. It would most probably first be established in one country, or in a few countries, "whilst the others will for some time remain bourgeois or pre-bourgeois."

The weakest link did break, as Lenin had foreseen, in Russia, though the tide of revolution was also mounting in other parts of Europe, impelled by the desperate desire of the peoples to end the war. Indeed, at one time it looked as if a socialist upheaval was about to triumph in Germany. It is hardly surprising that Lenin, the revolutionary leader, openly hailed this prospect, though he was resolutely opposed to the manipulating and artificial pushing or "driving forward" of any revolution from the outside, since for him this was essentially an inexorable social phenomenon ultimately shaped by internal forces. As E. H. Carr has observed, "it was the action of the western Powers toward the end of the year 1918 which contributed quite as much as of the Soviet government which had forced the international situation into a revolutionary setting."[4] Yet, being a realist, Lenin did not omit to stress from November 1917 onwards that it would be wrong and irresponsible for the young Soviet Republic to count on revolutions in other countries. They might or might not occur at the time one wished them to happen. There was no question either, as he said again and again, of trying to "export" the Russian Revolution.

While maintaining its belief in the ultimate victory of socialism in other countries, the young Soviet Republic had, meantime, to be prepared to stand on its own feet and to defend its own interests as a state. Not only had the forces of the White Guards and the interventionists to be defeated, but steps had to be taken to conclude peace with the capitalist countries and to pre-

[4] E. H. Carr, "The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923." London: Macmillan, 1953, p. 91.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pare, under certain conditions and safeguards, for coöperation with them. Exploratory moves for the resumption of trade and economic relations with the Allied and Central Powers, as well as with neutral countries, had begun immediately after the conclusion of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. As early as May 1918, for instance, the Soviet government made, through the good offices of Colonel Raymond Robins (the representative of the American Red Cross in Petrograd) detailed and far-reaching offers to the United States of long-term economic relations, including the granting of concessions to private businessmen for the exploitation, subject to state control, of Russia's vast and untapped raw material resources. These offers were reiterated a year later through William Bullitt. There was no response.

Military intrusion and economic harassment from the outside (the latter going to such lengths as "the gold blockade," *i.e.* the refusal to accept gold for desperately needed imports) continued, forcing the Soviet government, as Lenin put it, to "go to greater lengths in our urgent Communist measures than would otherwise have been the case." But the option of "peaceful cohabitation" with the capitalist world, based on normal economic, trade and diplomatic relations, was kept open none the less throughout this entire phase. This emerges clearly from the writings and utterances of Lenin and the documents on Soviet foreign policy during the pre-NEP period. Indeed, one of the most incisive and farsighted definitions of the concept of peaceful coexistence dates back to the early summer of 1920 when, in a report on the foreign political situation of the Soviet Republic, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs proclaimed that "Our slogan was and remains the same: peaceful coexistence (*mirnoye sosushchestvovaniye*) with other Governments whoever they might be. Reality itself has led . . . to the need for establishing durable relations between the Government of the peasants and workers and capitalist Governments. . . . Economic reality calls for an exchange of goods, the entering into continuing and regulated relations with the whole world, and the same economic reality demands the same of the other Governments also."[5] Thus, the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence has deep roots in the early history of the Russian Revolution and was most assuredly not something concocted on the spur of the moment for tactical use at Genoa.

Starting with the Decree on Peace, the first enactment of Soviet Russia, Lenin's pronouncements on the subject reflect the following basic policy considerations:

1. The October Revolution has shown that the victory of socialism on a world scale will not occur simultaneously. So long, therefore, as the other

[5] "Dokumenty Vneshnei Politiki SSSR." Moscow: Gospolitzdat, 1958, v. 2, p. 639. For a useful chronological anthology of Lenin's statements on coexistence, see W. I. Lenin, "Über die friedliche Koexistenz" (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1965). However, this collection does not contain a number of statements of key importance which first appeared in the last edition of Lenin's "Complete Works." So far as I am aware, Lenin did not himself employ the term *"mirnoye sosushchestvovaniye"* (peaceful coexistence) used by Chicherin but spoke of *"mirnoye sozhitelstvo"* (peaceful cohabitation) of socialist and capitalist states, the "parallel existence" of different systems of property relations. This term also occurs not infrequently in diplomatic notes and communications of the Soviet government during that early period. It has recently been stressed in Soviet literature on the subject that there is no substantive difference between the earlier and later terms, as some foreign analysts would make it appear.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

countries have not adopted the new system of socialist property relations established in Soviet Russia, different property systems will necessarily have to live side by side. Hence the concept of coexistence is not an antithesis to the notion of a revolutionary process of global scope aimed at a socialist transformation of society, but defines the setting and a policy framework therefor.

2. The Soviet Republic is ready and eager to live in peace with the outside world, including its immediate neighbors, the former enemy Powers and the newly independent nations. "Cohabitation" between the systems should, therefore, be peaceful.

3. The very existence of ties between Soviet Russia and the outside world, postulated above, ipso facto poses the question of what type of contacts should be developed in the trade, economic and technical fields.

4. The objective realities of world economic relations and the interdependence of nations imply mutual advantages to be reaped from commercial exchanges and an appropriate international division of labor. This situation is bound to lead the capitalist countries, willy-nilly, to engage in economic dealings, and especially in trade, with the world's first socialist state. The condition of peaceful coexistence is, therefore, not only desirable in itself, but objectively inevitable.

5. Because of Russia's temporary state of economic weakness and backwardness, the Soviet Republic is disposed to coöperate with foreign private capital on terms attractive to it, so long as the legitimacy and inviolability of the socialist system of property relations and of internal legislation (especially in matters of labor protection) are respected.

6. Peaceful coexistence will have to remain competitive, since the socialist state would constantly seek to demonstrate, by force of example, the superiority of its system in promoting the economic growth of society and the welfare of the working people.

7. Ideological contest and rivalry will, therefore, be an inescapable element of the interrelationship, whilst the inherent contradictions of capitalism will tend to generate revolutionary situations. However, these need not lead to war.

Not surprisingly, little was said at that juncture about the time-horizon of such cohabitation in any precise terms. Although Lenin (in a speech at the end of 1920) did conceive of peaceful coexistence not just as a means to gain a "breathing space" but as a "new period in which we have won the right to our fundamental existence in the network of capitalist States," he was too preoccupied with the very survival of the Soviet Republic to speculate unduly on this not unimportant aspect of the concept. It is understandable, therefore, that in March 1919 when he reported to the Eighth Party Congress against the background of stepped-up intervention from abroad, he could not but envisage, in the short run, a "general collision" between the systems. As long as Soviet Russia remained relatively weak, both militarily and economically, that danger was bound to be very real indeed. (In the end, the clash did occur in 1941.) However, there is ample evidence to the effect that Soviet Russia stood ready for a prolonged period of "peaceful cohabitation," for example, the directive that the average length of foreign conces-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sions was to be about 20 years. It may, therefore, be concluded that from the very outset the state of coexistence was, indeed, conceived in "historic" terms (that is to say, as stretching over a period of decades), provided, of course, that the capitalist states were prepared to renounce the idea of dislodging Soviet power by external force or internal subversion. For his part, Lenin was ready (as he told a correspondent of the *Chicago Daily News* in October 1919) to guarantee noninterference in the internal affairs of the capitalist states.

By the beginning of 1921 the civil war was by and large ended and the armies of foreign interventionists expelled. The main justification for the policy of "war communism" had ceased to exist. NEP was introduced in March of that year. It was based on the readmission of private trade in agricultural products and of small-scale private enterprises, though the "commanding heights" of the economy remained in the control of the state. In order to ensure the country's economic revival, it was more than ever vital to normalize trade relations, especially with the industrial countries of the West.

Meanwhile, the revolutionary tide abroad had receded. At the end of 1920 Lenin observed that "neither side—the Russian Soviet Republic or the capitalist world—has gained victory or suffered defeat . . . while our forecasts did not materialize simply, rapidly and directly, they were fulfilled insofar as we achieved the main thing—the possibility has been maintained of the existence of proletarian rule and the Soviet Republic, even in the event of the world Socialist revolution being delayed."

A certain balance, an equilibrium of forces (however relative and precarious) had thus been established. The Soviet government resumed its efforts for an accommodation with the West. But now there would be much tougher bargaining. "Had the capitalist gentlemen accepted the proposals we made to them in October 1917," Lenin remarked somewhat sardonically in a famous speech, "On the International and Internal Situation of the Soviet Republic," delivered on March 6, 1922 (*i.e.* about a month before Genoa), "they would have received five times as much as they have now." Bilateral explorations and negotiations were intensified, with some partial results, such as the conclusion of several trade agreements, first of all with the United Kingdom in March 1921.

Although, as we have seen, the notion and policy of peaceful coexistence had been conceived long before the NEP, it was during this new phase that the thrust of that policy was carried forward with fresh determination. Chicherin's instructions to the Plenipotentiary Representative of the R.S.F.S.R. in Lithuania, dated April 28, 1921, reflected the new situation. The envoy was told that "the last efforts at armed attack against the Russian Republic have been liquidated and we have entered a period of peaceful cohabitation and economic coöperation with all nations, even if their system be capitalist." Henceforth "economic interests were to prevail in our foreign policy." The representative was enjoined strictly to abide by the principle of complete noninterference in Lithuania's internal affairs.

Three months later, Chicherin gave an extensive and most illuminating interview to *l'Humanité,* published August 15, 1921. He stressed the con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tinuity of Soviet policy and provided a clear insight into the interrelations between Soviet Russia's internal and external policies. "It is untrue to say that we had changed and had reneged something. We are not Henri IV. It is not we who have changed, but our environment. . . . Only during the first months of our existence did we call for an immediate revolution in all countries." Chicherin reminded his readers that concessions to foreign capitalists to help restore Russia's economy had been offered from the spring of 1918 onwards. He then observed that the "bases of our present economic policy were laid down from the first year of our existence. Now we are again reverting to these principles of economic relations which we prefer." At the same time he stressed that "our paths coincided with that of Lloyd George. Both he and we want, as say the English, peace and trade. Only our views about the future differ. We expect the break-up of the capitalist system. Lloyd George expects that we shall be tamed. [Meanwhile] Let's trade together. The future will prove whether our hopes are well founded." Chicherin made it quite clear in his interview that, but for the need to counter attempts to destroy Soviet power by military means, the New Economic Policy might have started much earlier, since it was more appropriate to the backward state of the Soviet economy. Now the Soviet government could take up its original policy of coexistence and carry it forward in more systematic fashion. Bilateral diplomacy in this regard was to be combined with multilateral initiatives.

On October 28, 1921, *i.e.* more than two months before the adoption of Mr. Lloyd George's Resolution on Genoa by the Supreme Council at Cannes, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs dispatched a note to the governments of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and the United States proposing that an international conference be summoned to discuss the possibilities for "opening an opportunity for private initiative and capital to coöperate with the power of the workers and peasants in the exploitation of Russia's natural resources." The Soviet government, on that occasion, declared its readiness to recognize the debts contracted by the Tsarist government with other governments and private individuals before 1914, on mutually acceptable terms, including the granting of credits which would enable Russia to fulfill its obligations.[6] It was to this proposal and to Lloyd George's subsequent initiative at Cannes that the Genoa Conference and, more specifically, the decision to invite Lenin himself to attend, owes its origin.

It is typical of the British Premier's realism and shrewdness (qualities which Lenin readily acknowledged[7]) that the resolution which he sponsored at Cannes contained a passage which appeared to endorse Lenin's thesis that the parallel existence of the two systems of property, the capitalist and the socialist, was feasible: "Nations can claim no right to dictate to each other regarding the principles on which they are to regulate their system of ownership, internal economy and government. It is for every nation to choose for

[6] For an interesting account of the reactions to this overture, see Coolidge, *op. cit.*

[7] The original manuscript of Lenin's "Left-wing Communism" (1920) contains a somewhat ironic dedication to "the highly respected Mr. Lloyd George as a token of my gratitude for his speech of March 18, 1920, which was almost Marxist and is in any event extremely useful to the Communists and Bolsheviks of the whole world."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

itself the system which it prefers in this respect." This affirmation was, however, linked with the demand of guarantees by the Soviet Republic for the profits of foreign investors, the recognition of all prewar debts and obligations, compensation for losses incurred by foreign interests as a consequence of the revolution, etc. Nevertheless, Lenin was quick to seize on the political significance of what was tantamount to at least a partial acceptance of the notion of peaceful coexistence "by the other side."

On January 13, the Italian Premier, Bonomi, cabled Chicherin the text (in French) of the Cannes Resolution, but for some reason the key words of the above-quoted passage, *i.e.* "their system of ownership" (*leur régime de proprieté*), were omitted. Lenin immediately asked Chicherin for the original text and instructed the Soviet team at Genoa to quote this passage at every suitable occasion. Chicherin in his opening speech spoke of the great importance which his government attached to the first point of the Cannes Resolution "which deals with reciprocal recognition of different systems of ownership and different political and economic forms actually existing in different countries." Subsequently, Lenin considered that this part of the Cannes Resolution implied the acceptance by the capitalist countries of the inevitability of agreement between the two systems "on terms of equality."

II

Genoa was the first serious test of Soviet Russia's ability to perform in the complex arena of multilateral diplomacy. Preparations had started, therefore, without delay and continued with considerable intensity until the delegation's departure for Genoa on March 27. Early in January the Politburo asked the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to set up a preparatory committee for Genoa under Chicherin's chairmanship. This Preparatory Committee's task was threefold: it was mandated to advise the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party on the formulation of the policy instructions to the Soviet delegation, including elements for Chicherin's opening statement at the Conference; it organized work on the drafting of literally scores of what would nowadays be termed background or position papers concerning the feasibility of specific proposals for international economic coöperation; lastly, it had to advise on a broad campaign of public discussion to explain the issues at stake and the attitude which the Soviet government intended to adopt. Chicherin's suggestions for this campaign (which he submitted to the Politburo on March 6) stressed, in particular, the need, first, to stigmatize the danger of fresh military intervention against Soviet Russia (not because it could not be repelled militarily but because it would endanger the country's efforts at economic reconstruction), and, second, to drive home the point that the capitalist countries would be unable to organize their economies without Russia's participation in international relations.

At the same time bilateral negotiations were initiated with a number of countries to strengthen the diplomatic posture of the Soviet Republic at the Conference and thus prevent its isolation. For instance, as early as January 9, the Preparatory Committee examined the instructions to be sent to Krestinsky, the Soviet envoy in Berlin, concerning a possible economic accord with Germany. On January 16, Lenin, in a secret note to Molotov for members of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Politburo, raised the question of starting "*at once* personal talks (without any papers) in Berlin and in Moscow with the Germans about contacts between us and them at Genoa" and suggesting at once secretly "to all the plenipotentiary representatives to put out feelers with the governments concerned to find out whether or not they are prepared to start unofficial secret talks with us on a *preliminary* marking out of the *line* at Genoa." The Soviet delegation's painfully slow railway journey to Genoa was interrupted by a four-day stopover in Berlin, where Chicherin met with Chancellor Wirth, Foreign Minister Rathenau, and Maltzan, Head of the Foreign Ministry's Russian Department. During these meetings the ground was prepared for what become known as the Treaty of Rapallo, concluded on April 16, which came as a bombshell to the Conference. In fact, there is evidence that the Treaty would have been signed in Berlin but for Rathenau's hesitations. Thus Genoa and the Treaty of Rapallo formed from the outset integral parts of Soviet diplomatic strategy.

The Preparatory Committee for the Genoa Conference was established on January 5 in anticipation of the Conference and started work two days later, *i.e.* before Soviet Russia had officially received the Italian invitation. Much of its energy was devoted to compiling detailed material for a memorandum (subsequently circulated by the Russian delegation at Genoa) on "Russia's Counterclaims to the Powers responsible for intervention and blockade."[8] In the draft directives to the deputy head and all members of the delegation to Genoa, written February 1, Lenin specified, *inter alia,* that all members of the delegation "must be perfectly familiar with Keynes' book (*The Economic Consequences of the Peace*)." On February 6, Lenin proposed that the Soviet delegation be instructed to highlight such points as: the cancellation of all debts; the application of the "Irish" solution to all colonies and dependent countries and nations; the radical revision of the Treaty of Versailles; the granting of loans on favorable terms to the countries most ruined by the war; the establishment of a unified international gold unit for the currency system of a number of countries; the need for international agreement on combating inflation; and the fuel crisis and international measures for coping with it. Lenin also envisaged international measures for the most rational and economical use of power resources on the basis of unified planned electrification, and for the reorganization of international transport to handle deliveries of raw materials and food. Elaborating on the last point, the Chairman of the State Planning Commission (Gosplan) Krzhizhanovsky, an eminent engineer and an influential collaborator of Lenin, put forward the idea of constructing a gigantic integrated railway transport system connecting the European continent from the Pacific to the Atlantic and in this way linking "East" and "West."

In the light of these preliminary discussions and directives, Chicherin, in a letter to Lenin dated March 10, 1922, outlined the principal components of the policy to be pursued by the Russian delegation at Genoa. Lenin returned his letter with comments and a covering note four days later. Stressing

[8] This work was entrusted to Professor N. N. Liubimov, who was one of the principal experts of the Russian delegation at Genoa. I am indebted to him for giving me the benefit of his first-hand knowledge and recollections of the Conference.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that their general attitude to Genoa should be that of "merchants," Lenin felt that, as such, Soviet Russia should support all "pacificist" trends in the bourgeois camp. He endorsed Chicherin's basic approach, noting on the margin of the letter the following points from Chicherin's list (condensed and paraphrased here) as the basis of Russia's programs of multilateral coöperation, including its attitude to international organizations of various kinds:

(1) The "novelty" of the "international scheme" to be propounded by Soviet diplomacy should consist in the possibility for the African and other colonial peoples to participate, on an equal footing, with European peoples in conferences and commissions.

(2) Working-class organizations should be enabled to take part in international conferences, as a matter of course.

(3) While international conferences or congresses should abide by the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of individual countries, they should provide a forum for voluntary coöperation and aid given by the strong to the weak.

(4) A worldwide congress open to "all peoples of the world" should be convened. This congress should on no account permit the majority to dictate to the minority, but should work through consensus. Its technical commissions should be charged with the execution of "our extensive economic program of worldwide rehabilitation."

(5) The Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague should be associated with the World Congress, but for purposes of arbitration between capitalist governments and the Soviet government it should be reconstructed so that "half the members will be imperialists and half will be Communists."

(6) The Soviet delegation would propose a general reduction of armaments.

(7) A related proposal would be to add a number of prohibitions to the rules of war of The Hague and Geneva Conventions.

(8) The "broad program of worldwide rehabilitation" should provide for assistance to the weak nations based on "economic geography and the planned distribution of resources."

(9) One way of implementing this would be to envisage integrated world railway and navigation systems. Their internationalization should be gradual and be carried out by consent.

(10) In particular, a proposal would be made "that the capital of the advanced countries should build a supermain-line London-Moscow-Vladivostok (Peking)."

(11) Proposals should be made for a planned distribution of the gold reserves (kept in idleness in American banks). This measure should be combined with a planned distribution of commercial orders, trade and the supply of scarce materials.

(12) The aid should take the form of loans, the repayment of which, given the planned character of the proposals, should begin "in a few years."

(13) If central international barter and sales organizations in capitalist countries (conceived along the lines of Keynes' "Barter Institute" and Rathenau's "Zentralstelle") could be made to function as means of planned international distribution of commodities to needy countries, especially of oil and coal, they would become essential components of an extensive program of economic rehabilitation. This task should be linked with the elaboration by technical commissions of a program for the distribution of fuel and energy resources.

To these points Lenin added two more: (14) The cancellation of all war debts; and (15) The revision (in the light of Chicherin's thirteen items) of the Versailles Treaty and all military treaties.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is typical of Chicherin's rare combination of bold imagination and sober realism that he concluded his letter to Lenin by remarking that what he was visualizing was theoretically quite feasible under the "bourgeois system," though he was fully aware of the fact that "in historically conditioned reality his proposals would clash with national egoism and the rapaciousness of capitalist oligarchies." Lenin, in the postscript to his covering letter addressed to Chicherin, stressed the need for the Soviet delegation to explain that, having come to the Conference as "merchants," their objective was to persuade, and not "to have it all our way with the United State through a majority." In a lighter vein, he concluded the postscript in French: "Les rieurs seront avec nous." This did not, of course, mean that he failed to take Genoa seriously, but rather that, as a statesman and a good diplomat, he had to be prepared for the failure of the Conference; whatever the outcome, the Soviet delegation would use the Conference platform for an intelligent and persuasive enunciation of Russia's policy of peace and coexistence.

Having thus received Lenin's policy clearance, Chicherin some days later submitted to him his "Elements for the First Speech at the Conference." On March 23, Lenin, in an internal note transmitted by telephone to Molotov (at that time Secretary of the Party's Central Committee), suggested a number of changes to be made in Chicherin's draft, which were all taken into account when the text was put in form:

(1) One should not just talk about different "politico-economic systems" in general, but about "different systems of ownership."

(2) "Definitely to throw out" any reference to "inevitable forcible revolution and the use of sanguinary struggle." On the contrary, to stress that "we Communists do not share the views of the pacifists . . . but having come (to Genoa) as merchants we positively consider it our duty to give our fullest support to any attempt at a peaceful settlement of outstanding problems."

(3) "Definitely to delete" the words "our historic conception includes the use of forcible measures."

(4) "Definitely to delete" the words "our historic conception being definitely based on the inevitability of new world wars." To use such "frightening words" would be tantamount to playing into the hands of one's opponents.

The far-reaching significance of these comments cannot be gainsaid. They contain the following fundamental threefold proposition regarding Soviet relations with the capitalist world which has retained its validity after half a century:

1. It is the recognition of the difference in property systems in capitalist and socialist countries which lies at the heart of the coexistence question. Without the recognition of the legitimacy of the socialist system of property, and its essential equality of rights alongside the capitalist system, no peaceful coexistence is possible.

2. The principal objective of foreign policy and diplomacy in East-West relations is the settlement of all questions at issue without recourse to force, *i.e.* by negotiation.

3. War is *not* inevitable.[9]

[9] When similar views to these were propounded at the Twentieth (1956) and subsequent Congresses of the CPSU, some foreign observers nevertheless spoke of major shifts in Soviet attitudes.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Chicherin's opening statement at Genoa thus provided the policy frame within which the specific proposals concerning "peaceful cohabitation" with the "bourgeois camp" were advanced. Indeed, it may be said without exaggeration that the Genoa dossier laid the foundations of Soviet foreign policy in relation to the potentialities of East-West coöperation in the years to come, particularly in situations of positive response by the other side. It exerted a profound doctrinal and practical influence on the subsequent evolution of Soviet thinking and attitudes toward such vital matters as the possibility of avoiding wars; the nature of international organizations and the Soviet Union's role in them; policies toward the underdeveloped countries; the link between economic coöperation and military security; East-West trade; and the extent to which joint ventures of the two groups of countries may be attempted.

The International Economic Conference at Genoa achieved but little. Apart from failing to reach agreement on German reparations, it also failed in its main purpose—to resolve "the Russian question." Russia was not prepared to accept the conditions posed by the Allied Powers for a normalization of their relations with the Soviet Republic, such as the return of the nationalized property to foreigners and the abolition of the foreign-trade monopoly. It also proved impossible to strike a bargain between the claims of the Allied Powers (especially those of the business circles most directly concerned) on the Soviet Republic, and the latter's counterclaims, and, more particularly, to match Russia's readiness to recognize the Tsarist prewar debts and to offer concessions (even, if need be, to the former owners) by the granting of adequate credits and loans on acceptable terms. (Negotiations on the matter were resumed at The Hague from June 15 to July 22, 1922, but, once again, without avail.) Yet, from Russia's viewpoint, the Genoa Conference was far from being a total failure (particularly since Lenin entertained but few illusions about the chances of its success). The gathering had provided, for the first time after the October Revolution, a unique opportunity to think through and thereafter to proclaim from an international rostrum Soviet Russia's views on its relations with the outside world. The very fact that the Soviet government became a party (albeit with some reservations) to a number of resolutions adopted by the Conference dealing with various aspects of economic reconstruction in Europe was characterized by Chicherin as "the first general act in which Russia has taken part during the last four years." Professor Coolidge was, therefore, undoubtedly right when he wrote in his article in the first issue of *Foreign Affairs* that "the Soviet republic had indeed won the *de facto* recognition of Europe."

In his concluding remarks at the last plenary on the closing day, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs observed that "the sole fact of convening all the European countries, without distinction of victor or vanquished, and without discrimination between opposing systems of ownership, was a memorable event." The Russian delegation had wished to make "a bold step forward towards new political and economic methods . . . the establishment of a new general system." It had been prevented from submitting to the Conference the question of disarmament which, in its view, constituted an inseparable element of such a unified system as it had outlined at the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

beginning of the Conference. The "Russian problem can only be satisfactorily solved if it is considered by all concerned in terms of the equality of rights of the countries having different systems of ownership." But though the Russian thesis had not been retained, the Soviet Republic would continue its efforts for conciliation.

The All-Russian Central Executive Committee, having discussed Yoffe's report on Genoa (Chicherin having been ordered by Lenin to go from Genoa to Germany for medical treatment), considered that its delegation had done all that was feasible under the circumstances. Besides, by skillful handling it had succeeded in bringing off "the coup" of Rapallo. This Treaty provided for de jure recognition of Soviet Russia by the Weimar Republic, for reciprocal renunciation of claims and for trade relations based on the Most Favored Nation principle. The Treaty thus strengthened the international prestige of the Soviet state and served as a model for subsequent accords with other capitalist countries.

Russia's efforts at conciliation with her capitalist environment continued after Genoa, as Chicherin had promised. It is a chequered story.

Trade expanded, but political enmity and suspicion inhibited its normal growth. Programs for extensive economic coöperation based on peaceful coexistence of the two systems were proposed by the U.S.S.R. at the International Economic Conference in Geneva in 1927, and at the London Economic Conference in 1933. On the political plane, the Soviet government urged disarmament and collective security, especially between 1927 and 1934 at the Disarmament Conference (and its Preparatory Committee). In 1934, the Soviet Union joined the League, where Litvinov proclaimed and insisted that peace was indivisible. However, it was never fully accepted as a member of the international community. The country had, therefore, to "coexist" under conditions of what it considered to be essentially hostile encirclement and enforced isolation. Fortunately, the war forged an effective alliance between the Four Great Powers, a dramatic proof that the policy of coexistence could work after all. But the high hopes for an era of postwar coöperation were dashed.

III

Has the experience of Genoa any relevance a half-century later? Lenin once half-jokingly remarked that the only alternative to Soviet Russia's living together and trading with the capitalist countries surrounding it was to fly away to the moon. Who would have thought that a mere 50 years after Genoa the General Assembly of the United Nations (a new world organization, this time counting both the United States and the Soviet Union among its founding members) would be discussing the preparation of an international law to govern the activities of states on that planet through a kind of "lunar coexistence"? It is not easy to think of a more telling illustration of the dramatic transformation in the condition of man, of the "acceleration of history," in so brief a span of time.

On earth, however, the problem of a lasting normalization of the East-West relationship remains one of the crucial issues of our epoch, much more so than it was at the time of Genoa, though major political initiatives of recent

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

months in a situation of international fluidity might hopefully be harbingers of qualitative changes and forward movements.

Even a cursory glance at the present politico-economic map shows the emergence of the world socialist system as one of the salient elements of the contemporary scene. The erstwhile Soviet Russian Republic has evolved into the U.S.S.R., now an undisputed world power which, having been denied this status during the interwar period, not unnaturally insists on claiming and exercising its conventional attributes. The socialist order first ushered in by the Russian Revolution is now common to a number of countries, including, more particularly, those which together form a community of, by and large, institutionally homogeneous socialist states, grouped together for purposes of economic coöperation in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). Comprising some 350 million people or around ten percent of the world's population (*i.e.* not counting the huge population of socialist countries in Asia), they are currently estimated to account for about 20 percent of global national income and somewhat more than one-third of world industrial production. Their overall average growth rates markedly exceed those of the developed capitalist countries—a far cry from the days of Genoa when Soviet Russia's industrial output, having reached an all-time low in 1920, had climbed to about a quarter of its prewar volume.

There has thus occurred a marked shift in politico-economic power relationships in the world which makes for a much more stable balance of forces than was conceivable a half-century ago. No longer has the Soviet Union to exist alone in a "network" of avowedly hostile capitalist states, as before the war; coexistence now manifests itself through relations between the two world systems of states. Essentially European in content and not much more than a vision at the time of Genoa (when the two sides were observing each other rather than anything else), coexistence has now clearly become an ineluctable reality and a global concept. This significant change has added a new dimension to its meaning since there is now a solid basis for lasting understanding from which both sides would clearly derive comparable advantages.

As late as the end of 1924, even so discerning and thoughtful a journalist as J. L. Garvin, the Editor of the London *Observer,* could assert that "the existing system (in the Soviet Union) cannot be maintained. Soviet Russia, whatever may be its nominal system of government a few years hence, is bound to become a capitalist State" (*Observer,* December 28, 1924). Today, despite stubbornly lingering illusions here and there that such a metamorphosis might somehow still materialize, the existence of a world system of socialist states has increasingly come to be accepted as an irreversible fact of political life. These countries are, at the same time, full-fledged members, on a footing of equality, of the international economic community, and (with the exception, so far, of the German Democratic Republic) contribute their full share to the deliberative, policy-setting and technical functions of the United Nations system, including, more particularly, most of its specialized bodies dealing with international coöperation in economic and social matters.

But the mutual pursuit of peaceful coexistence as a deliberate and systematic policy of optimizing East-West collaboration is quite another matter.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The decision to follow such a course depends on the political will of both sides.

Reactions to the concept of peaceful coexistence in the capitalist countries vary. The number of those who are prepared to test it seems to be growing. Yet there continues to be a widely and deeply held belief that the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence is nothing more than a tactical maneuver, resorted to as a temporary expedient (or, worse still, as an instrument of deliberate and clever deception) which is brought into action whenever deemed suitable by the Soviet side; and it is felt by many that the actual importance now ascribed to that policy during the early phases of Soviet political history is grossly exaggerated, if not conjured up by a deliberate ex post facto refocusing of events. This view is propounded not only by the avowed adversaries of the Soviet régime; the genuineness and continuity of that policy are also questioned by scholars such as George F. Kennan.[10]

Far be it from me to argue in favor of one-sided "total righteousness" which Kennan enjoins all of us to put aside, but the gravamen of the argument developed in this essay is precisely that the concept of peaceful coexistence represents a genuine and long-term policy objective, having deep roots in the thinking and the practice of Soviet foreign relations from the very inception of the Soviet state. It is, of course, true that principles of foreign policy have rarely the same meaning at two different periods separated by 50 years. But while one should eschew facile analogies, close study of Soviet foreign policy over the years does suggest the presence of a strong link with its original ideological anchorage. Even today, I believe, this continuity of basic ideas can be traced, however much both theory and policy have meanwhile evolved.

The continuity of the notion is borne out by Soviet efforts to activate coexistence policies after the war, especially in the economic and related fields, as soon as some measure of détente had set in. The CPSU, in major statements of long-term policy, including its program, has reaffirmed on many occasions its adherence to the idea of peaceful coexistence conceived along Leninist lines. Moreover, the Soviet government, implementing this general party line, has on repeated occasions come forward, more particularly in the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE)—since the European region is for obvious reasons the focal point of peaceful coexistence—with a number of far-reaching initiatives. Their close bonds of conceptual kinship with the program presented by Chicherin in 1922 are unmistakable: they are, in a sense, variations on the Genoa themes composed in a new setting. Thus, in 1956 and in 1957, the Soviet Union proposed the conclusion of a formal all-European agreement, to be valid for an indefinite period, on international economic coöperation within the framework of the Economic Commission for Europe "to facilitate the implementation of concerted measures to ensure the economic development of all European countries in an atmosphere of mutual trust and understanding."

In 1958, the Soviet delegation in ECE proposed the establishment of an

[10] See "Peaceful Coexistence: A Western View," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1960. For a recent Soviet criticism of Kennan's and other Western views on the subject, see "Peaceful Co-Existence and the Revolutionary Process" (in Russian), by V. N. Yegorov (Moscow: Mezhduharodniye Otnosheniya, 1971).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

all-European organization for the peaceful utilization of atomic energy, and the convening of a conference of ministers of trade to discuss such matters as long-term trade problems, including the exchange of patents and licenses on a commercial basis. In 1960, the Soviet Union suggested that the possibility of the joint planning and construction of industrial projects by European countries be examined within the ECE. In 1960, and then again in 1961, the Soviet Union expressed readiness to take part in the elaboration of the terms of reference of what was subsequently to become the Organization for Economic Coöperation and Development (OECD) and, after its establishment, to become a party to it. In 1962, the Soviet representative in ECE proposed the conclusion of an agreement within that body on a mutual reduction of customs tariffs of countries participating in the Commission.

None of these ideas met with any response by the other side, either because they were not taken seriously or else because they would have implied major policy changes which the Western countries were not then prepared even to contemplate. A similar fate befell the Soviet plan for an all-European security pact, proposed in the summer of 1958, linking peaceful settlement of disputes, reduction of foreign armed forces on German territories and related measures of politico-military security with economic, scientific and cultural coöperation. Nevertheless the U.S.S.R. continued to intensify its participation in economic activities of the United Nations, and especially in ECE with its special vocation for developing East-West coöperation. Parallel efforts were undertaken by the U.S.S.R. (and other socialist countries) to promote trade, economic, technical and industrial coöperation on the bilateral level.

This ongoing process of widening bilateral relations between East and West, though it does not as yet add up to a veritable system of planned and deliberate peaceful coexistence, augurs well for a breakthrough on a multilateral plane. It should greatly ease the task of mutual adjustment, concertation and even coördination of policies once the "green light" is given at the political level. For, as Chicherin once remarked, a trade agreement without a political understanding is impossible.

But can a convincing case for such a system be made, half a century after Lenin's and Chicherin's imaginative and yet down-to-earth offer at Genoa fell on deaf ears? Is it realistic and worthwhile trying to strive for it? Let us first look at the economic and social sides of the matter, in the light of the structural changes in the world economy which have meanwhile intervened.

Gunnar Myrdal, when he headed the ECE Secretariat, remarked some 15 years ago that "on an immense scale the cold war holds back economic progress on both sides of the dividing line." The negative effects of the absence of adequate East-West coöperation based on mutual trust are nowadays more widely and more clearly comprehended than was the case at the time of the Genoa Conference, if only because of the gigantic rise in worldwide expenditure on armaments, running at an annual rate of more than 200 billion dollars. Viewed positively, the need for such coöperation on a large scale has perhaps never been so convincing as it is today. Nowhere is this so strikingly evidenced as in matters of economics and trade. While the share of CMEA countries in world industrial output is (as we have seen)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on the order of upwards of 30 percent, its share of world trade is barely ten percent, of which "East-West" trade accounts for a mere five percent or so. This trade flow can and does, of course, develop, but in the absence of positive measures its growth will be sub-optimal in pace and pattern of international specialization. This, surely, does not in the long run make sense.

Lenin's emphatic dictum at the time of Genoa that the international economy cannot develop satisfactorily without Russia's participation holds good *a fortiori* today also in relation to the socialist countries which together not only form an economic grouping of impressive size, but represent a big, dynamic and increasingly diversified market which needs to be more fully integrated into world trade. It offers as yet unutilized large-scale possibilities for mutually advantageous exchanges which on occasion may have an appreciable stabilizing effect on the fluctuating capitalist world economy (particularly at times of downturn).[11]

What are the potentialities of peaceful coexistence? In the Soviet view this policy does not imply or lead to a "convergence" (toward a kind of global and largely homogeneous "industrial society" as some Western writers postulate) because of the fundamental qualitative differences in property and social relationships between the two groups of countries and the elements of economic competition and ideological rivalry involved. But Soviet writers consider that wide-ranging, stable and long-term coöperation founded on global interdependence as well as mutuality and community of interests is both feasible and highly desirable. United Nations' activities over the last quarter of a century have done much to articulate and heighten this awareness of the ultimate kinship of man, of an "international community" joining forces in the pursuit of societal goals, identified as commonly shared, such as full employment, stable economic growth, social well-being and cultural progress.

Contemporary Soviet political scientists, when discussing the coexistence problem, explicitly subscribe to this approach, although they stress that this does not imply the attenuation of either the class struggle within the framework of individual nations, especially in the highly mature capitalist countries, or of the trends toward socialism. They stress also that, particularly as a result of recent transformations of the world scene, due to the technological revolution, the process of what Lenin terms the "internationalization" of virtually all major activities of the human society has grown apace. Therefore, institutional and ideological differences between the capitalist and socialist countries notwithstanding, the range of common problems is constantly widening, thus providing solid ground on which peaceful coexistence could be built through concerted endeavors. Human society is much more closely interrelated than ever before. Entirely new societal phenomena, such as the threat to the human environment,[12] imperatively demand matrix-type

[11] Soviet-American trade, for instance, "has recently averaged about 200 million dollars a year. Secretary of Commerce, Maurice H. Stans, believes there is a potential for 5 billion dollars in two-way trade by 1975. State Department experts . . . have expressed caution but nevertheless believe a five-fold rise of one billion dollars a year is quite conceivable." Paris: *International Herald Tribune,* November 18, 1971.

[12] The policy reports by Brezhnev and Kosygin at the last Congress of the CPSU contain several references to the need for international coöperation in this area.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

coördination of mutually consistent national endeavors, collectively conceived policies and joint measures. Programs for an adequate development of infrastructure must be suitably dovetailed. Certain technological policies, in particular, need to be placed in an international context to benefit from economies of scale, since their application within national boundaries, even of large national entities, has become prohibitive. It has been pointed out that an increasing number of decisions on the allocation of investment and research and development resources have to be taken by reference to the probable development of international demand for the resultant products over a span of several years. Because of the uncertainty of all such forecasts, there is growing danger of uneconomic decisions being taken by governments or by enterprises with respect to rational lines of specialization. This trend can be counteracted by East-West coöperation in the industrial field, whereby opportunities are exploited for combining, in different proportions depending on the particular case, production, technological, managerial, financial and marketing capacities of the parties.

Current Soviet writings on prospects for East-West coöperation in the economic and related fields, based on peaceful coexistence, show a keen awareness of such emerging factors and furnish evidence of careful analysis of the specifics of the evolving East-West relationship under present circumstances.[18]

But assuming that a convincing case has been made for the inherent advantages of peaceful coexistence in economic and social terms—and current developments in East-West trade bear witness to the gradual acceptance of this thesis—what are the political implications of the policies being proposed by the Soviet Union as well as the other socialist countries in this regard?

In the second part of this essay an attempt was made to distill from primary sources the initial attitudes of the Soviet state toward such fundamental issues as war, revolution and ideological rivalry, and to ascertain how, and to what extent, these basic viewpoints of doctrinal principle could be fitted into the Soviet concept of peaceful coexistence. A careful scrutiny of policy pronouncements during the postwar period leads one to conclude that these attitudes (while obviously adjusted and refined to reappraise events and to take account of such new phenomena as the common danger of thermonuclear war) have remained in essence the same as at the time of Genoa.

They amount to the following: War is not inevitable, particularly now that the socialist part of the world is immeasurably stronger than it was 50 years ago so that a much more stable balance has been attained than was possible half a century ago. The class struggle within the capitalist system and the system's contradictions will persist. The revolutionary process will mature in each country in its own time and in its own manner; this process should be as orderly as feasible and the socialization of the means of production should provide for suitable compensation to its former owners. In many countries socialization may take the form of national liberation movements which will receive the moral and political support of the socialist countries;

[18] See, for instance, A. Vetrov, "Problems of 'East-West' Economic Ties," *Foreign Trade*, Moscow, No. 2, 1971.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

while such movements need not (and hopefully will not) be violent, they may, however, assume such forms if essential structural transformations are resisted by force. Ideological contestation and economic competition between the systems will go on, though this should not lead to a polarization, since a system of peaceful coexistence implies the renunciation of force and an absolute commitment to seek solutions to differences through negotiations and to aim at a gradual dismantling of politico-military blocks. Agreed coexistence policies should not be motivated by the propagation of ideological goals. Effective noninterference and nonintervention should ensure that there be no export either of revolution or of counterrevolution. Finally, as Litvinov stressed in 1925, the policy of peaceful coexistence means not only peace between the two groups of countries, but—since in our era wars rarely remain localized—also between the nonsocialist countries.

There are, however, two basic considerations resulting from the changes of the political and economic map since Genoa which supplement the Genoa dossier. One of them is that interstate relations between socialist countries are governed by social laws, policies and criteria which are uniquely specific to the socialist system and which are subsumed in the principle of socialist internationalism. (This, it is held, is fully consistent with the observance by all countries, irrespective of differences in systems, of generally applicable principles of interstate relations founded on the Charter of the United Nations.) The coöperation of the participants within the CMEA is much more comprehensive than seems possible between institutionally heterogeneous actors. Yet, this special relationship is not one of exclusiveness. The Comprehensive Program for Socialist Economic Integration of CMEA Countries (published last fall) makes express provision for links with the capitalist countries through a policy of peaceful coexistence, for the fitting of CMEA patterns of specialization into the worldwide division of labor and for outward-looking contacts with the developing countries.

The other consideration is that the external policy of the socialist states has to take into account the possible economic, social and political consequences of their contacts with the capitalist countries; accordingly, intrasocialist contacts should always take priority. None the less, peaceful coexistence, it is argued, opens up vast areas of fruitful coöperation.

This updated case for peaceful coexistence certainly does not lack forthrightness inasmuch as it spells out both the scope and the constraints of a peaceful coexistence policy "without illusions." That policy can hardly be likened to a Trojan Horse to entice the capitalist world and lull its vigilance.

This being so, is—to put it bluntly—"the game worth the candle" from the vantage point of the capitalist countries? Should they take the political risks of a stepped-up coöperation with the East, implying long-term commitments, only to preside ultimately (as some would have it) over their own funeral? What is the point of giving "capitalist assistance for anti-capitalist purposes," as Garvin wrote in 1924? Would it not be wiser, on balance, to continue with the present piecemeal, limited dealings with the East, mainly in the field of trade, while relying on the nuclear deterrent and a superior economic potential?

To this not uncommon line of argument, one might reply as follows: The

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

state of coexistence is an objective reality to which one has to adjust. Inter-systems trade cannot rise to its potential and optimal level if the political relationship is not normalized. Only by a comprehensive but realistic accommodation between East and West can the twin elements of politico-military security, on the one hand, and social progress and stable access to the world market, on the other, be guaranteed now and, more importantly, for the coming generations about whom Brezhnev and Brandt spoke at their Yalta meeting last fall.

There is no other rational option open to mankind; the alternative is recurring and possibly catastrophic deteriorations of world relations. Only through East-West coöperation can the world ever hope to achieve a significant reduction in the colossal armaments expenditure which even an economic giant like the United States has found that it cannot forever afford and which the developing countries increasingly resent. Solely a scheme of peaceful coexistence, based on firm reciprocal commitments for the maintenance of security and the respect of genuine noninterference, could ensure that internal conflicts due to social tension do not jeopardize the maintenance of world peace. The evolution of the world toward new societal forms could surely be left to the verdict of history. If the capitalist world is convinced of its own viability and its economic and moral superiority over the system which exists in the socialist countries, it should not have undue worries on this score, particularly since current Soviet writings on the subject refer to peaceful coexistence as a historic phase in the evolution of the human race toward higher societal forms. Soviet economists have long cast aside former ideas of an automatic collapse or shrinkage of capitalism. On the contrary, they appreciate its ability to develop productive forces and control, to some extent, its cyclical movements, though they remain convinced that ultimately the socialist system will prevail.

But one should not, of course, minimize the difficulties on the road from détente toward a more lasting entente, assuming once again that present doubts in the West on the political score can be dissipated. One specific difficulty has to do with the need, in any scheme of enlarged East-West cooperation, to arrive at some sort of arrangement for settling the relations between the participants of CMEA and the European Economic Community (EEC). Soviet economists recognize that the process of integration of the capitalist economies and its institutional embodiments are realities of life which one has to take into account. The Soviet Union considers, however, that, as distinct from CMEA, the EEC is a closed, inward-looking and protectionist entity, politically linked with NATO. It is regarded as a major source of uncertainty and discrimination in world trade, causing serious difficulties to other countries, including socialist nations, more particularly with respect to agricultural exports. EEC policies have forced CMEA countries to take certain protective countermeasures which they would not have otherwise envisaged. Admittedly, the evolution of EEC has, thus far, not prevented the Community from devising special measures for the conduct of East-West trade by its members, but the situation remains unsatisfactory. Direct informal contacts between the staffs of CMEA and EEC could be established, if desired, through such U.N. bodies as the ECE and the United

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) where both CMEA and EEC already enjoy consultative or participant status. At meetings of UNCTAD's Trade and Development Board the impact of economic groupings of developed countries on world trade is discussed periodically, with the active participation of representatives of these two organizations.

All these and other procedures are, however, clearly of an interim character. Conceivably a scheme of widened East-West coöperation could give rise to a more satisfactory arrangement particularly if the EEC could find a way of divesting itself of the political connotation with which it was endowed at the time of its establishment. It would also be conducive to better understanding if the EEC could take measures to protect the legitimate trade and economic interests of nonmembers, make express provisions for its participation in region-wide coöperation, even if this meant the cessation or restructuring of certain activities of EEC that could more advantageously be carried out within an all-European framework, and ensure that its policies do not run counter to the process of wider economic specialization. Such steps might be supplemented by a consultative procedure on questions requiring settlement. But all this requires much further thought and clarification.

Another problem which has to be solved is that of confidence. It is nowadays a banality to say that there can be no international coöperation, no peace, without confidence. Schiller's *Wallenstein* cries: "For war's eternal 'midst cunning and suspicion; only with faith and confidence there's peace. Who poisons confidence, Oh he assassinates the coming generations in the mother's womb!" Chicherin, in a less poetic vein, remarks at the time of Genoa: "It is necessary to create confidence. Without it the capitalists will not open their purses." In fact, the Soviet offer at Genoa was spurned partly because of an almost total absence of credence and trust on the part of the Western Powers. In the harsh reality of world politics, it takes a long time to establish a feeling of trust even between nations with a common history, institutions and values, and very little—a petty incident or a fortuitous misunderstanding perhaps—suffices to weaken or destroy it altogether. When taking root, international confidence remains a delicate plant requiring careful and constant nurturing. The creation and maintenance of confidence between the East and the West, against the background of decades of enmity, fear and suspicion, are, therefore, a particularly formidable and yet absolutely essential part of a deliberate policy for utilizing the full potentialities of peaceful coexistence. This is likely to be a complex process, involving the initial thrust of solemnly proclaimed major political decisions, such as the recent treaty between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany. Such statesmanlike acts ipso facto generate trust by postulating it as an essential element of the diplomatic instrument. In this way, a series of practical coöperative measures, by producing mutually beneficial results, reinforce the original impulse through "feedback" effects, and set in train, to use Myrdal's sociological terminology, an upward spiral of cumulative causation whereby confidence engenders coöperation and coöperation engenders confidence. In view of the particular difficulties of creating confidence between the two sides in question, the scope of commonly shared values being ideologically and politically limited, the process, in its initial

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

phase, could be promoted by, first, a special mental and moral effort to turn a new page in East-West relations, and, second, by endowing it with a contractual basis, including a wide range of accords, from a multilateral legal instrument governing coöperation as a whole (such as frame-agreements) to specific arrangements in particular fields (such as protocols), with built-in machinery for verifying results and forestalling misunderstandings.

Even if everything possible were done to create an atmosphere of trust, a ramified and lasting system of peaceful coexistence, comprising a network of intermeshing bilateral arrangements and multilateral accords of the kind alluded to, could at best be fashioned in successive stages. But this process should be purposeful, moving forward methodically within an overall design. Therefore, while, *faute de mieux,* partial advances should continue to be sought, it may be argued that bold and comprehensive, though not necessarily grandiose, schemes of East-West coöperation of the kind which Chicherin adumbrated at Genoa a half-century ago are needed to make a real and badly needed impact on world politics. In such a system the day-to-day commercial operations which still supply the life-blood of coexistence (though they are increasingly becoming the end-result rather than the basis of economic coöperation in a broader sense) should be combined with wide-ranging schemes for human progress through a coördinated application of technology, and a concerted attack (by means of a jointly operated research capability wherever appropriate) on major common needs identified in the key areas of (1) production and trade (including money, finance, credit and investment); (2) transport and communications; (3) resource development and management (including energy generation and distribution); (4) the protection of health and environment; (5) the strengthening of common cultural values; and (6) East-West coöperation in overcoming the economic development gap. Provision would have to be made for promoting, on an increasing scale, related movements of persons, for in the last analysis human contacts represent an essential ingredient of the coexistence process. Specific coöperative schemes between certain key actors—such as, for instance, Soviet-Japanese and Soviet-U.S. coöperation in the utilization of the natural wealth of Siberia, based, in part, on the granting of credits and repayment in kind (a theme first broached, be it remembered, in Genoa)—could serve to reinforce the edifice and give the system the necessary politico-economic momentum.[14]

[14] "Probably the biggest project centers on the huge copper deposits in Udokan, Siberia. An estimated 4 billion dollars is required to bring these fields into full commercial use. . . . An estimated 400,000 tons of copper would be mined annually. About half of that would go to the Soviet Union; the other half to the United States. A second giant project involves exploitation of the extensive gas deposits all over the Soviet Union. The project under consideration calls for an investment of 3 billion to 4 billion dollars to augment Soviet production by 800 million dollars annually by the end of this decade. About half of the increment would go to meet Russian needs. . . . The rest liquified and carried in specially built ships, would come to the United States." Joseph Kraft, "Doing Business with Russia." Paris: *International Herald Tribune,* November 18, 1971. It appears from an interview by Mr. Eldridge Haynes, Chairman of Business International, published in *Moscow News* on December 25, 1971, that these and other similar schemes were, in fact, discussed in Moscow in the course of a round table of top executives of large U.S. corporations and enterprises organized at the end of last year.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The overall design should be completed by an institutional mechanism providing on a continuing basis the means for specific undertakings for the maintenance of peace and security. A careful blending and integration of political, economic and related coöperation within the scheme seems desirable to ensure a diversified pattern of peaceful coexistence with a built-in mechanism of checks and balances. Individual participants in such a scheme would naturally develop their particular patterns of East-West relations, reflecting their special needs and requirements within the framework of coexistence, but the "multilateral roof" would help to keep an overall equilibrium and minimize friction. A general framework could be sought in appropriate regional arrangements (such as a Treaty Organization for European Security and Coöperation) related to the United Nations, the world body where the several coexistence efforts might ultimately coalesce. The United Nations could give the notion the status of a generally recognized norm of international law (a point made by several Soviet jurists) and undertake work of systematic codification. (A valuable beginning has already been made by the adoption by the General Assembly in 1970 of the Declaration on Friendly Relations between States.) The United Nations could also intensify its efforts at making the idea and the potentialities of East-West coöperation more generally known and appreciated, and thus offer an imaginative and yet realistic vision of what the world would be like if a state of peaceful coexistence in the full sense could be attained. And why not launch a United Nations Decade of Peaceful Coexistence to complement and reinforce its Development Decades?

Such, then, are the contours of a possible far-reaching accommodation between the East and the West which seem to emerge both from a historical study and from an assessment of current Soviet policies in this regard and of a possible approach toward its implementation. Clearly, many of the issues raised require further elucidation and detailed elaboration: the final shape of peaceful coexistence would obviously have to be worked out on the basis of a common understanding under which both sides stand to gain. The important thing is that the accommodation should be based on the recognition of the essential equality of the two sides rather than on "symmetry," as some peace-researchers suggest. Right from the beginning of the life of the Soviet state, Lenin was aware of the need for compromise for the sake of peaceful coexistence. The Soviet Union has always stressed its readiness to sit down with the other side and negotiate the various proposals. It has never demanded or expected the impossible. But at some point in time, it would seem, a major policy decision will have to be made by all concerned to explore the modalities of a lasting collaborative arrangement between the West and the East. Clearly, one is here faced by a "necessity of choice." The Soviet challenge, as we have seen, evoked no response when first presented in Genoa in 1922. If it had, the course of history might conceivably have been different. Fifty years later, when the case for peaceful coexistence is much more plausible, will the challenge remain unheeded? There has rarely been a more propitious time than now when inescapable economic and social imperatives call for a new political impetus.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By John G. Stoessinger

with the assistance of William Diebold, Jr., Economics; Fritz Stern, Western Europe; Henry L. Roberts, Eastern Europe, Soviet Union; John C. Campbell, Middle East, North Africa; Lewis C. Austin, Asia; Robert D. Crassweller, Latin America; Frank Wolf, Africa.

General: Political and Legal

FIFTEEN MEN ON A POWDER KEG. By Andrew Boyd. New York: Stein and Day, 1971, 383 p. $8.95.

A sophisticated journalist has written a lively, acerbic and highly informative account of the Security Council. While the book does not qualify as "history" it nevertheless is one of the best treatments of the subject to date.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS. By C. P. Snow. New York: Scribner, 1971, 224 p. $6.95.

An eloquent and multifaceted plea for bridging the gulf between science and the humanities. The author is particularly concerned about the relationship between the scientist and government.

LIVING WITH THE COMMUNISTS: CHINA 1953–5, SOVIET UNION 1962–5. By Humphrey Trevelyan. Boston: Gambit, 1972, 320 p. $6.95.

An astute and sensitive memoir, crisply presented by a leading British diplomatist, of political conditions in China during the mid-fifties and in the Soviet Union during the mid-sixties. The section on the Soviet Union is superior to that on China.

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL. VOLUME III, THE CHALLENGE OF WAR, 1914–1916. By Martin Gilbert. Boston: Houghton, 1971, 988 p. $15.00.

A reconstruction of Churchill's career between 1914 and 1916. The author shows convincingly how Churchill's contemporaries believed his political career to be at an end in 1916. Churchill disagreed.

THE SURVIVAL OF SMALL STATES: STUDIES IN SMALL POWER/GREAT POWER CONFLICT. By David Vital. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971, 136 p. $6.50.

A realistic appraisal of the options for maneuver open to small states. The author's view of the world takes their interests and aims very much into account.

POWER THROUGH SUBVERSION. By Laurence W. Beilenson. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1972, 299 p. $8.00.

Lenin is seen as the master theorist and practitioner of subversion in this highly conceptualized historical study. The author calls for a doctrine of "foreign aid for freedom" and concludes that the United States should exert its own power through subversion.

NOTE—By special arrangement with UNA-USA World Affairs Book Center, readers of Foreign Affairs may obtain any book published in the United States (except paperbacks), at the publisher's regular list price. Prepaid orders over $10.00 postage free; under $10.00, add 25¢ for U.S.A., 75¢ outside U.S.A. Send orders with check or money order, to World Affairs Book Center, 345 East 46th Street, New York, New York 10017.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SURVIVING THE FUTURE. By Arnold Toynbee. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971, 164 p. $5.95.

Seven discursive essays on man and society which originated from a dialogue with Japanese intellectuals.

A WORLD IN REVOLUTION: A NEWSPAPERMAN'S MEMOIR. By Herbert L. Matthews. New York: Scribner, 1972, 462 p. $12.50.

The author's observations on a number of countries in revolutionary ferment are not particularly revealing, but his analyses of the changing editorial policies of *The New York Times* for which he worked for 45 years are penetrating and instructive.

MAN AND LAND: THE ESSENTIAL REVOLUTION. By Erich H. Jacoby with Charlotte F. Jacoby. New York: Knopf, 1971, 400 p. $10.00.

A refreshingly pragmatic study of land reform in developing countries, concluding with a set of sensible recommendations.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND DECOLONIZATION. By Yassin El-Ayouty. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971, 286 p. Gldrs. 47.70.

This scholarly study reveals the catalytic role of the Afro-Asian states in the decolonization process.

US/UN: FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION. By Robert E. Riggs. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1971, 347 p. $4.95 (Paper).

One of the best analytical studies of the pursuit of American policy objectives through the United Nations currently available.

STEINSTÜCKEN: A STUDY IN COLD WAR POLITICS. By Honoré M. Catudal, Jr. New York: Vantage Press, 1971, 165 p. $4.95.

The fascinating story of the political tribulations of a tiny West German village near Berlin, completely enclosed by East German territory.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER. By Georg Schwarzenberger. New York: Praeger, 1971, 298 p. $17.50.

A highly sophisticated and very up-to-date treatment of the subject.

General: Military, Technical and Scientific

THE BIOLOGICAL IMPERATIVES: HEALTH, POLITICS, AND HUMAN SURVIVAL. By Allan Chase. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971, 399 p. $8.95.

The author argues that environmental disease factors are now multiplying at rates that threaten the biological future of man. He makes a powerful case for reversing national priorities which now place military might above good health.

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION: A GLOBAL SURVEY. By Thomas W. Wilson, Jr. New York: Dunellen, 1971, 364 p. $12.50.

A timely assessment of the global imperatives of the environmental crisis followed by a useful summary of the leading international agencies attempting to cope with it today.

THE DOUBLE-CROSS SYSTEM—IN THE WAR OF 1939 TO 1945. By J. C. Masterman. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972, 203 p. $6.95.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This report, kept secret for over 25 years, advances the bold claim that British Intelligence managed to control the entire apparatus of Nazi espionage in Britain and, moreover, convinced Hitler that the D-Day landings would take place at Calais rather than in Normandy.

GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY: POLITICAL APPLICATIONS OF LIMITED NAVAL FORCE. By James Cable. New York: Praeger (for the Institute for Strategic Studies), 1971, 251 p. $11.00.

An attempt to develop a doctrine of limited use of naval force. Well endowed with illustrative case materials, the analysis is particularly enlightening on the enigma of Soviet naval power.

PAWNS: THE PLIGHT OF THE CITIZEN-SOLDIER. By Peter Barnes. New York: Knopf, 1972, 275 p. $7.95.

A well-researched chronicle of the ways in which the military recruits, trains and—in the author's opinion—dehumanizes and often breaks its soldiers. A useful list of recommendations for improvement concludes this disturbing polemic.

TET! By Don Oberdorfer. Garden City: Doubleday, 1971, 385 p. $7.95.

The author of this fast-paced chronicle concludes that nobody won in the Tet offensive. Rather, everybody lost: the North Vietnamese and Vietcong lost a battle and the Johnson administration lost the confidence of the American people.

U.S. TROOPS IN EUROPE: ISSUES, COSTS, AND CHOICES. By John Newhouse with others. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1971, 177 p. $6.95 (Paper, $2.95).

The authors of this balanced work conclude that there is a continuing need for a substantial number of U.S. forces in Europe and recommend a number of steps to share the cost more evenly.

STRANGE WAR, STRANGE STRATEGY: A GENERAL'S REPORT ON VIETNAM. By General Lewis W. Walt. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1970, 208 p. $7.95.

A spirited defense of U.S. pacification policy in South Vietnam, by a Marine General with command responsibility and long first-hand experience.

VIET-NAM CRISIS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY. VOLUME I: 1940–1956. Edited by Allan W. Cameron. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971, 452 p. $18.50.

A welcome guide to the available documentation on the Vietnam War, covering the period from 1940 to 1956, with succinct and objective introductions to each section. A sequel covering the following 15 years would be useful.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE. By Benson D. Adams. New York: American Elsevier, 1971, 274 p. $12.50.

This competent and technically highly informative monograph focuses on the Nike-Zeus, Nike-X, Sentinel and Safeguard missile systems.

A DICTIONARY OF MODERN WAR. By Edward Luttwak. New York: Harper and Row, 1971, 224 p. $7.95.

A lavishly illustrated guide covering hardware and organization as well as concepts of modern war.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

General: Economic and Social

THE MULTINATIONALS. By Christopher Tugendhat. New York: Random House, 1972, 242 p. $7.95.

It seems suitable that the MP for the Cities of London and Westminster should write about the newest complex of government-business relations. Lucidly, as befits a former financial journalist, he discusses the activities of the big international companies and makes moderate proposals for national and international measures that will strengthen the hands of governments in dealing with them.

TARIFF PROFILES IN LATIN AMERICA: IMPLICATIONS FOR PRICING STRUCTURES AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION. By Harry H. Bell. New York: Praeger, 1971, 168 p. $13.50.

An interesting contribution to the growing discussion of the impact of tariffs and other import restrictions on development. Half the book is a technical examination linking effective protection and prices and the other half a more broadly based discussion of the implications of the findings for comparative advantage, specialization and economic integration in Latin America. The author is a former Foreign Service Officer.

THE EVOLUTION OF ENERGY POLICY IN WESTERN EUROPE. By Richard L. Gordon. New York: Praeger, 1970, 330 p. $17.50.

This long-worked-over study casts much light on many aspects of "the reluctant retreat from coal" (as a subtitle accurately describes its subject). Realistic and penetrating on many points, it is a bit weak on synthesis but still a valuable contribution to an important topic.

ENERGY IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: A STATISTICAL REVIEW OF TRENDS IN OUTPUT, TRADE, AND CONSUMPTION SINCE 1925. By Joel Darmstadter with Perry D. Teitelbaum and Jaroslav G. Polach. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press (for Resources for the Future), 1972, 876 p. $22.50.

An impressive collection of statistics plus an interpretive essay by a senior research associate of Resources for the Future.

ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS. By J. Marcus Fleming. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971, 358 p. $10.00.

The Deputy Director of Research of the International Monetary Fund, who was formerly a British civil servant, has written many first-rate articles linking economic theory and practice. Those in this volume deal largely with import restrictions, liquidity and exchange rates.

OST-WEST-KONVERGENZ. By Kurt Dopfer. Zurich: Polygraphischer Verlag, 1970, 571 p. Swiss Fr. 38.

"Will the economic régimes of East and West draw closer together?" is the young author's question. He travels a long and rather interesting path through theory, comparative systems, some recent history and a good bit of philosophy to some cautious conclusions wrapped in even broader speculations.

AID AS IMPERIALISM. By Teresa Hayter. Baltimore: Penguin, 1971, 221 p. $1.45 (Paper).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The thesis implied in the title is not well argued but there are interesting points about the leverage exercised by the World Bank and other aid agencies in Latin America. The English author, originally helped in her inquiry by World Bank officials, later became a target for their criticism and is now a member of the International Marxist Group.

THE ORGANIZATION OF SPACE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. By E. A. J. Johnson. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970, 452 p. $15.00.

An intriguing mixture of economics, geography and history deployed to analyze a complex of issues that have quite a bit to do with the quality of life in poor countries.

TROPICAL DEVELOPMENT 1880–1913. Edited by W. Arthur Lewis. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971, 346 p. $10.25.

A leading authority on development, and some of his students, demonstrate how the growth of demand for tropical products in the late nineteenth century brought significant growth to a number of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

BEHAVIORAL CHANGE IN AGRICULTURE: CONCEPTS AND STRATEGIES FOR INFLUENCING TRANSITION. Edited by J. Paul Leagans and Charles P. Loomis. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971, 506 p. $12.50.

An interesting effort to bring many disciplines to bear on the problems of inducing change in agriculture by broad governmental policies and measures directed at individual farmers.

OIL AND WORLD POWER: A GEOGRAPHICAL INTERPRETATION. By Peter R. Odell. New York: Taplinger, 1971, 188 p. $6.95.

Informative, low-keyed, rather relaxed.

INDUSTRIALIZATION IN A LATIN AMERICAN COMMON MARKET. Prepared by Martin Carnoy. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1972, 267 p. $8.95.

Research institutions in ten Latin American countries and the United States have combined efforts to devise a method of showing where industries can be most economically located (and how to estimate the cost of locating them elsewhere). The method is then tried out on six industries.

The United States

COMING APART: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF AMERICA IN THE 1960's. By William L. O'Neill. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971, 442 p. $12.50.

A richly colorful potpourri, but lacking in analytical depth. What emerges as the main thesis of this chronicle is that the nation went on a kind of "binge" during the 1960s in which both Left and Right participated. The author has little to say about the nature or duration of the hangover.

UNCOMMON SENSE. By James MacGregor Burns. New York: Harper and Row, 1972, 196 p. $6.95.

Neither revolutionary violence nor one-foot-at-a-time gradualism will cure the nation's ills, in the author's view. What is needed is a fundamental rethinking of our goals and of our means of reaching them. An intellectual's prescription for social and political change.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE LIMITS OF POWER: THE WORLD AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 1945–1954. By Joyce and Gabriel Kolko. New York: Harper and Row, 1972, 820 p. $15.00.

Two leading revisionist historians diagnose the postwar decade as the crucial period during which "America's basic problems—and failures—emerged." While many will argue with the authors' substantive conclusions, it will be difficult to fault their meticulous research.

KENNEDY JUSTICE. By Victor S. Navasky. New York: Atheneum, 1971, 482 p. $10.00.

The best book to date on RFK as Attorney-General. There are fascinating insights into his relationship with J. Edgar Hoover and the drive to "get Hoffa" is well analyzed. The reader also learns much about the way decisions were made near the top of the Kennedy administration.

THE KENNEDY DOCTRINE. By Louise FitzSimons. New York: Random House, 1972, 275 p. $7.95.

A labored and largely unsuccessful attempt to demonstrate that "President Kennedy's policies were as dominated by cold-war thinking as were those of his predecessors." Moreover, the author claims he did not believe his own words: "Ask not what your country can do for you: ask what you can do for your country."

PACIFIST'S PROGRESS: NORMAN THOMAS AND THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN SOCIALISM. By Bernard K. Johnpoll. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970, 336 p. $8.95.

"Thomas's failure as a politician was merely a reflection of his success as a human being," the author asserts. His evangelism and hatred for war were always stronger than his desire to come to grips with Realpolitik and to reconcile the working-class and middle-class members of his party. A fine contribution.

THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND THE ORIGINS OF McCARTHYISM. By Richard M. Freeland. New York: Knopf, 1972, 419 p. $10.00.

An important and original work advancing the thesis that Truman used anticommunism as a political tactic to rally support for his policies in Western Europe and thus, unwittingly, prepared the ground for the excesses of McCarthyism.

THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY. By John C. Stennis and J. William Fulbright. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1971, 139 p. $5.75.

Two prominent legislators debate the nature of the balance between Congress and the President in foreign policy. Stennis, on the whole, approves the present system, but Fulbright diagnoses executive usurpation.

PEACE WITH CHINA? U.S. DECISIONS FOR ASIA. Edited by Earl C. Ravenal. New York: Liveright, 1971, 242 p. $7.50 (Paper, $2.95).

Eighteen scholars and government officials discuss the future of U.S. China policy. The level of discourse is almost uniformly high.

POLITICAL HYSTERIA IN AMERICA: THE DEMOCRATIC CAPACITY FOR REPRESSION. By Murray B. Levin. New York: Basic Books, 1971, 312 p. $8.50.

This fine case study of the "Red Scare" of 1919–20 is used by the author as a searchlight for the illumination of the darker recesses of the American political mind.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DISSENT AND THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR: AN ESSAY ON THE GROUNDS OF PUBLIC MORALITY. By Morton A. Kaplan. New York: Dunellen, 1970, 172 p. $6.95.

A turgidly written but intellectually quite profound exploration of major political dilemmas facing the United States at home and abroad.

THE RESPONSIBLES. By William S. White. New York: Harper and Row, 1972, 275 p. $7.95.

The author emphasizes the positive sides of five American leaders—Truman, Taft, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson—to make the point that the American political system is still capable of producing greatness.

THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES, 1918–1969. By Paul L. Murphy. New York: Harper and Row, 1972, 570 p. $10.00.

A workmanlike though somewhat ponderous history of constitutional evolution in the United States during the past half-century.

The Western Hemisphere

CUBA, CASTRO, AND THE UNITED STATES. By Philip W. Bonsal. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971, 318 p. $9.95.

A former U.S. Ambassador to Cuba has written an eloquent first-hand account of Castroite Cuba and its relations with its northern neighbor. An important conclusion: "There seems . . . no prospect of any fundamental change in Cuban-American relations as long as Castro remains in power."

THE UNITED STATES AND THE TRUJILLO REGIME. By G. Pope Atkins and Larman C. Wilson. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1972, 245 p. $10.00.

A sound study of U.S.-Dominican relations during the era of Trujillo, with appropriate reference to pre-Trujillo developments. The analysis is not parochial, and several conclusions are applicable in regions far from the Caribbean.

THE UNITED STATES IN PANAMANIAN POLITICS: THE INTRIGUING FORMATIVE YEARS. By G. A. Mellander. Danville (Ill.): Interstate Printers and Publishers, 1971, 215 p. $7.95.

This interesting account of the U.S. presence in Panamanian affairs in 1903–08 serves as useful background for current Canal negotiations.

THE MIDDLE BEAT. By Paul P. Kennedy; edited by Stanley R. Ross. New York: Teachers College Press, 1971, 235 p. $8.50.

A *New York Times* correspondent recalls, in broad-ranging and colorful prose, the drama of events in Mexico, Guatemala and El Salvador from 1954 to 1965.

CATHOLICISM AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA. By Frederick C. Turner. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971, 272 p. $8.75.

A competent and scholarly description of current attitudes toward social change currently held by progressive Roman Catholic leaders and their movements. Much use is made of pastoral messages and other ecclesiastical source materials.

UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN SPANISH AMERICA. By Keith Griffin. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1970, 288 p. $10.00.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Believing that underdevelopment is implicit in present national and international structures, the author outlines various proposals for fundamental changes in existing systems.

THE POLITICS OF MEXICAN DEVELOPMENT. By Roger D. Hansen. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971, 267 p. $11.00.

The author criticizes the Mexican Revolution for its failure to diminish the gap between rich and poor, and assigns the principal blame to nineteenth-century, self-seeking entrepreneurial attitudes of the traditional Mexican élite.

THE ILLUSION OF DEMOCRACY IN DEPENDENT NATIONS. By José A. Silva Michelena. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1971, 312 p. $15.00.

The author studies Venezuelan society in depth and predicts a possible revolutionary crisis by 1984 if structural changes are not successfully implemented. The analysis tends to be technical.

Western Europe

MEMOIRS OF HOPE: RENEWAL AND ENDEAVOR. By Charles de Gaulle. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972, 392 p. $10.00.

A translation of the postwar memoirs noted here in July 1971 and in January 1972.

TROIS ÉTUDES: PRÉCÉDÉES DU MÉMORANDUM DU 26 JANVIER 1940. By Charles de Gaulle. Paris: Plon, 1971, 253 p. Fr. 25.50.

Three essays on military themes, written with the General's usual breadth and incisiveness, and an analysis of France's precarious position submitted to her leaders in January 1940.

FRENCH NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY. By Wilfrid L. Kohl. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971, 412 p. $12.50.

A scholarly study of the different stages and purposes of the French nuclear program and of its impact on French relations with other powers.

MAI 1968. By Adrien Dansette. Paris: Plon, 1971, 473 p. Fr. 35.70.

A well-known historian gives us—perhaps for the first time—a reliable historical account and analysis of the events of May. A remarkable achievement, lucid, penetrating and evocative.

TO THE MAGINOT LINE: THE POLITICS OF FRENCH MILITARY PREPARATION IN THE 1920's. By Judith M. Hughes. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971, 300 p. $9.00.

A close and exceptionally perceptive study of the causes and consequences of French military planning in the interwar years. Set in the context of political and psychological realities, based on wide research and revealing interviews, this is a superb and suggestive monograph by a young American historian.

LLOYD GEORGE: A DIARY. By Frances Stevenson; edited by A. J. P. Taylor. New York: Harper and Row, 1972, 338 p. $10.00.

A remarkable work, absorbing and illuminating. Frances Stevenson was both mistress and confidential secretary to Lloyd George—and apparently a model in both roles. An invaluable source on Lloyd George and world events from the First to the Second World War. Clio rejoices at Cupid's success.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MY LIFE. By Sir Oswald Mosley. New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1972, 521 p. $12.95.

The revealing memoirs of an exceptionally intelligent Fascist, intrinsically interesting and a useful reminder that even among Fascists there were variations. A commentary on half a century of history and of men Mosley knew, including Roosevelt, Mussolini and Hitler.

THE BRITISH GENERAL ELECTION OF 1970. By David Butler and Michael Pinto-Duschinsky. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971, 493 p. $15.00.

In the greatest upset since World War II, the Tories won an "unpopularity contest" and this study explains the reasons for the reversal. A fine, literate study of an election and of British politics in general.

THE FAILURE OF ILLIBERALISM: ESSAYS ON THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF MODERN GERMANY. By Fritz Stern. New York: Knopf, 1972, 233 p. $7.95.

A collection of connected essays dealing with the style and substance of German politics from Bismarck to Adenauer. Literate, informative and timely, by an historian writing for the general reader as well as for the specialist.

IN EXILE: ESSAYS, REFLECTIONS AND LETTERS, 1933–1947. By Willy Brandt. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971, 264 p. $9.50.

A moving record of Brandt's thoughts and activities as a young Socialist before, during and immediately after exile. Under the trying conditions of the 1930s and the war, he had already fused idealism with a strong political intelligence.

GERMANY IN OUR TIME: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE POSTWAR YEARS. By Alfred Grosser. New York: Praeger, 1971, 378 p. $12.50 (Paper, $4.95).

A veteran analyst of German affairs presents a comprehensive survey of all aspects of the two Germanys since the war.

DIE DEUTSCH-FRANZÖSISCHEN BEZIEHUNGEN SEIT 1945: MYTHEN UND REALITÄTEN. By Gilbert Ziebura. Pfullingen: Neske, 1970, 200 p. DM. 14.80.

A critical, revisionist perspective on Franco-German reconciliation, its successes and shortcomings. The author, a German political scientist, argues that the relations between the two countries must go far beyond their present stage in order to become truly exemplary.

THE GERMAN REARMAMENT QUESTION: AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND EUROPEAN DEFENSE AFTER WORLD WAR II. By Robert McGeehan. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971, 280 p. $10.00.

A somewhat narrow, scholarly study of America's role in pushing for German rearmament, a decisive and controversial event in postwar developments.

GERMANY'S OSTPOLITIK: RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES. By Lawrence L. Whetten. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1971, 244 p. $6.50 (Paper).

A timely analysis of the immediate origins of Brandt's policies, set in the context of changing power relations between and within the great blocs. A sober perspective on Germany's likely power in the future is included.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PROJECT PAPERCLIP: GERMAN SCIENTISTS AND THE COLD WAR. By Clarence G. Lasby. New York: Atheneum, 1971, 338 p. $8.95.

A broad view of American efforts to capture leading German scientists and bring hundreds of them to this country. Sensibly set against the background of the emergent cold war and based on interviews and government documents, by an American historian.

SECRET CONVERSATIONS WITH HITLER: THE TWO NEWLY-DISCOVERED 1931 INTERVIEWS. Edited by Edouard Calic. New York: Day, 1971, 191 p. $6.95.

Hitler's calculated rantings against Jews, Marxists, foreign powers, and especially against the "rotten bourgeoisie" as delivered to a bourgeois editor. An important source for Hitler's views and tactics before gaining power.

DEUTSCHE REVOLUTION UND WILSON-FRIEDEN. By Klaus Schwabe. Düsseldorf: Droste, 1971, 711 p. DM. 87.

A massive study by a German historian of the changing relations between the United States and defeated Germany, seen in the context of ideological, political and economic factors.

DOCUMENTS OF DESTRUCTION: GERMANY AND JEWRY, 1933–1945. Edited by Raul Hilberg. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971, 242 p. $2.95 (Paper).

Representative documents from all over Europe, illustrating horror, degradation and death. A collection, probably unique, that speaks for itself.

LES COMMUNISTES EN ESPAGNE. By Guy Hermet. Paris: Colin, 1971, 215 p. Fr. 34.

A difficult and unusual topic, handled with surprising mastery: the fate of the Spanish Communist Party during its period of illegality and exile. A useful, perhaps a timely study.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

LET HISTORY JUDGE: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF STALINISM. By Roy A. Medvedev; edited by David Joravsky and Georges Haupt. New York: Knopf, 1972, 566 p. $12.50.

This important book, which the author authorized to have published abroad, is a massive inquiry into the crimes and excesses of Stalinism and a strenuous effort, within the accepted framework of Marxism-Leninism, to analyze the reasons for this fearful phenomenon that held Russia in its grip for a generation. Much of the story will be familiar to the Western reader, but much will not. The first really serious and sustained effort by a Soviet scholar; well edited with useful explanatory material.

A QUESTION OF MADNESS. By Zhores A. Medvedev and Roy A. Medvedev. New York: Knopf, 1971, 223 p. $5.95.

An account by a prominent Soviet biochemist, and his twin brother, of his being diagnosed as an "incipient schizophrenic" and railroaded into a mental institution, for evident political reasons.

STALIN: THE HISTORY OF A DICTATOR. By H. Montgomery Hyde. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1972. 679 p. $12.95.

A lengthy biography reflecting much consultation of available sources but tending to be episodic and anecdotal rather than analytical in its approach to the formidable subject.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE SOVIET UNION UNDER BREZHNEV AND KOSYGIN: THE TRANSITION YEARS. Edited by John W. Strong. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1971, 277 p. $5.95 (Paper, $3.95).

Essays by a number of scholars dealing with various facets of Soviet life and politics in the post-Khrushchev years.

DAS SOWJETISCHE ESTABLISHMENT. By Michael Morozow. Stuttgart: Seewald, 1971, 198 p. DM. 12.

A study of the persons making up the leadership of the Soviet party and bureaucratic hierarchies.

WELTMACHT ZUR SEE: DIE SOWJETUNION AUF ALLEN MEEREN. By Wolfgang Höpker. Stuttgart: Seewald, 1971, 211 p. DM. 12.

A German journalist's alarmed view of the expansion and implications of Soviet sea power.

THE ECONOMICS OF SOVIET MERCHANT-SHIPPING POLICY. By Robert E. Athay. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971, 150 p. $7.50.

An examination of the economic role of the Soviet Union's rapidly expanding merchant-shipping activities.

THE WHITE DEATH. By Allen F. Chew. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1971, 313 p. $12.50.

A historian reviews the Soviet-Finnish Winter War and finds the reality to have been nearly as heroic and remarkable as described in the myths that sprang up about it.

STADIEN DER AUSSENHANDELSVERFLECHTUNG OSTMITTEL- UND SÜDOSTEUROPAS. By Eckhard Weber. Stuttgart: G. Fischer, 1971, 308 p. DM. 48.

A significant study of the evolution of foreign trade patterns in East Central and Southeastern Europe in the years of Soviet hegemony.

A HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACIES: EASTERN EUROPE SINCE STALIN. By François Fejtö. New York: Praeger, 1971, 374 p. $13.50.

A translation of a substantial study, "Histoire des Démocraties Populaires," noted here in October 1969.

6 X SICHERHEIT. By Peter Bender. Cologne: Kiepenheuer (for the Institute for Strategic Studies, London), 1971, 250 p. DM. 12.80.

A study of the individual efforts of the six East European states of the Warsaw Pact to achieve security against various real or perceived threats in the postwar years.

CLASS INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL ORDER. By Frank Parkin. New York: Praeger, 1971, 205 p. $7.00 (Paper, $2.95).

Essays by a British sociologist dealing with some questions of social stratification in both capitalist and socialist societies.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE ABSOLUTE MONOPOLY OF POWER. By Barbara Wolfe Jancar. New York: Praeger, 1971, 330 p. $17.50.

This detailed study of political power in a communist state develops the theme of an "absolute monopoly" of power, not total but exclusive control. The book is centrally concerned with the crisis of 1968.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PRAGUE NOTEBOOK: THE STRANGLED REVOLUTION. By Michel Salomon. Boston: Little, Brown, 1971, 361 p. $8.95.

A French journalist's informal account of what he saw and heard in Prague in 1967–68.

BULGARIAN COMMUNISM: THE ROAD TO POWER, 1934–1944. By Nissan Oren. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972, 293 p. $12.50.

This excellent monograph, which serves as a sequel to Joseph Rothschild's work on the earlier history of Bulgarian communism, follows the development of the Party in the decade leading to the establishment of communist rule in the country at the end of the Second World War.

REVOLUTIONARY BREAKTHROUGHS AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF ROMANIA, 1944–1965. By Kenneth Jowitt. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, 317 p. $12.00.

After a lengthy and rather formal exercise in comparative analysis, the author examines the premises and policies of the Rumanian communist régime from gaining power through the 1960s.

The Middle East and North Africa

ISRAEL: A PERSONAL HISTORY. By David Ben-Gurion. New York: Funk and Wagnall, 1971, 862 p. $20.00.

"Epic history" and a good deal of autobiography. Long excerpts from the author's diaries enrich the documentation. The war of 1948 is covered in detail. The treatment of other important aspects of Israel's history, such as the Sinai-Suez war and the Lavon Affair, is less revealing than readers might expect.

LETTERS TO PAULA. By David Ben-Gurion. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1972, 259 p. $5.95.

Letters written in the period 1919–39 which provide some interesting insights into the future Prime Minister's struggles to establish a Jewish state.

THE UN AND THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES: A STUDY IN NON-TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION. By Edward H. Buehrig. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1971, 215 p. $8.50.

Concentrating on the UNRWA experience as an international agency, the author touches rather lightly on such matters as relations with the Israeli government after 1967 and the role of the camps in the activities of the fedayeen.

A HISTORY OF O.P.E.C. By Fuad Rouhani. New York: Praeger, 1971, 281 p. $17.50.

The establishment, structure and functions of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries—up to its finest hour, the highly successful negotiations with the major oil companies in 1971.

THE MAKING OF AN ARAB NATIONALIST. By William L. Cleveland. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971, 211 p. $8.50.

An excellent biography, describing the trends and forces that nurtured the thought of Satiʿ al-Husri, the most influential ideologist of Arab nationalism.

DIE BAATH-PARTEI. By Horst Mahr. Munich: Olzog, 1971, 181 p. DM. 22.

A competent summary, based on Western sources, of the history and organization of the Baath, mainly in Syria but with some mention of its activities in other Arab states.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA. VOLUME I: THE FIRST YEAR, 1918–1919. By Richard G. Hovannisian. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972, 547 p. $15.00.

The author's previous work, "Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918," was the forerunner to this thoroughly researched description of the tribulations of the ill-fated independent state's first year.

South and Southeast Asia

INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND THE GREAT POWERS. By William J. Barnds. New York: Praeger (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1972, 388 p. $12.50.

A Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Barnds traces the evolution of the antagonisms which have plagued South Asia for the past 25 years. The national policies of India and Pakistan, from their colonial legacy to the present, as well as the interests of outside powers, are objectively evaluated. American policy is considered at length. Barnds concludes with suggestions which seem to offer the best hope for success in dealing with India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, but makes it clear that on the subcontinent success is a relative term.

RADICAL POLITICS IN WEST BENGAL. By Marcus F. Franda. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1971, 287 p. $12.50.

Bengali national sentiment and radical reformist drive have already created a new nation in East Bengal; Franda examines the working out of these same forces in that part of Bengal which lies within India to the west. A painstaking and perceptive analysis of the relations between community, class and political action with some interesting perspectives on the future.

INDIA'S GREEN REVOLUTION: ECONOMIC GAINS AND POLITICAL COSTS. By Francine R. Frankel. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971, 232 p. $7.50.

For anyone who believes that economic development automatically implies social justice and political stability this book is strongly recommended. High-yield strains of wheat and rice may solve the problem of feeding India; but what if only the rich farmer can afford to introduce them? The "green revolution" may have revolutionary and unexpected consequences for Indian society and politics.

WAHLKAMPF IN INDIEN. Edited by Dagmar Bernstorff. Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag, 1971, 379 p.

Fruit of the research of an international team of political scientists in the 1967 Andhra Pradesh elections, this well-documented survey tends to confirm the thesis that caste and community organizations in Indian politics can serve as nuclei to structure democratic competition; and need not, simply because they are traditional forms, obstruct political modernization.

SINGAPORE: THE POLITICS OF SURVIVAL, 1965–1967. By Chan Heng Chee. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1971, 65 p. $3.75.

Singapore's delicate balancing act in the struggle for an autonomous existence, and the development of a community consciousness based on the values of effort, change and multiracial diversity are the themes handled capably in this brief monograph.

WAR OF THE VANQUISHED. By Mieczyslaw Maneli. New York: Harper and Row, 1971, 228 p. $6.95.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The war of the title is Vietnam's, one in which there are no winners. The author, ex-delegate to the ICC from Poland, exiled since 1968 for his excessively liberal socialism, diplomat and professor of law, is admirably qualified to write a frank account.

THE VIETNAMESE REVOLUTION. By Le Duan. New York: International Publishers, 1971, 151 p. $5.95 (Paper, $1.95).

The First Secretary's most recent full-scale report to the ruling party of North Vietnam, this extremely interesting programmatic analysis deals with the problems of combining a successful offensive military strategy and economic, technological and cultural development.

VIETNAMESE ANTICOLONIALISM 1885–1925. By David G. Marr. Berkeley: University of California Press (for the Center for South and Southeast Asia Studies), 1971, 322 p. $12.50 (Paper, $3.65).

A study in cultural and psychological history which traces the deep roots in fact and myth of Vietnamese national feeling and the long struggle to give it political form.

THE MATRIX OF POLICY IN THE PHILIPPINES. By Harvey A. Averch and others. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971, 234 p. $8.00.

AID and the Department of Defense sponsored the aggressively quantitative research reported by the three RAND authors here. They make a fervent case for more statistical analysis in U.S. organizational intelligence. Their own conclusions, adduced to make the point, will convince those who like to look on the bright side: Philippine political life is basically stable, the economy will continue to grow, the crime problem has been overestimated, and the Huks are not a serious threat.

East Asia and the Pacific Ocean

MAO'S GREAT REVOLUTION. By Robert S. Elegant. New York: World Publishing Co., 1971, 478 p. $12.50.

This well-narrated attempt to make sense of China's internal politics suffers from the author's assumption that the actors are motivated solely by power considerations and not at all by those that are ideological or patriotic. Elegant is vivid on Maoist behavior but minimizes—probably wrongly—the significance of Maoist thought.

MAO'S REVOLUTION AND THE CHINESE POLITICAL CULTURE. By Richard H. Solomon. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, 604 p. $16.75.

This ingenious analysis demonstrates that Mao's principal task in reshaping the Chinese polity has been to change the way people think: to make modern men out of traditional. That institutions cannot be changed until attitudes are has been, in most un-Marxist fashion, Mao's guiding principle; this examination suggests that the principle has been correct—but with paradoxical consequences.

LA MONGOLIE ENTRE MOSCOU ET PÉKIN. By Arcady Stolypine in collaboration with Dimitri Stolypine. Paris: Stock. 1971, 238 p. Fr. 32.

An interesting historical and political analysis of the international relations of Mongolia, wedged between the three great Asian powers, Russia, China and Japan. Author's views: conservative, pro-Russian.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE FRAGILE BLOSSOM: CRISIS AND CHANGE IN JAPAN. By Zbigniew Brzezinski. New York: Harper and Row, 1972, 153 p. $5.95.

A quick and imaginative overview of the Japanese situation in the coming years. Predictions: lower rates of economic growth, social instability, political vacillation, great-power status unattainable. The foreign policy analysis is outstanding, the political analysis accurate, but the economic analysis probably is mistakenly pessimistic. A book that should be read.

ARMS, YEN AND POWER: THE JAPANESE DILEMMA. By John K. Emmerson. New York: Dunellen, 1971, 420 p. $15.00.

The Deputy Chief of the U.S. Mission in Tokyo, 1962–67, now retired, brings a third of a century's Asia experience to forecasting the Japanese future. His verdict: more of the same. Salient predictions: that Japan will remain firmly non-nuclear and that "close coördination and consultation between Tokyo and Washington will continue." The first is dubious as long as the nuclear non-proliferation treaty remains unsigned; for the second, "no comment."

KOREA: THE THIRD REPUBLIC. By Kyung Cho Chung. New York: Macmillan, 1971, 269 p. $6.95.

A succinct, well-organized and generally impartial survey of the South Korean political system, plus a passionate plea for reunification. The concrete proposals to this end are unfortunately demonstrated to be unfeasible by the author's own analysis.

AUSTRALIA IN NEW GUINEA. By L. P. Mair. Melbourne University Press, 1970, 254 p. (Portland, Ore.: International Scholarly Book Services, $8.10).

Professor Mair's 1948 classic, now updated, gives the reader an overview of the complex and contradictory evolution of one of the world's last remaining colonial societies. This sober book demonstrates vividly and unemotionally how white man and brown man become each other's burdens.

TO BUILD A NATION. By Park Chung Hee. Washington: Acropolis Books, 1971, 216 p. $10.00.

President Park's book is at once position paper, campaign document and ideological statement: an accurate expression of the values which motivate the present South Korean élite.

ASIA AND THE PACIFIC IN THE 1970s: THE ROLES OF THE UNITED STATES, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND. Edited by Bruce Brown. Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1971, 253 p. A$5.00.

The Australian Institute of International Affairs presents here the position papers and comment from a 1970 conference on ANZUS relations. Generally of a very high quality, the thinking has an honesty of analysis tempered by a bleak concern for a future conceived as increasingly disorderly and uncertain.

Africa

WEST AFRICA'S COUNCIL OF THE ENTENTE. By Virginia Thompson. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972, 313 p. $13.50.

A much-needed survey of the five-country regional grouping dominated by the Ivory Coast. The author is a political scientist at the University of California at Berkeley.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LES DÉCOLONISATIONS EST-AFRICAINES. By Claude Horrut. Paris: Pedone, 1971, 231 p. Fr. 30.

A history of the withdrawal of British authority from Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and Zanzibar, with particular attention to problems of tribe, region, race and separatism. There is an extensive bibliography.

GHANA AND THE IVORY COAST. Edited by Philip Foster and Aristide R. Zolberg. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971, 303 p. $11.50.

An excellent collection of original essays on aspects of politics in the two countries.

NIGERIA: MODERNIZATION AND THE POLITICS OF COMMUNALISM. Edited by Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1971, 680 p. $12.50.

Distinguished Africanists comment on the impact of what Geertz calls "primordial" attachments to modernization and political development. A contribution to the literature on Nigeria as well as to the discipline of political science.

ETHIOPIE D'HIER ET D'AUJOURD'HUI. By André Davy. Paris: Le Livre Africain, 1970, 254 p. Fr. 40.

A general political history from the pre-Axum period to the present.

WE MUST RUN WHILE THEY WALK: A PORTRAIT OF AFRICA'S JULIUS NYERERE. By William Edgett Smith. New York: Random House, 1972, 296 p. $7.95.

Highly readable, this political biography was written by a *Time* correspondent who has reported on East African affairs for a decade.

UJAMAA, ESPOIR DU SOCIALISME AFRICAIN EN TANZANIE. By Sylvain Urfer. Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1971, 239 p. Fr. 27.

Analyzing the ideology of TANU as developed primarily by President Nyerere, the author argues that it constitutes the most comprehensive and distinctively African approach to the problems of building a polity on the continent.

MADAGASCAR. By Nigel Heseltine. New York: Praeger, 1971, 334 p. $11.00.

One of the few English language books on Madagascar, this study is particularly strong in its synthesis of social and economic developments in the period before 1960. The author served as economic adviser to the President of the country.

FRENCH POLICY TOWARDS THE CHINESE IN MADAGASCAR. By Leon M. S. Slawecki. Hamden (Conn.): Shoe String Press, 1971, 265 p. $10.00.

An analysis of the role played by overseas Chinese in the internal politics of colonial Madagascar and in domestic and, more importantly, foreign policy of the Malagasy Republic. Despite the presence of less than one-tenth of one percent Chinese in the island's population, the author argues that their presence has had an important influence on policy.

REVOLUTION IN GUINEA. By Amilcar Cabral. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970, 174 p. $4.95.

Speeches, interviews and statements of the leader of the PAIGC, the liberation movement in Portuguese Guinea which began an armed insurrection in 1963.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOURCE MATERIAL

By Donald Wasson

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C. 20402. *United Nations, International Court of Justice:* United Nations, Sales Section, New York 10017. *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org.* and *Food and Agric. Org.:* Unipub, Inc., P.O. Box 433, New York 10016. *Int. Labor Office:* 917 15th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005. *European Communities:* 2100 M St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037. *Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development:* 1750 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, and Congressional documents, unless otherwise noted, are for the 92nd Congress, 1st Session. New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

Africa

Development prospects and planning for the coming decade with special reference to Africa: report on the Fourth Interregional Seminar on Development Planning, Accra, 4—13 Dec. 1968. New York, 1970. 38 p. (ST/TAO/SER.C/116.)

Asia and Pacific Ocean

Amendment to the Asian Development Bank Act. Report, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, to accompany S. 749, Oct. 14, 1971. Washington, 1971. 10 p. (S. Rept. 92—397.)

Newsman's visit to China: briefing by William Attwood, publisher of *Newsday*. Hearing, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Nov. 3, 1971. Washington, 1971. 33 p.

Repeal Formosa Resolution. Report, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, to accompany S.J. Res. 48, Sept. 21, 1971. Washington, 1971. 6 p. (S. Rept. 92—363.)

Fourth Five Year Plan, 1969–74: summary. New Delhi, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1971. 152 p. Rs. 2.

The Indian Ocean: political and strategic future. Hearings, Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Jl. 20—28, 1971. Washington, 1971. 242 p.

Relief problems in East Pakistan and India. Hearings, Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees, Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, Je. 28–Oct. 4, 1971. Washington, 1971. 3 pts.

United States-Vietnam relations, 1945–1967: study prepared by the Department of Defense . . . for the House Committee on Armed Services. Washington, 1971. 12 v. (Com. Print.) $50.00.

The Pentagon Papers: the Senator Gravel edition. Boston, Beacon Press, 1971. 4 v.

Directing the Secretary of State to furnish to the House . . . certain information concerning . . . an uncontested Presidential election in South Vietnam. . . . Report, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, to accompany H.Res. 632, Oct. 14, 1971. Washington, 1971. 6 p. (H. Rept. 92—567.)

——. Report, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, to accompany H.Res. 638, Oct. 14, 1971. Washington, 1971. 6 p. (H. Rept. 92—568.)

Legislation on the Indochina war. Hearings, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Je. 23–Jl. 12, 1971. Washington, 1971. 283 p.

Privileged resolutions directing the President to furnish the House . . . with the study "United States-Vietnam relationships, 1945–67". Hearing, Committee on Armed Services, House, on H.R. 489 [and others], Je. 28, 1971. Washington, 1971. pp. 5371–5396.

U.S. assistance programs in Vietnam. Hearings, Subcommittee, Committee on Government Operations, House, Jl. 15–Aug. 2, 1971. Washington, 1971. 362 p.

Economy and efficiency of U.S. aid programs in Laos and Cambodia. Hearing, Subcommittee on Government Operations, House, Jl. 12, 1971. Washington, 1971. 133 p.

Atomic Power

Atomic safeguards: a study in international verification, by Alan McKnight. New York, 1971. 301 p. (UNITAR Study, 5.) $6.50.

Prospects for comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. Hearings, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, Jl. 22–23, 1971. Washington, 1971. 153 p.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

—— Staff report . . ., Nov. 1, 1971. Washington, 1971. 9 p. (Com. Print.)

ATOMIC Energy Commission Appropriation Bill, 1972. Hearings, Subcommittee, Committee on Appropriations, House, Apr. 27–May 11, 1971. Washington, 1971. Pt. 4.

——. Act, approved Oct. 5, 1971. Washington, 1971. 12 p. (92-134—H.R. 10090.)

COMMERCIAL POLICY AND TRADE

INTERNATIONAL aspects of the President's new economic policies. Hearings, Subcommittee on International Trade, Committee on Finance, Senate, Sept. 13–Oct. 1, 1971. Washington, 1971. 168 p.

UNITED States international economic policy in an interdependent world. Report . . . by the Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy. Washington, 1971. 394 p. $1.50.

WESTERN Europe and the new economic policy. Report of Sen. Mike Mansfield to the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, Oct. 1971. Washington, 1971. 22 p. (Com. Print.)

TARIFF preferences for developing countries: existing and proposed arrangements, by G.C. Reeves. Washington, United States Tariff Commission, 1971. 166 p.

SUGAR Act amendments of 1971. Conference report, to accompany H.R. 8866, Sept. 28, 1971. Washington, 1971. 21 p. (S. Rept. 92—381.)

——. Act, approved Oct. 14, 1971. Washington, 1971. 11 p. (92–138—H.R. 8866.)

——. Report, Sept. 28, 1971. Washington, 1971. 12 p. (H. Rept. 92—519.)

NORTHWEST Atlantic Fisheries Act amendments. Hearing, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, on H.R. 8791, Je. 10, 1971. Washington, 1971. 66 p.

DEVELOPING NATIONS

UN development aid: criteria and methods of evaluation. New York, Arno Press (for UNITAR), 1971. 135 p. (UNITAR Study, 1.) $9.00.

THE ECONOMIC interest of the industrial countries in the development of the Third World, by David Wightman. New York, 1971. 93 p. (U.N. Centre for Economic and Social Information, Executive Briefing Paper, 5.)

GREAT experiment: science and technology in the Second United Nations Development Decade, by Robin Clarke. N.Y., 1971. 54 p. (71.I.19.) $1.00.

INTERNATIONAL Development Association third replenishment. Report, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, Oct. 14, 1971. Washington, 1971. 12 p. (S. Rept. 92—396.)

——. Special report of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies . . . on the proposed replenishment. . . , Committee on Banking and Currency, House, Je. 30, 1971. Washington, 1971. 67 p. (H. Doc. 92—140.)

ENVIRONMENT

ECE Symposium on Problems Relating to Environment, Prague, 1971. New York, 1971. 386 p. (71.II.E.6.) $6.50.

MAN'S environment and the Atlantic Alliance, by J. R. Huntley. Brussels, NATO Information Service, 1971. 47 p.

1972 U.N. Conference on Human Environment. Suggestions for consideration developed by the Secretary's Advisory Committee on the 1972 U.N. Conference on the Human Environment. Washington, Dept. of State, 1971. 97 p. (International Organization and Conference Series, 97.)

WATER pollution control legislation. Hearings, Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution, Committee on Public Works, Senate, on S. 75 [and others], May 13–Je. 23, 1971. Washington, 1971. Pts. 8–9.

MARINE Protection and Research Act of 1971. Report, Committee on Commerce, with the concurrence of the Committee on Public Works, Senate, to accompany H.R. 9727, Nov. 12, 1971. Washington, 1971. 45 p. (S. Rept. 92—451.)

FINANCIAL POLICY AND EXCHANGE

ACTION now to strengthen the U.S. dollar. Report, Subcommittee on International Exchange and Payments, Joint Economic Committee, August, 1971. Washington, 1971. 19 p. (Jt. Com. Print.)

FOREIGN AID

FOREIGN Assistance Act of 1971. Report, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, to accompany H.R. 9910, Oct. 21, 1971. Washington, 1971. 90 p. (S. Rept. 92—404.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

——. Report, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, to accompany S. 2819, Nov. 8, 1971. Washington, 1971. 30 p. (S. Rept. 92—431.)

——. Report, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, to accompany S. 2820, Nov. 8, 1971. Washington, 1971. 51 p. (S. Rept. 92—432.)

——. Conference report . . . to accompany S. 2819, Dec. 16, 1971. Washington, 1971. 33 p. (S. Rept. 92—590.)

FOREIGN assistance and related programs appropriations. Hearings, Subcommittee, Committee on Appropriations, Senate, Je. 8–Sept. 8, 1971. Washington, 1971. 1429 p.

——. Report, Committee on Appropriations, House, to accompany H.R. 12067, Dec. 6, 1971. Washington, 1971. 45 p. (H. Rept. 92—711.)

AMENDING further the Peace Corps Act. Hearing, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, on H.R. 9166, Jl. 27, 1971. Washington, 1971. 63 p.

——. Act, approved Oct. 8, 1971. Washington, 1971. 1 p. (92–135—S. 2260.)

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY

TOWARD wider acceptance of U.N. treaties, by Oscar Schachter. N.Y., Arno Press (for UNITAR), 1971. 190 p. (UNITAR Study, 2.) $10.00.

SMALL states and territories: status and problems. New York, Arno Press (for UNITAR), 1971. 216 p. (UNITAR Study, 3.) $11.00.

INTERNATIONAL negotiation: the impact of the changing power balance; selected comment. Compiled by the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, Committee on Government Operations, Senate, Jan. 3, 1972. Washington, 1971. 17 p. (Com. Print.)

CONSULTATION and consensus in the Security Council, by F. Y. Chai. New York, 1971. 55 p. (UNITAR Study, PS 4.) $2.50.

THE COLD WAR: origins and developments. Hearings, Subcommittee on Europe, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Je. 7–18, 1971. Washington, 1971. 231 p.

CHANCERIES. Report, Committee on the District of Columbia, House, to accompany H.R. 11490, Nov. 4, 1971. Washington, 1971. 6 p. (H. Rept. 92—611.)

OUTER SPACE

STATEMENTS by Presidents of the United States on international coöperation in space; a chronology: October 1957—August 1971. Prepared for the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Senate, Sept. 24, 1971. Washington, 1971. 126 p. (S. Doc. 92—40.)

SOCIAL QUESTIONS

WORLD plan of action for the application of science and technology to development. New York, 1971. 286 p. (71.II.A.18.) $4.00.

MANPOWER movements and labour markets, by Bernard Kayser. Paris, OECD, 1971. 210 p. $3.75.

THE WORLD heroin problem. Report of special study mission, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, pursuant to H. Res. 109, Je. 22, 1971. Washington, 1971. 46 p. (H. Rept. 92—298.)

THE INTERNATIONAL narcotics trade. Report of special study mission, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, pursuant to H. Res. 143, Oct. 24, 1971. Washington, 1971. 171 p. (Com. Print.)

SEMINAR on Measures to be Taken on the National Level for the Implementation of U.N. Instruments Aimed at Combating and Eliminating Racial Discrimination and for the Promotion of Harmonious Race Relations: Symposium on the Evils of Racial Discrimination, Yaounde, Cameroons, 16–29 June 1971. New York, 1971. 36 p. (ST/TAO/HR/42.)

UNITED NATIONS

UNITED States role in the United Nations system: hearings on recommendations of the . . . Lodge Commission and the Katzenbach Commission. Hearings, Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Oct. 13–14, 1971. Washington, 1971. 85 p.

VIEWS of youth on the United Nations: testimony of U.N. Association Youth Essay Contest winners. Hearings, Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Sept. 23, 1971. Washington, 1971. 30 p.

UNITED STATES

THE PRESIDENT'S new economic program. Hearings, Joint Economic Committee, Aug. 19–Sept. 3, 1971. Washington, 1971. 2 pts.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SCIENCE, technology and the economy. Hearings, Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development, Committee on Science and Astronautics, House, Jl. 27–29, 1971. Washington, 1971. 161 p.

DEPARTMENT of Defense appropriations for fiscal year 1972. Hearings, Subcommittee, Committee on Appropriations, Senate, Mar. 22–Apr. 27, 1971. Washington, 1971. 4 pts.

——. Hearings, Subcommittee, Committee on Appropriations, House, May 17–Sept. 23, 1971. Washington, 1971. Pt. 9.

——. Report, Committee on Appropriations, House, to accompany H.R. 11731, Nov. 11, 1971. Washington, 1971. 139 p. (H. Rept. 92—666.)

——. Report, Committee on Appropriations, Senate, to accompany H.R. 11731, Nov. 18, 1971. 210 p. (S. Rept. 92—498.)

——. Conference report, Dec. 14, 1971. Washington, 1971. 17 p. (H. Rept. 92—754.)

To amend the Military Selective Service Act of 1967. . . . Act, approved Sept. 28, 1971. Washington, 1971. 16 p. (92–129—H.R. 6531.)

ARMS control implications of current defense budget. Hearings, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, Je. 16–Jl. 14, 1971. Washington, 1971. 295 p.

U.S. government information policies and practices—the Pentagon Papers. Hearings, Subcommittee, Committee on Government Operations, House, Je. 23–Jl. 7, 1971. Washington, 1971. 3 pts.

SECURITY classification as a problem in the Congressional role in foreign policy. Prepared by the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, December 1971. Washington, 1971. 41 p. (Com. Print.)

TRANSMITTAL of executive agreements to Congress. Hearings, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, on S. 596, Oct. 20–21, 1971. Washington, 1971. 97 p.

EXECUTIVE privilege: the withholding of information by the Executive. Hearing, Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, on S. 1125, Jl. 27–Aug. 5 1971. Washington, 1971. 635 p.

WESTERN EUROPE

CAPITAL movements in the OECD area: an econometric analysis, by W. H. Branson and R. D. Hill, Jr. Paris, OECD, 1971. 55 p. (OECD Economic Outlook.) $3.80.

THE UNITED Kingdom and the European Communities, presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister. London, HMSO, 1971. 45 p. 25 p.

BERICHT der Kommission für die Reform des Auswärtigen Dienstes, vorgelegt dem Herrn Bundesminister des Auswärtigen. Bonn, n. pub., 1971. 159 p.

THE GREEK case: report of the Commission. Strasbourg, European Commission of Human Rights, n.d. 2 v.

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

DEFENCE in the 70's: White Paper. Ottawa, Minister of National Defence, 1971. 50 p. $1.00.

IN search of balance—Canada's intergovernmental experience. Washington, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1971. 123 p. $1.25.

THE CANADIAN agricultural situation at mid-September, 1971, by A. M. Boswell [and others]. Ottawa, Dept. of Agriculture, 1971. 162 p.

CARIFTA and the new Caribbean. Georgetown, St. Vincent, Commonwealth Caribbean Regional Secretariat, 1971. 143 p.

CONTRIBUTIONS to the IDB Fund for Special Operations. Report, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, to accompany S. 748, Oct. 14, 1971. Washington, 1971. 11 p. (S. Rept. 92—395.)

UNITED States policy towards Cuba. Hearing, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, on S.J. Res. 146 [and others], Sept. 16, 1971. Washington, 1971. 29 p.

PANAMA Canal, 1971. Hearings, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, on H. Res. 74 [and others], Sept. 22–23, 1971. Washington, 1971. 173 p.

II. OTHER PUBLICATIONS

ADELPHI PAPERS. London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971. 75¢ each.

79. Urban guerrilla warfare, by Robert Moss; with an appendix. . . , by Carlos Marighella. 42 p. *80.* Moving the glacier: the two Koreas and the powers, by Morton Abramowitz. 26 p.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AFRIKA SPECTRUM. Hamburg, Deutsches Institut für Afrika-Forschung, 1971. DM. 8.50 each.
No. 3/70. Strategie und Politik im Maghreb. 115 p. *No. 1/71.* Militär in Afrika. 112 p.

AMERICAN LABOR AND THE INDOCHINA WAR: THE GROWTH OF UNION OPPOSITION, by P. S. Foner. N.Y., International Publishers, 1971. 126 p. $1.45.

AMERICAN POLICY FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 1969–1971, by R. J. Pranger. Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1971. 69 p. (Foreign Affairs Study, 1.) $3.00.

ASA MONOGRAPHS. Falls Church, Va., Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Center for Advanced Studies and Analyses, 1971.
7. The impact of developments in the Asian Pacific on South Asia and the Indian Ocean basin, 1972–1984, by James McGarry and Daniel Tretiak. 41 p.

THE BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, by H. H. Schloss. N.Y., New York Univ., Institute of Finance, 1970. 55 p.

THE BEAR AT THE GATE: CHINESE POLICYMAKING UNDER SOVIET PRESSURE, by H. C. Hinton. Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research; Stanford, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1971. 111 p. (AEI-Hoover Policy Study, 1.) $3.00.

BEHIND THE HEADLINES. Toronto, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1970.
Vol. XXX. No. 7–8. Defence in the 70s: comments on the White Paper, by N. Z. Alcock [and others]. 21 p. 75¢.

BUDDHIST POLITICS: JAPAN'S CLEAN GOVERNMENT PARTY, by Arvin Palmer. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1971. 98 p. Gldrs. 16.20.

CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT—LATIN AMERICA'S GREAT TASK: REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, by Raúl Prebisch. N.Y., Praeger, 1971. 293 p.

CHANGING DIRECTIONS OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY, by C. P. Fitzgerald. Melbourne, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1971. 27 p.

COLLOQUE SUR LES PROBLÈMES DE LA CONFERÉNCE EUROPÉENNE POUR LA COOPÉRATION ET LA SECURITÉ. Bucarest, L'Association de Droit International et de Relations Internationales de la République Socialiste de Roumanie, 1971. 166 p.

COMMUNIST CHINA'S POLICY TOWARD LAOS: A CASE STUDY, 1954–67, by Chae-Jin Lee. Lawrence, Univ. of Kansas, Center for East Asian Studies, 1970. 161 p. (International Studies, East Asian Series, 6.)

A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY: NOTES ON THEORIZING, by E. L. Morse. Princeton, Princeton Univ., Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Center of International Studies, 1971. 42 p. (Research Monograph, 36.) $2.50.

CONFERENCE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE: ISSUES FOR THE 1970's. N.Y., Center for Inter-American Relations, 1971. 138 p. $1.25.

DIVERSIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF COFFEE, by Paul Streeten and Diane Elson. N.Y., Praeger, 1971. 101 p.

DOCUMENTATION ON CHINA 1963–1965, ed. by Vimla Saran. New Delhi, Jawaharlal Nehru Univ., School of International Studies, 1971. 346 p. Rs. 20.00.

DOING BUSINESS WITH THE USSR. N.Y., Business International, 1971. 199 p. $107.00.

DOKUMENTATION ZUR ÖSTERREICHISCHEN ZEITGESCHICHTE 1945–1955, ed. by Josef Kocensky. Vienna, Jugend und Volk, 1970. 531 p.

LES ÉCHANGES INTERNATIONAUX (PAYS INDUSTRIALISÉS), by Jacques Bourrinet. Vendôme, Presses Universitaires de France, 1971. 94 p.

ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE. Princeton, Princeton Univ., Dept. of Economics, International Finance Section, 1971. $1.00 each.
90. The choice of a pivot for parities, by John Williamson. 33 p. *91.* The book value of monetary gold, by Fritz Machlup. 24 p.

EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: ASSOCIATIONS AND TRADE AGREEMENTS, by Stanley Henig. London, Chatham House; PEP, 1971. 145 p. (European Series, 19.) £ 1.25.

FOR FURTHER SOCIALIST DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC: DIRECTIVES OF THE PUWP CC FOR THE VI PARTY CONGRESS ADOPTED . . . SEPTEMBER 4, 1971. n.pl., Polish Interpress Agency, 1971. 119 p.

FOR THE WELL-BEING OF US ALL: THE PEOPLE'S CHAMBER OF THE GDR ADOPTS THE LAW ON THE 1971–1975 FIVE-YEAR PLAN. Dresden, Verlag Zeit im Bild, 1971. 46 p.

GAMES FOREIGN POLICY EXPERTS PLAY: THE POLITICAL EXERCISE COMES OF AGE, by L. P. Bloomfield and C. J. Gearin. Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for International Studies, Arms Control Project, n.d. 32 p. (c/71–20.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE GREAT GLOBE TRANSFORMED, by W. E. Griffith. Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for International Studies, 1971.
1. The Sino-Soviet-American relationship. 23 p. *2.* East and Southeast Asia. 21 p. *3.* The Indo-Pakistani crisis. 19 p. *4.* The Middle East. 16. p. *5.* Europe. 23 p.

HEADLINE SERIES. N.Y., Foreign Policy Association, 1971. $1.00 each.
207. Cuba and the U.S., by R. D. Crassweller. 63 p. *208.* Rethinking economic development, by R.d'A. Shaw. 63 p.

THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT: SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL DECISION-MAKING. Prepared for the Secretariat of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment by the International Institute for Environmental Affairs. N.Y., Author, 1971. 31 p.

INDUSTRY AND EUROPE, by Christopher Layton [and others]. London, PEP, 1971. 91 p. £ 1.50.

INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION OF SPACE EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION, by Edward Miles. Denver, Univ. of Denver (for the Social Science Foundation and Graduate School of International Studies), 1971. 51 p. (Monograph Series in World Affairs, Vol. 8. No. 4.)

INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE, 1968, ed. by Zuhair Diab. Beirut, Institute for Palestine Studies, 1971. 510 p.

ISRAEL'S ADMINISTRATIVE CULTURE, by G. E. Caiden. Berkeley, Univ. of California, Institute of Governmental Studies, 1970. 118 p. $2.75.

JAPAN AND NUCLEAR CHINA, by John Welfield. Canberra, Australian National Univ. Press, 1970. 46 p. (Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, 9.)

LESSONS OF VIETNAM: THREE INTERPRETIVE ESSAYS, by D. J. Duncanson [and others]. N.Y., American-Asian Educational Exchange, 1971. 61 p. (Monograph Series, 8.) $1.00.

MACHT UND KOMPROMISS: DIE BEZIEHUNGEN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND ZU DEN VEREINTEN NATIONEN 1956–1970, by E.-O. Czempiel. Düsseldorf, Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag, 1971. 189 p.

THE MAKING OF CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY, by R. B. Farrell. Scarborough, Canada, Prentice-Hall, 1969. 181 p. $5.95.

MINERALS IN THE AUSTRALIAN ECONOMY: CRUDE OIL, by R. D. Freeman and P. Cohen. Melbourne, Committee for Economic Development of Australia, 1971. 28 p. (Supplementary Paper, 35.) A$3.50.

MONOGRAPHS. Washington, Overseas Development Council, 1971.
5. Forces for change in Latin America: U.S. policy implications, by C. I. Bradford, Jr. 67 p. $2.00.

LA NATURE JURIDIQUE DES TRAITÉS CONSTITUTIFS DES ORGANISATIONS INTERNATIONALES, by Sandro Amaducci. Geneva, Graduate Institute of International Studies, 1971. 156 p.

ON THE CABLE. . . . REPORT OF THE SLOAN COMMISSION ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS. N.Y., McGraw-Hill, 1971. 256 p. $2.95.

OUR COURSE: PEACE AND SOCIALISM; COLLECTION OF SPEECHES, by L. I. Brezhnev. Moscow, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1971. 94 p.

THE PHILIPPINES' CLAIM TO SABAH, by M. O. Ariff. Singapore, Oxford Univ. Press, 1970. 76 p.

POLICY PAPERS. N.Y., New York Univ., Center for International Studies, 1970–71. $1.50 each. *Vol. 4. No. 1.* Perspectives past and present: United States relations with mainland China, by R. W. Barnett. 17 p. *Vol. 4. No. 2.* Excess industrial capacity and supplementary economic assistance for developing countries, by Fernando Gasparian and Ingo Walter. 55 p. *Vol. 4. No. 4.* A rationale for international technology assessment: towards an ethical science, by Edward Weisband and T. M. Franck. 40 p. *Vol. 4. No. 5.* A neo-imperialism critique: do the rich nations need the poor? By S. M. Miller and Roy Bennett. 63 p. *Vol. 5. No. 1.* Of Suez, withdrawal and Jarring: the search for a compromise, by Gidon Gottlieb. 21 p.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INDEPENDENT FIJI, by E. K. Fisk. Canberra, Australian National Univ. Press, 1970. 89 p. A$1.95.

THE PRISON DIARY OF HO CHI MINH, trans. by Aileen Palmer. N.Y., Bantam Books, 1971. 103 p. $1.25.

PRODUCTIVITY. Melbourne, Committee for Economic Development of Australia, 1971. 2 v. (Occasional Paper, 16, 17.) A$8.00.

PROSPECTS for Soviet economic growth in the 1970's: main findings of symposium held 14–16th April 1971 in Brussels, ed. by Yves Laulan. Brussels, NATO Information Service, 1971. 156 p.

PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF U.S.-JAPANESE RELATIONS, by Hiroshi Kitamura. Cambridge, Harvard Univ., Center for International Affairs, 1971. 46 p. (Occasional Papers, 28.) $1.75.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DIE SCHWEIZ UND DIE VEREINTEN NATIONEN. Berne, Herbert Lang (for the Schweizerische Gesellschaft für die Vereinten Nationen), 1970. 95 p.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN A UNIVERSAL UNITED NATIONS, by Arthur Hall. N.Y., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1971. 42 p. (Occasional Paper, 11.) $1.00.

SMALL BUSINESS IN JAPAN'S ECONOMIC PROGRESS, comp. by Tokutaro Yamanaka. Tokyo, Asahi Evening News, 1971. 140 p.

SOUTHERN AFRICA: PROPOSALS FOR AMERICANS. N.Y., United Nations Association of the United States of America, 93 p. $1.00.

SPECIAL ANALYSES. Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1971.
6. Soviet military trends: implications for U.S. security, by W. R. Kintner and R. L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. 50 p. $3.00. *7.* Brazil's trotting peg: a new approach to greater exchange rate flexibility in less developed countries, by J. B. Donges [and others]. 36 p. $2.00.

THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, by L. L. Whetten. N.Y., National Strategy Information Center, 1971. 49 p. $1.00.

DAS SOWJETISCH-JAPANISCHE VERHÄLTNIS 1931–1941: AUSWIRKUNGEN AUF DIE ENTWICKLUNGSPOLITIK IN OST- UND SÜDOSTASIEN, by K. S. Krieger. Mainz, Hase & Koehler Verlag (for the Institut für internationale Solidarität), 1970. 78 p. (Schriftenreihe, 11.)

STATE ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES IN TURKISH DEVELOPMENT, by Gustav Schachter and B. C. Cohen. Boston, Northeastern Univ., Dept. of Economics, Research Center, 1971. 27 p. (Research Reports, 32.)

STRUGGLE FOR COOPERATION: THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS SECRETARIAT AND PRO-LEAGUE INTERNATIONALISM IN THE UNITED STATES 1919–1924, by T. L. Deibel. Geneva, Graduate Institute of International Studies, 1970. 155 p.

DER STRUKTURWANDEL DER WIRTSCHAFTSSYSTEME IN DEN OSTEUROPÄISCHEN LÄNDERN, by Ota Šik. Zurich, Verlag der Arche, 1971. 45 p.

TERRITORIAL CLAIMS OF MAO TSE-TUNG: HISTORY AND MODERN TIMES, by A. Kruchinin and V. Olgin. Moscow, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, n.d. 111 p.

THE TEST BAN. Stockholm, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1971. 64 p.

TWO, THREE . . . MANY VIETNAMS: A RADICAL READER . . . ed. by the Editors of *Ramparts* [and others]. San Francisco, Canfield Press, 1971. 272 p. $3.95.

THE UKRAINE AND THE CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS, by Grey Hodnett and P. J. Potichnyj. Canberra, Australian National Univ., Research School of Social Sciences, Dept. of Political Science, 1970. 154 p. (Occasional Paper, 6.)

UNDERSTANDING THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, by John Hein. N.Y., The Conference Board, 1970. 31 p. $3.00.

THE UNITED FRONT IN THAILAND, by D. C. Weatherbee. Columbia, Univ. of South Carolina, Institute of International Studies, 1970. 103 p. (Studies in International Affairs, 8.) $4.00.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: POLICIES FOR A CHANGING ECONOMY. N.Y., Committee for Economic Development, 1971. 75 p. $1.50.

U.S. FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY FOR THE 1970'S: A NEW APPROACH TO NEW REALITIES. Washington, National Planning Association, 1971. 215 p. (Planning Pamphlet, 130.) $2.50.

U.S. IMPORT SURCHARGE AND CANADA, statement by the Canadian-American Committee. Washington, National Planning Association; Montreal, Private Planning Association of Canada, 1971. 10 p.

DIE USA UND DER VIETNAM-KONFLIKT 1964–1967, by C.-C. Schweitzer. Cologne, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1969. 112 p.

VÄRLDSPOLITIKENS DAGSFRÅGOR. Stockholm, Utrikespolitiska Institutet, 1971. Kr. 4.25 each.
8. Tystnad i Turkiet, by J.-O. Pettersson. 32 p. *9.* Kampen för Bangla Desh, by Andres Küng. 32 p.

VIETNAM AND THE SILENT MAJORITY: THE DOVE'S GUIDE, by M. J. Rosenberg [and others]. N.Y., Harper & Row, 1970. 162 p. $1.25.

VOICES OF TOMORROW: THE 24TH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, ed. by Jessica Smith. N.Y., New World Review, 1971. 192 p. $1.95.

THE WORLD DEVELOPMENT PLAN: A SWEDISH PERSPECTIVE, by Ernst Michanek. Stockholm, Almquist & Wiksell (for the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation), 1971. 71 p.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED